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ivABSTRACT
CONSTRAINTS ON THE GENERATION OF REFERRING EXPRESSIONS,
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO HINDI
Rashmi Prasad
Supervisor: Ellen F. Prince
This dissertation makes a progress towards the generation of referring expressions in Hindi.
We ﬁrst make a proposal to exploit a combination of Gricean implicatures (Grice, 1975)
and Centering theory constraints (Grosz et al., 1995) to formulate a generation algorithm
for referring expressions whose domain of application is deﬁned in terms of the Centering
Transitions. The formulated algorithm is an abstraction over the cross-linguistic variabil-
ity observed across languages. To set the language-speciﬁc parameters of the algorithm,
in particular the parameter that decides the relative salience of the discourse entities in an
utterance, we propose a corpus-based methodology to identify the ways in which discourse
salience is realized linguistically in any language. We apply this method to a Hindi cor-
pus to investigate three possible linguistic reﬂexes of discourse salience: grammatical role,
word order, and information status, and show that Hindi does not display exhibit any cor-
relation between discourse salience and either word order or information status, and that
grammatical function emerges as the primary determinant of salience. Using the results
of the proposed methodology for Hindi, we provide an analysis of Hindi zero pronouns.
We argue that the constraints on the use of zeros in Hindi are neither syntactic (Kameyama,
1985) nor explicablepurely in terms of the singular notion of the topic(Butt & King, 1997).
Our analysis, provided in terms of Centering transition preferences, shows that pronouns
can be dropped in Hindi only when they occur in an utterance following a CONTINUE or a
SMOOTH-SHIFT transition, thus demonstrating the importance of the Preferred Center for
zero pronoun realization. Finally, with respect to the problem of deﬁning the utterance unit
vfor discourse, we provide an analysis of complex sentences containing relative clauses.
We argue that different kinds of relative clauses have different utterance statuses as well
as different effects on the hierarchical organization of discourse segments. Non-restrictive
relative clauses form a distinct but embedded utterance unit, while restrictives are part of
the main clause unit. Our data also provide support for partitioning the class of restrictive
relatives into indeﬁnite head and deﬁnite head restrictives (Prince, 1990), with indeﬁnite
head restrictives patterning like non-restrictives.
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Introduction
1.1 The General Problem
Understanding and providing a formal explanation for why natural language users em-
ploy different types of expressions to talk about the things they do, such as objects, events,
states, and propositions, is an important aspect of natural language research. Also of partic-
ular interest within this research area and the focus of much current research in linguistics,
psycholinguistics, and computational linguistics is understanding how and why we use dif-
ferent types of expressions to continue to talk about things once they have been introduced
into the conversation or the discourse. Such expressions, used to talk about previously
mentioned things, are called anaphoric expressions.1 Consider the English text segment
(1), for example. This segment is taken from the middle of a text in which the individuals
“Dr. Macphail” and “Horn” have already been introduced in the text prior to the segment
1There are certain constraints on the (non-)occurrence of anaphoric expressions that are assumed in this
study but which will not be discussed in any detail. These are intra-sentential syntactic constraints imposed
on certain expressions such as reﬂexives and pronouns which are dealt with through principles in Binding
Theory (Chomsky, 1981) and are speciﬁed in terms of locality constraints. The interested reader is referred
to the cited work and related literature.
1shown. The question that is very simply posed is the following: how can we account for
the different expressions – shown in bold face – used in the text segment to talk about “Dr.
Macphail” and “Horn”? We are particularly interested in the alternation between the use
of non-informative forms of expression, such as pronouns and null expressions (
￿ ), and
more informative forms, such as proper names and deﬁnite descriptions.2 The writer is
seen to alternate between using different forms as he progresses through the utterances in
the segment. Related to the question of what it is that governs the choice of such different
forms isalso the problem of formalizing how hearersunderstand the anaphoric expressions,
especially the reduced, non-informative ones such as the pronouns.3
(1) a. Dr. Macphail
￿ , getting out of bed, saw that he
￿ was heavily tattooed. (he
￿ =
Horn)
b. Horn
￿ made him
￿ a sign to come to the verandah.
c. Dr. Macphail
￿ got out of bed
d. and
￿
￿ followed the trader
￿ out.
Somerset Maugham; “Rain”
It canbe seen immediately that the choice of form is not arbitrary. The textin (2), which
repeats the ﬁrst and second utterances from (1), shows that the use of different expressions
in the second utterance than the ones actually used either makes the wrong references (2bi)
or makes the text sound incoherent (2bii).4 In (2bi), where a pronoun is used to refer to
“Dr. Macphail” and another pronoun to refer to “Horn”, we note that, in the absence of
2In this thesis, we exclude pronouns from the class of deﬁnite descriptions. We will also use the term “full
noun phrases” or “ descriptive noun phrase” as covering both proper names and deﬁnite descriptions.
3We will use the term speaker and hearer to mean the communicative participants of a discourse, where
the mode of communication may be written or spoken language, the participants may be single or multiple,
and the communication style may be a monologue or a dialogue.
4We are deliberately using the term “utterance” instead of “sentence” to refer to the linguistic expression
of propositional content, and will continue to do so throughout the thesis. The distinction between the two
2the correct indices, there is a strong tendency to read the utterance with the references
switched from the actual ones, i.e., with the subject pronoun referring to “Dr. Macphail”
and the indirect object pronoun referring to “Horn”, instead of the other way around. It
seems, therefore, that proper reference to the two named individuals in this particular case
requires that one of the NP forms be more informative. At the same time, (2bii) shows
that there seems to be an additional constraint on which of the NP forms can be a pronoun:
using a pronoun to refer to Horn and a proper name to refer to “Dr. Macphail” does get the
references correct, but the text doesn’t seem coherent.5 The third option shown in (2biii),
in which both individuals are referred to with a proper name is the only one that seems like
a reasonably coherent alternative for this particular example.
(2) a. and Dr. Macphail
￿ , getting out of bed, saw that he
￿ was heavily tattooed. (he
￿
= Horn)
b. i. # He made him a sign to come to the verandah.
ii. # He
￿ made Dr. Macphail
￿ a sign to come to the verandah.
iii. Horn
￿ made Dr. Macphail
￿ a sign to come to the verandah.
Such non-arbitrary alternations in referring expression forms are not typical of English
alone. Our goal in this dissertation is to investigate some of the constraints on the choices
in reference form in Hindi, where similar alternations are observed, as shown in (3).6 The
segment in (3a) is taken from the beginning of a text and the ﬁrst utterance of the segment
has a special signiﬁcance in studies of discourse and dialog structure. This will become clear in later chapters.
Also, we assume in this thesis that certain types of coordination of VP’s should be treated structurally as S
coordination, as for the coordination seen across (1c) and (1d). However, we are not concerned here with
providing an account of which kinds of coordination should be treated as VP coordination and which as S
coordination.
5The # sign preﬁxed to the examples indicates contextual/pragmatic infelicity
6ERG=ergative, ACC=accusative, POSS=possessive, SELF=reﬂexive pronoun, INF=inﬁnitive,
LOC=locative.
3thus introduces (i.e., mentions for the ﬁrst time) “the king” (baadshaah) and “the judge”
(qaazii) into the discourse context. The writer continues to talk about these two individuals
in (3bi), using a deﬁnite description to refer to “the judge” and a pronoun to refer to “the
king”.7 Like the English example above, the choice of other forms for the two individuals,
such as the choice of pronouns for both (as in (3bii)), or the choice of a pronoun for “the
judge” and a deﬁnite description for “the king” (as in (3biii)) yields the wrong references
and makes the text incoherent, respectively. Finally, using deﬁnite descriptions for both the
individuals (as in (3biv)) is the only other choice that allows the text to remain acceptable.
(3) a. [ek baadshaah]
￿
[a king]
￿
[ek qaazii]
￿
[a judge]
￿
ko
ACC
bahut
much
maantaa
like-INF
thaa
did
“A king was very fond of a judge.”
b. i. [qaazii]
￿
[judge]
￿
ne
ERG
[uspar]
[him-LOC]
￿
apnii
SELF
vidvataa
knowledge
kaa
POSS
aisaa
such
raNg
color
jamaa
stuck-INF
rakkhaa
place-INF
thaa
had
ki
that
baadshaah
king
use
him
sarvagyaanii
all-knowing
samajhtaa
understand
thaa
did
“The judge had inﬂuenced him with his knowledge so much that the king
thought him to be all-knowing”
ii. # [usne] [uspar] apnii vidvataa kaa aisaa raNg jamaa rakkhaa thaa ...
iii. # [usne]
￿ [baadshaah]
￿ par apnii vidvataa kaa aisaa raNg jamaa rakkhaa
thaa ...
iv. [qaazii]
￿ ne [baadshaah]
￿ par apnii vidvataakaa aisaaraNg jamaa rakkhaa
thaa ...
The seemingly analogous examples from English and Hindi above might suggest that
the same constraints, however they are formulated, will hold for both the languages. How-
ever, research on referring expression form in different languages such as Finnish, German,
7Hindi has null marking for the deﬁnite article.
4Greek, Japanese, Italian, Turkish, Russian etc. has shown that some of the choices in re-
ferring expression form may be governed by constraints that vary cross-linguistically. It
has been suggested that such variation depends mostly on the formal linguistic means that
different languages employ for marking functional roles such as those of topic, empathy,
point of view etc. In other words, the speciﬁcation of the constraints on referring expres-
sion choice may vary from language to language “...depending on the means the language
provides for marking discourse function.” (Walker et al., 1994). In this thesis, we are thus
interested in determining the linguistic correlates of discourse function in Hindi, but specif-
ically those discourse functions that have been isolated in the literature as having an effect
on referring expression form.
1.2 The Model Assumed for Discourse Interpretation and
Anaphoric Reference
The phenomenon of anaphoric reference such as considered in the examples above con-
stitutes only a part of reference phenomena in general. Below, we clarify what we mean
by anaphoric reference within a representation model of discourse interpretation and then
further narrow down the scope of this study as focusing on certain kinds of anaphoric ref-
erence.
In terms of the classiﬁcation found in Prince (1992), we can say that anaphoric refer-
ence is the phenomenon of evoking discourse-old entities (with the arguable exception of
inferrables– see fn. 11), where discourse entities are representations of objects in the world
in our mental representation of the discourse, and are “evoked” in the mental representa-
tion by linguistic expressions.8 Furthermore, the crucial property of such a representational
8In the text of the thesis, we will talk about discourse entities by enclosing them in double quotes, as in
“John”, and the forms used to refer to them will be given in italics, as in John, He, him etc. In the examples,
5model is that the entities evoked in the discourse must be made “accessible” in the repre-
sentation. An informal view of such an entity-based representation is found in Webber
(1978):
￿ “...a discourse model may be described as the set of entities “naturally evoked” by
a discourse and linked together by the relations they participate in. These entities I
will call discourse entities.”
Accessibility of discourse entities is important since they are used to determine the in-
terpretation of anaphoric expressions in the subsequent discourse. In work related to the
interpretation of indeﬁnites, Karttunen (1976) is the ﬁrst to suggest that discourse entities
(called discourse referents by Karttunen) need to be made accessible in the discourse rep-
resentation for subsequent reference. Such an entity-based representational view of the
discourse is also seen in dynamic semantic theories such as the ﬁle change semantics of
Heim (1982) and the discourse representation theory of Kamp (1981) and Kamp & Reyle
(1993).9 We will further assume that the mental representations of entities are those that the
speaker believes the hearer to possess in his/her mind. While all the discourse participants
are guided by their own individual mental representations of the discourse, we are partic-
ularly concerned with the mental representation of the hearer’s knowledge and beliefs that
however, while the forms are still represented as italicized, the discourse entities will not be shown in quotes.
9The representationalapproach takeninDRT hasbeenquestionedby thelaterdynamicapproachessuchas
Groenendijk & Stokhof (1991) which attempt to derive the same context-based interpretations of sentences
without a DRT-like intermediate level of representation. They promote a theory of contextual meaning in
which contexts are semantic objects, not linguistic ones (as the discourse representation structures (DRSs) of
DRT are) and in which theobjects thatare manipulateddynamically are semantic objects, not representations.
They argue that such a theory of meaning can “...remain neutral with respect to the existence and nature of
a language of thought ...” (Groenendijk & Stokhof, 1996) which is what they regard the DRSs as. In this
thesis, we will remain neutral with regard to this question.
6the speaker assumes the hearer to possess during the ongoing discourse. It is this assump-
tion that guides the linguistic choices that the speaker makes (Chafe, 1976; Prince, 1981;
1992).
Building up on and clarifying the general idea prevalent in the literature that discourse
entities are informationally split between old and new (Halliday, 1967; Kuno, 1972; Chafe,
1976; Clark & Haviland, 1977; Prince, 1981), Prince (1992) proposes to view this informa-
tional classiﬁcation in terms of the (speaker’s beliefs about the) hearer’s knowledge “prior
to the discourse” – the hearer-status of entities – and knowledge being shared “during the
ongoing discourse” – the discourse-status of entities. An entity can be then considered as
old or new with respect to either their hearer-status or their discourse-status. An entity is
hearer-new when the speaker believes that the hearer does not know about the entity being
talked about from prior knowledge. Conversely, an entity is hearer-old if the speaker be-
lieves that the hearer does have prior knowledge of the entity mentioned. This difference
brings out the contrast between (4) and (5) in their usual contexts (from Prince (1992)):
(4) I’m waiting for it to be noon so I can call someone in California.
(5) I’m waiting for it to be noon so I can call Sandy Thompson.
Viewed from the point of view of their discourse-status, an entity is discourse-new if it
is evoked for the ﬁrst time in the current discourse, whereas an entity is discourse-old if it
was evoked previously (once or more) in the prior discourse.
These four information-statuses yield three interesting cross-classiﬁcations: hearer-
new&discourse-new,hearer-old&discourse-new,andhearer-old&discourse-old. Hearer-
newentities arealso newinthe currentdiscourseand aretherefore, by deﬁnition, discourse-
new. Hearer-old entities, onthe other hand, may be discourse-newor discourse-old depend-
ing on whether they are mentioned for the ﬁrst time in the current discourse or not.10
10The fourth available cross-classiﬁcation, that is hearer-new & discourse-old is of course not possible.
7In this thesis, then, we will be focusing on studying the constraints on forms used to
evoke discourse-old entities, which as noted above, are also hearer-old. Thus, we will not
be looking at the forms used to evoke hearer-new or discourse-new entities.11 Expressions
evoking discourse-oldentities were showninour ﬁrst example, (1), where theforms usedto
evoke the entities for both “Dr. Macphail” and “Horn” are all non-discourse-initial usages.
In the Hindi example in (3), however, “the king” and “the judge” are both discourse-new
However, note that this claim makes an important assumption about the “shared knowledge” of the discourse
participants in the discourse model. That is, all the discourse participants are assumed to be “present” (phys-
ically or otherwise) for the discourse from the time that it began. There are other kinds of interactional
contexts in which the stated classiﬁcation may be argued to hold, for example, in a dialogue, a person may
walk into an ongoing conversation and thus certain entities which are hearer-new for the new participant
might be argued to be discourse-old. At the same time, however, such a classiﬁcation would depend on what
the discourse model is construed to be for such contexts, that is, whether the discourse model for the new
participant continues to be the one that started when the discourse began before the new participant’s arrival,
or whether a new discourse model gets created, or ﬁnally, whether there are multiple discourse models to be
considered after the arrival of the new participant.
11There is another category of information-status that Prince discusses, namely, that of inferrables, and is
exempliﬁed by her example in (i):
(i) He passed by the Bastille and the door was painted purple.
In (i), the hearer does not have a mental representation for the door in question, but the hearer is assumed
to infer the relation between “the door” and “the Bastille”, and evoke the discourse entity for “the door” via
this inferred relation.
Prince notes that it is “...difﬁcult to collapse inferrables with any of the mentioned statuses. On the one
hand, inferrables are like hearer-old entities in that they rely on certain assumptions about what the hearer
does know, e.g., that buildings have doors, and they are like discourse-old entities in that they rely on there
being already in the discourse model some entity to trigger the inference. On the other hand, inferrables are
like hearer-new entities (and therefore discourse-new) in that the hearer is not expected to already have in his
or her discourse model the entity in question.” (Prince, 1992)
Because of the problem with classifying inferrables into one or the other informational categories, we will
put the study of the referring forms for inferrables outside the scope of this study.
8entities in the ﬁrst sentence. They are discourse-old when they are evoked again in the
subsequent sentence.
In investigating correspondences between all of her proposed information-statuses and
linguistic form, Prince (1992) notes about the form of discourse-old entities that pronouns
are highly probable indicators of this discourse status.12 However, she also points out that
“...while the use of a pronoun probably entails that the entity it represents is discourse-
old, an entity’s status as discourse-old does not entail that it will be represented by a pro-
noun” (Prince, 1992). In particular, deﬁnite noun phrases of all kinds can be used to evoke
discourse-old entities. This point brings us back to our examples (1) and (3) again, where
the NP forms used to evoke the discourse-old entities are seen to be either proper names,
deﬁnite descriptions, pronouns, or null forms.
1.3 Discourse Entity Types and the Scope of this Study
We have already noted that we are not focussing on syntax-driven locality constraints on
referring expression form (see fn. 1.). In addition, the scope of anaphoric reference in this
study is restricted further in the following sense: as noted and described exhaustively in
Webber (1978), discourse entities can be of various kinds. They can be representations of
objects, individuals, events, states, properties, propositions etc. Furthermore, it is possible
to evoke these entities with different types of linguistic expressions, such as noun phrases,
verb phrases, sentences, etc. In this study, we will restrict ourselves to entities evoked by
noun phrases. Needless to say, a complete understanding of what motivates the variation
between all the different forms in any language is obviously desirable, but it is beyond the
12Note that pronouns can even be used for inferrables, as shown in (1).
(1) Mix the ﬂour with the water and knead it
9scope of the current study.
1.4 Cognitive Activation and Referring Expression Form
Various approaches and accounts have been proposed within research in discourse inter-
pretation to explain the reference phenomena as described above from the point of view
of natural language generation and interpretation. While they differ to varying degrees in
the exact formulation of the constraints, they all agree on one key idea, namely, that the
use of different forms must be explained in terms of some kind of “cognitive activation”.
This notion has been given different labels in the literature, such as prominence, activation,
accessibility, focus, salience, etc. However, some of these approaches attempt to establish
correlations between reference form and degree of activation that covers reference phe-
nomena more general than the one considered here. The relationship in these approaches is
presented as a hierarchy, such as in those of Giv´ on (1983), Ariel (1990), and Gundel et al.
(1993). The basic idea of the hierarchy-based correlation proposed by these approaches
is that pronominal forms are used for the most highly activated entities in the discourse
whereas deﬁnite NP forms are used for less activated ones.13 In this study, we will adopt
the notion of cognitive activation explicated in “Centering theory” (Grosz et al., 1983;
1995), which grew out of the work on focusing and discourse structure (Grosz, 1977;
Grosz & Sidner, 1986), on focusing for the interpretation of pronouns (Sidner, 1979), and
on the relationship between complexity of inference and the (local) discourse structure
(Joshi & Kuhn, 1979; Joshi & Weinstein, 1981). Below, we describe the Centering model,
how it formalizes the notion of cognitive activation, and how it attempts to account for
choices in referring expression form.
13See Arnold (1998) and Eckert (1998) for detailed discussion of these approaches.
101.5 Centering Theory
1.5.1 Discourse Coherence, Cohesive Devices, and Centering
Centering theory is built around the view that aspects relating to the meaning of a discourse
can be described in terms of its coherence. So in answer to the general question of what
it means to understand a discourse, it could be said that a discourse is understood when
all parts of the discourse are perceived as related to each other. This perception of con-
nectedness makes the discourse coherent, and when coherence is perceived, the meaning
of the discourse is understood. The next question to ask, then, is how is such coherence
perceived? That is, what kinds of cohesive devices (Halliday & Hasan, 1976) are used to
establish coherence? Also, how are these cohesive devices realized in natural language?
Centering theory deals with one kind of cohesive device, namely, focus/center of atten-
tion. Thus, one kind of coherence is viewed as resulting from the ability to perceive what
a discourse is about. The theory also deals with the way the focus of attention is realized
and perceived linguistically, namely with referring expressions. Thus, in keeping with the
issues related to discourse coherence mentioned above, the goal of Centering theory is to
relate center of attention, choice of referring expression form, and the perceived coherence
of utterances in the discourse segment (to be clariﬁed below). The notion of cognitive acti-
vation that we discussed in Section 1.4 corresponds to the center of attention in Centering.
We will show below how this notion of the center of attention is correlated with the form
of referring expressions.
The notion of the “discourse segment” comes from the assumption made in Centering
theorythat discourseshaveastructure, withthreecomponents(Grosz& Sidner, 1986). One
of these components, the linguistic structure (the others being intentional structure, and
attentional state), serves to divide the discourse into constituent discourse segments, which
mayhaveembeddingrelationshipsbetween them. Coherence, then, iscomputed atthelevel
11of thediscoursesegment, withinas wellas across thesegments. That is, discoursesegments
exhibit both local coherence – i.e., coherence among the utterances in that segment – and
global coherence – i.e., coherence with other segments in the discourse. The structure
determined by attentional state, which is built from the center of attention as a cohesive
device, also operates at the local (within the discourse segment) as well at the global level
(across discourse segments).
Centering theory is a model of the local-level component of attentional state. As stated
above, Centering theory is concerned with establishing the role of the attentional state as
a cohesive device, and with explicating the linguistic realization of the attentional state as
referring expressions. In addition, Centering theory makes a further claim that coherence
is not an absolute property of discourse, but is rather gradable. That is, different discourses
may have different degrees of coherence. This idea is based on earlier work (Joshi & Kuhn,
1979; Joshi & Weinstein, 1981) that was the precursor to Centering where the degree of co-
herence was correlated with the inference load on the hearer, or the perceiver of coherence.
Based on this, Centering theory further claims that the structure of the attentional state, as
well as the linguistic form of this cohesive realization, with referring expressions, affects
the amount of inference load placed on the hearer, and thus also the degree of coherence of
the discourse segment.
The idea of attentional state, or the center of attention, relates to the idea that speakers
and hearers have their attention centered (or focussed) on certain entities at any given point
of the discourse. At the global level, the centered entities, which may be one or more,
are those that are relevant to the overall discourse and are determined by the intentional
structure of the discourse (Grosz, 1977). At the local level, which pertains to utterance
by utterance processing within the discourse segment, speakers’ and hearers’ attention is
centered on a single entity. This centering of attention on a single entity at any given
point in the discourse segment is the underlying premise of Centering theory, and it is
12also the basis for the focusing model of Sidner (1979) and the model of complexity of
inference in Joshi & Kuhn (1979) and Joshi & Weinstein (1981). In Sidner’s model, such
centering was used as a means to identify the referents of anaphoric expressions, whereas
in the complexity model of Joshi et al., centering was used to show how the meaning of an
utterance is integrated into discourse meaning.14
Centering theory was also motivated by the idea that modeling the center of attention,
or the attentional state, allowed for limiting the number of inferences required for discourse
interpretation. In Sidner’s model, for example, centering was seen as providing a structured
source for the interpretation of anaphors, and inference rules were applied in her algo-
rithm only to conﬁrm or reject a selected co-speciﬁer (Sidner’s term for antecedent). Such
an approach was crucially contrasted with purely inference based systems (Hobbs, 1976;
Charniak, 1972; Reiger, 1974) for anaphor interpretation, in which the process is simply
too uncontrolled and complex. Joshi et al. used the notion of centering to determine an
almost monadic predicate representation of an utterance in discourse which they used to
reduce the complexity of inference.
1.5.2 Coherence and Attentional State
The relationship between centering of attention and coherence derives from the idea that
coherence between utterances in the discourse segment is inﬂuenced in part by the degree
of continuity in what the segment is about. Each utterance in the discourse segment is
“about” one particular entity, and this “being about” one particular entity captures the idea
discussed above that speakers’ and hearers’ attention is centered on one particular entity
at any given point. Differences in the coherence of segments is affected by differences
in continuity exhibited by successive utterances in terms of their “aboutness” of a given
14Sidner actually uses the term discourse focus for the centered entity, which was abandoned in its adapta-
tion within Centering theory because of the potential confusion of the term with its other uses in the ﬁeld.
13entity. If successive utterances continue to be about the same entity, they will be more co-
herent as opposed to successiveutterances that shift from being about one entity to another.
The examples in (6) and (7) (from Grosz et al. (1995)) illustrate the relationship between
coherence and aboutness/centering.
(6) a. John went to his favorite music store to buy a piano.
b. He had frequented the store for many years.
c. He was excited that he could ﬁnally buy a piano.
d. He arrived just as the store was closing for the day.
(7) a. John went to his favorite music store to buy a piano.
b. It was a store John had frequented for many years.
c. He was excited that he could ﬁnally buy a piano.
d. It was closing just as John arrived.
Discourse (6) is more coherent than discourse (7). Centering explains this difference as
arising from different degrees in continuity in what the discourse is about. Discourse (6)
centers around a single entity, whereas discourse (7) seems to ﬂip back and forth among
several different entities. That is, whereas discourse (6) is clearly about “John”, discourse
(7) has no single clear center of attention. (7a) seems to be centered on “John”, but after
that the center seems to shift to “the store” (7b), then back to “John” again (7c), and then
againto “the store”(7d). Thisconstant shiftingof the centeriswhat makes(7) lesscoherent
compared to (6).15
15However,note that while shifting the center constantly from one entity to another degradesthe coherence
of a discourse, maximal coherence in a discourse in a discourse of extended length may be intentionally
avoided because it may become monotonous.
141.5.3 Coherence and Referring Expression Form
Centering theory also relates the degree of coherence between utterances to the inference
load placed on the hearer due to the speaker’s choice of linguistic form to realize the same
propositional content. Choices in linguistic form have to do with the syntactic form of the
utterances as well as the form of referring expressions. According to Centering theory,
pronouns and deﬁnite descriptions, for example, place different inference demands on the
hearer. Consider for example the following discourse (from Grosz et al. (1995)) in (8).
(8) a. Terry really goofs sometimes.
b. Yesterday was a beautiful day and he was excited about trying out his new
sailboat.
c. He wanted Tony to join him on a sailing expedition.
d. He called him at 6am.
e. He was sick and furious at being woken up so early.
The use of the pronoun in (8e) to refer to “Tony” is confusing. According to Centering
theory, this is explained by the fact that through utterance (8d), “Terry” has been the center
of attention and hence is the most likely referent of he in utterance (8e). It is only when
the word sick is processed and the inference is made that it is unlikely that “Terry” is the
one who is sick (since he is eager to go on a sailing expedition) that the interpretation
of the pronoun is shifted from “Terry” to “Tony”. A much more natural sequence results
if a proper name is used for “Tony”, as shown in (9). While the segment still displays
low coherence in (9) because of the sudden shift that the hearer needs to make in his/her
center of attention from “Terry” to “Tony”, it is still better than (8) in that the hearer has
to make one less inference, namely, the one related to the interpretation of the pronoun.
Furthermore, unlike (8), there is also no garden path resulting from this discourse.
15(9) a. Terry really goofs sometimes.
b. Yesterday was a beautiful day and he was excited about trying out his new
sailboat.
c. He wanted Tony to join him on a sailing expedition.
d. He called him at 6am.
e. Tony was sick and furious at being woken up so early.
Note, however, that the unnaturalness of (8) is due also to the fact that both the entities
“Terry” and “Tony” are ambiguous with respect to their grammatical features of person,
number and gender. If “Tony” were replaced by a female entity “Antonia”, the use of a
pronoun in the (e) utterance would be quite natural, as shown in (10).
(10) a. Terry really goofs sometimes.
b. Yesterday was a beautiful day and he was excited about trying out his new
sailboat.
c. He wanted Antonia to join him on a sailing expedition.
d. He called her at 6am.
e. She was sick and furious at being woken up so early.
According to Centering, such a discourse would still be less coherent than (8)because it
wouldstillinvolveashiftinthe centerofattention from“Terry” to“Antonia”, butCentering
does not say anything about why it sounds much better than (9). In Chapter 2, we account
forthe differencebetween the three discourses shownhere within our generation algorithm.
1.5.4 Centering Deﬁnitions and Constraints
The basic deﬁnitions and assumptions of Centering theory are shown in Figure 1.1.
16(1) Each utterance U
￿ in a discourse segment, U
￿ ,...,U
￿ , evokes a set of discourse
entities which are called the forward-looking centers, C
￿ ’s, of that utterance.
(2) Utterances other than the segment initial utterance have a Backward-looking Cen-
ter, C
￿ .
(3) The C
￿ of an utterance U
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ connects with one of the C
￿ ’s of utterance U
￿ .
(4) The set of forward-looking centers,
￿ C
￿
￿
￿ , is partially ordered according to dis-
course salience.
(5) The highest ranked member of
￿ C
￿
￿
￿ is referred to as the Preferred Center, C
￿
Brennan et al. (1987).
(6) The more highly ranked an element of
￿ C
￿ (U
￿ )
￿ , the more likely it is to be the
C
￿ (U
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ).
(7) The most highly ranked element of
￿ C
￿ (U
￿ )
￿ that is realized in U
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ is, by deﬁni-
tion, the C
￿ (U
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ).
Figure 1.1: Centering Deﬁnitions
The Backward-looking Center represents the discourse entity that the utterance most
centrally concerns, and is similar to what has been elsewhere called the topic (Strawson,
1964; Reinhart, 1981; Horn, 1986). Centering further stipulates that each utterance U
￿ has
at most Backward-looking Center. This captures the claim of Joshi & Kuhn (1979) and
Joshi & Weinstein (1981) that discourses have a monadic tendency, i.e., the tendency to be
about one thing at a time. This claim has also received psycholinguistic support (Hudson-
D’Zmura, 1988; Gordon et al., 1993) in the literature.
The term realizes (in Deﬁnition 7) is deﬁned as follows16: an utterance U realizes a
center c if c is an element of the situation described by U, or if c is the semantic interpre-
tation of some subpart of U. Thus, the relation realizes describes pronouns, zero pronouns,
explicitly realized discourse entities, and those implicitly realized centers that are entities
16The use of the term draws on notions from situation theory (Barwise, 1999).
17inferrable from the discourse situation (Prince, 1981; 1992).
The determination of the Backward-looking Center of an utterance depends crucially
on the ranking of the forward-looking centers of the previous utterance in the segment. A
number of factors play a role in determining this ranking. We will discuss this point fur-
ther below. However, it is important to note here that it is the C
￿ list ranking/ordering that
is argued to be the primary basis for the cross-linguistic variation in referring expression
form. In the original Centering formulation, which was based on examples from English
discourses, it was assumed that the ranking of the forward-looking centers was structurally
determined in large part by the grammatical roles of the expressions that realized the cen-
ters. In the rest of this section, we will rank the C
￿ list according to grammatical role for
expository purposes.
To capture the relationship between the degree of aboutness (of a single entity) of a
discourse segment and the coherence of the segment, Centering deﬁnes three types of
Transition relations across pairs of utterances, which was later extended to four types in
Brennan et al. (1987). We present the extended Transition types below. The Transitions,
shown in Table 1.1, are determined by two factors: whether the C
￿ (U
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ) is the same as the
C
￿ (U
￿ ) or not, and whether the C
￿ (U
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ) is the same as the C
￿ (U
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ) or not. The different
Transition types capture or reﬂect the degree(s) to which discourse segments or sequence
of utterances continue to be about the same entity. For example, a CONTINUE Transition
reﬂects the fact that speakers center on the same entity across an utterance pair and will
most likely continue to center on the same entity in the subsequent utterance. A RETAIN
Transition reﬂects the fact that while being centered on the same entity from one utterance
to the next, the speaker’s attention will most likely shift to another entity in the subsequent
utterance. In a SMOOTH-SHIFT Transition, the speaker actually shifts the center to a dif-
ferent entity than the previous utterance and creates an expectation that s/he will continue
to talk about this new entity. Finally, in the ROUGH-SHIFT Transition, the speaker shifts
18the center to a different entity than in the previous utterance, but at the same time does not
create an expectation of further continuation of centering. ROUGH-SHIFT Transitions have
been argued in the literature to be one of the indicators of discourse segment boundaries.
C
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￿
￿
￿
￿ ) = C
￿ (U
￿ ) C
￿ (U
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ )
￿
￿ C
￿ (U
￿ )
OR C
￿ (U
￿ ) = [?]
C
￿ (U
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ) = C
￿ (U
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ) CONTINUE SMOOTH-SHIFT
C
￿ (U
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ )
￿
￿ C
￿ (U
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ) RETAIN ROUGH-SHIFT
Table 1.1: Transitions in the Centering Model
The use of different types of Transitions are illustrated by the discourse (from Grosz
et al. (1995)) in (11).
(11) a. John
￿ has been having a lot of trouble arranging his vacation.
b. He
￿ cannot ﬁnd anyone to take over his responsibilities.
[C
￿ = John; C
￿ =
￿ John, ...
￿ ; Tr = CONTINUE]
c. He
￿ called up Mike
￿ yesterday to work out a plan.
[C
￿ = John; C
￿ =
￿ John, Mike, ...
￿ ; Tr = CONTINUE]
d. Mike
￿ has annoyed him
￿ a lot recently.
[C
￿ = John; C
￿ =
￿ Mike, John
￿ ; RETAIN]
e. He
￿ called John
￿ at 5 am on Friday last week. (he = Mike)
[C
￿ = Mike; C
￿ =
￿ Mike, John, ...
￿ ; Tr = SHIFT]
Utterance (11b) establishes “John” as both the C
￿ as well as the most highly ranked
element of the C
￿ list. In utterance (11c) “John” continues as the C
￿ , but in utterance (11d)
he is only retained; “Mike” has become the most highly ranked element of the C
￿ . Finally,
in utterance (11e) the Backward-looking Center shifts to being “Mike”.
Centering stipulates two constraints, one on center realization and the other on center
movement. The ﬁrst constraint, given below as Rule 1, is the only constraint in Centering
theory that explicitly inﬂuences the choice of reference form.
19￿ Rule 1: If some element of C
￿ (U
￿ ) is realized as a pronoun in U
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ , then so is the
C
￿ (U
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ).
This constraint stipulates that no element in an utterance can be realized as a pronoun
unless the Backward-looking Center of the utterance is realized as a pronoun also. Rule 1,
sometimes called the pronoun rule, represents one function of pronominal reference: the
use of a pronoun to realize the C
￿ signals to the hearer that the speaker is continuing to talk
about the same thing. Note that Rule 1 does not preclude using pronouns for other entities
so long as the C
￿ is realized with a pronoun.
From Rule 1 it follows that if there are multiple pronouns in an utterance (both of
which realize entities from the previous utterance), then one of these must be the C
￿ . It
also follows from this same rule that if there is only one pronoun in an utterance, then this
pronoun must be the C
￿ .
A violation of Rule 1 occurs if a pronoun is not used for the Backward-looking Center
when some other entity is realized by a pronoun. Such a violation occurs in the following
sequence in (12), which is presumed to be in a longer segment currently centered on John.
(12) a. He
￿ has been acting quite odd lately.
[C
￿ = John (he); C
￿ =
￿ John
￿ ]
b. He
￿ called up Mike
￿ yesterday.
[C
￿ = John; C
￿ =
￿ John, Mike
￿ ; Tr = CONTINUE]
c. John
￿ wanted to meet him
￿ urgently.
[C
￿ = John; C
￿ =
￿ John, Mike
￿ ; Tr = CONTINUE]
The violation of Rule 1 leads to the incoherence of the sequence. The only possible
interpretation is that the “John” referred to in (12c) is a second person named John, not
the one referred to earlier in the sequence. However, even under this interpretation the
sequence is very odd.
20It is important to realize that Rule 1 constrains the realization of the most highly ranked
element of the C
￿ (U
￿ ) that is realized in U
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ given that pronominalization is used. Obvi-
ously any entities realized in U
￿ that are not realized in U
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ , including the C
￿ (U
￿ ) as well
as the highest ranked element of C
￿ (U
￿ ), do not effect the acceptabilityof Rule 1. Likewise,
if no pronouns are used, then Rule 1 is not applicable.
The second constraint is given by Rule 2 below:
￿ Rule 2: Sequences of continuation are preferred over sequences of retaining, and
sequences of retaining are to be preferred over sequences of shifting.
Rule 2 reﬂects the intuition that continuation of the center and the use of retentions
when possible to produce smooth transitions to a new center provides a basis for local
coherence. In a locally coherent discourse segment, shifts are followed by a sequence of
continuations characterizing another stretch of locally coherent discourse. Frequent shift-
ing leads to lack of coherence as was illustrated by the contrast between Discourse (6) and
Discourse (7).
1.6 Outline of the Dissertation
Our ﬁrst goal in this thesis, which is subject of Chapter 2, is to discuss the limitations of
Centering theory in terms of providing an explanation for a wide range of alternations in
the use of referring expression forms. As we discussed in Section 1.5.3, the only con-
straint on referring expression form formulated within Centering theory is in the encoding
of Rule 1. However, this rule can only be applied to a restricted set of cases. The goal of
this chapter is to explicitly specify constraints on the generation of referring expressions.
These constraints borrow ideas only implicitly stated in Centering theory and also draw
on ideas relating to Gricean principles of interpretation (Grice, 1975). In doing this, we
are interested in showing that these constraints can be applied to understanding referring
21expression phenomena in a wide variety of cases. In addition, the constraints can also be
used for modeling referring expressions in generation systems. And ﬁnally, as we will see
in the remaining chapters, they can also be applied to specify general and language-speciﬁc
parameters within Centering theory so that the theory can itself then be usefully applied to
different languages.
In Chapter3, wepresent astudyof referringexpressions inHindi. Languageshavebeen
shown to vary with respect to the constraints that govern the use of referring expressions,
and one of the sources of variation lies in the different means that languages have at their
disposal for the marking of discourse salience. In other words, we need to determine how
to rank the forward-looking centers list of an utterance at any given point of the discourse.
Centering constraints, as well as the generation constraints that we formulate in Chapter 2,
can only be applied to a language after this language-speciﬁc parameter has been set. In
this chapter, we ﬁrst present a corpus-based language-independent methodology that will
allow us to identify the structural linguistic factors that determine the relative salience of
discourse entities in an utterance. The methodology exploits a speciﬁc formulation of Rule
1 of Centering without being circular in its application. We apply this method to a Hindi
corpus and investigate the effect of three factors on discourse salience: grammatical role,
word order, and information status. The results of our study show that Hindi, despite being
a free-word order language, does not display any effect of word order on salience. Free
word order in languages like German has been argued to have an effect on salience (Ram-
bow, 1993). Our results thus bring out a signiﬁcant contrast between Hindi and German,
in that it calls for viewing scrambling or other word order phenomena across the two lan-
guages differently, at least to the extent that the same syntactic form does not necessarily
map onto the same discourse function in the two languages. Information status has also
been argued, most notably in Strube (1998), to affect discourse salience. The initial results
in Strube (1998) were based on evidence from German, and was later extended to be a
22universal factor. However, results from our Hindi corpus show that the information status
of discourse entities does not exhibit any salience affecting characteristics, suggesting a
reassessment of the universality claim with respect to information status. For Hindi, then,
grammatical role emerges as the most signiﬁcant factor.
In the same chapter, following the results obtained from the application of the method-
ology above, we use the grammatical role as the primary ranking in Hindi to provide an
analysis of the use of Hindi zero pronouns. Contrary to earlier proposals, we argue that
the constraints on the use of zeros in Hindi are neither syntactic (Kameyama, 1985), nor
explicable purely in terms of the singular notion of the topic, especially one that is deﬁned
syntactically (Butt & King, 1997). Our study is conducted within the Centering framework,
using the Hindi-speciﬁc ranking results, and the analysis is provided in terms of Centering
Transition preferences. We show that pronouns can be dropped in Hindi only when they
occur in an utterance following a CONTINUE or a SMOOTH-SHIFT Transition, thus demon-
strating the importance of the preferred center, the
￿
￿
￿ , for zero pronoun realization. We
also formulate a zero pronoun rule that must be used in tandem with the rules for overt
pronoun interpretation or generation in Hindi.
In conducting the corpus analysis to identify the linguistic determinants of salience,
one of the ﬁrst issues we faced was that of specifying the utterance unit for local discourse
processing. In the model of discourse interpretation that is assumed here, discourses are
composed of utterances and discourse entities are added to the discourse representation
when the utterance they are part of is syntactically and semantically processed. The ques-
tion then is, what constitutes the utterance? Is it the sentence, or some smaller unit like the
tensed clause? Is the representation of the utterances in the discourse model hierarchical?
If so, what determines the hierarchical discourse representation of the ongoing discourse?
These are issues that have been explored extensively in previous research. However, there
is no consensus yet reached. In order to continue with the work presented in this thesis,
23however, we adopted what we believed to be the correct results from the literature, with
different assumptions coming from different research sources. In Chapter 4, however, we
present an analysis of the utterance status of complex sentences containing relative clauses
since no extensivework on relativeclause containing sentences is available (except for sug-
gestions made in Kameyama (1998) and Hurewitz (1998)). With respect to relative clause
sentences, we argue that different kinds of relative clauses have different effects on the hi-
erarchical organization of discourse segments. Using anaphoric evidence from discourse,
we ﬁrst show that non-restrictive relative clauses pattern differently from restrictive rela-
tive clauses, and we argue that non-restrictives, but not restrictives, should form a distinct
but embedded utterance unit. For restrictive relative clauses, however, we motivate a fur-
ther partitioning between indeﬁnite head restrictives and deﬁnite head restrictives, so that
the indeﬁnite head restrictives are grouped together with the non-restrictives with respect
to their utterance status, i.e., as forming a distinct but embedded utterance unit. Our ap-
proach towards the treatment of relative clauses in discourse is in line with the approach
seen in syntactic accounts (Demirdache, 1991) and other discourse accounts (Prince, 1990)
of relative clauses for English and Yiddish.
24Chapter 2
Formulation of Constraints for
Generating Referring Expressions
In Chapter 1, we described the Centering model (Grosz et al., 1983; 1995), discussing how
the model formalizes the notion of cognitive activation as the attentional state of speakers
and hearers and establishes relationships between attentional state and discourse coherence
on the one hand and between discourse coherence and the form of referring expressions on
the other hand.
Apart from the Rule 1 constraint, however, Centering does not explicitly tell us much
more about how speakers are guided in their use of referring expression forms. Rule 1
imposes a constraint on the form of the Backward-looking Center in a restricted set of
contexts:
￿ Rule 1 Constraint on Referring Expression Form:
If some element of C
￿ (U
￿ ) is realized as a pronoun in U
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ , then so is the C
￿ (U
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ).
Rule 1 makes the prediction that, in the discourse in (13), (13ci) sounds much better
than (13cii). (13cii) is less coherent since the Backward-looking Center, “John”, is not
25pronominalized whereas some other entity, “Mike”, is. It is important to note that both
(13ci) and (13cii) instantiate a CONTINUE Transition, so that the Rule 1 constraint in this
case operates independently of the type of Transition.
(13) a. He
￿ has been acting quite odd lately. (He
￿ = John)
[C
￿ = John (he); C
￿ = John]
b. He
￿ called up Mike
￿ yesterday.
[C
￿ = John (he
￿ ); C
￿ = John; Tr = CONTINUE]
c. i. # John
￿ wanted to meet him
￿ urgently.
[C
￿ = John; C
￿ = John; Tr = CONTINUE]
ii. He
￿ wanted to meet him
￿ quite urgently.
[C
￿ = John (He
￿ ); C
￿ = John; Tr = CONTINUE]
In this chapter, we develop an algorithm for generating referring expression forms used
innaturallanguagediscourse. Wewillstartwithspecifying primitiveconstraintsintermsof
Gricean principles (Grice, 1975) and then show how the Centering principles, in particular
Rule 1 and Deﬁnition6, can be added naturallyto these primitiveconstraints. Our approach
is meant to present a comprehensive account of how referring expression forms are used in
natural language discourses. Ultimately, we explicitly formulate an algorithm for generat-
ing referring expression forms based on the Centering principles. The constraints speciﬁed
in the algorithm are much wider in the domain of their application than Rule 1. The domain
of application of the algorithm is deﬁned in terms of Centering Transition sequences. The
algorithm is designed in such a way as to be useful for generation systems, while keeping
structural and inferential mechanisms neatly distinct.
262.1 Gricean Principles and Anaphoric Usage
According to Grice (1975), communication is driven by a cooperative effort on the part of
discourse participants, such that they attempt to convey what they mean in the most optimal
way. Underlying this general cooperative principle are more speciﬁc rules that are argued
to be characteristic of linguistic utterances. Grice groups them into the four maxims of
quantity, quality, relation and manner. For our purposes, the ﬁrst and the last are most
relevant for referring expression forms and are given in (14) and (15).
(14) Maxim of Quantity:
a. Make your contribution as informative as is required.
b. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.
(15) Maxim of Manner:
a. Avoid obscurity and ambiguity.
These two maxims can be seen to function in the way speakers use anaphoric expres-
sions (as in other dimensions of communication), and for each of the maxims, the rules can
be formulated more precisely to show how they work in the domain of discourse anaphora.
The “quantity” principle is reformulated in (16):
(16) The Maxim of Quantity in Anaphoric Usage:
Use the non-informative pronominal form to refer to an entity when
a. its reference can be unambiguously determined and
b. when no additional information needs to be conveyed about the entity (that can
be conveyed through a descriptive noun phrase).
(16a) follows from (14b) and is able to account for the oddness of the repetition of the
proper name Billy in (17b). Since there is no other entity in this simple discourse that the
27pronoun he could refer to, and because the speaker can be certain that the hearer will be
able to determine its interpretation, the choice of the pronoun to refer to “Billy” turns out
to be the form that is no more informative than necessary.1
(17) a. Billy
￿ knocked on the door.
b. He
￿ /#Billy
￿ rang the bell.
c. But no one answered.
(16b) is a speciﬁc case of (14a) is instantiated in cases like (18b), with the use of the
deﬁnite description the snarling beast. The use of the pronoun instead would have been
just as sufﬁcient for identifying the entity to which it refers, but the speaker chooses to use a
more informative expression. However, rather than constituting a violation of the quantity
maxim, this kind of over-informativeness actually has a particular function. It is often
the case that speakers use the alternative deﬁnite description form to convey additional
information to the hearer. In this example, the deﬁnite description is used because the
speaker intends the hearer to acquire more knowledge about the particular dog in question,
and to make an additional inference, namely, that something unpleasant is in the ofﬁng.
(18c) conﬁrms this inference.2
(18) a. Susan looked at the dog
￿ .
b. The snarling beast
￿ /It
￿ was approaching her slowly.
c. She quickly decided to step into the store.
1In languages such as Japanese, which allows unrestricted use of zero pronominals, a zero pronoun would
be used for the unambiguous reference (Kameyama, 1985).
2This example is adapted from Grosz et al. (1995), who also note this kind of over-informativeness:
i. My dog
￿ is getting quite obstreperous.
ii. I took him
￿ to the vet the other day.
iii. The mangy old beast
￿ always hates these visits.
28The maxim of manner comes into play when multiple entities compete for the interpre-
tation of anaphoric forms. As a ﬁrst approximation, the reformulation of this maxim for
anaphoric use can be stated as follows:
(19) Maxim of Manner for Anaphoric Usage: First Version
a. Use more informative form(s) of reference when more than one entity quali-
ﬁes as the interpretation of the pronominal form(s) (where satisfying person,
number, gender (etc..) features of the pronoun counts as “qualifying”).
Simply read, what this rule says is that if more than one entity can match the gram-
matical features of the pronominal form, then the use of the pronoun is not felicitous and
a more informative form of reference must be used. However, this behavior is not consis-
tently observed in naturally occurring discourse. For example, in (20d), the pronoun they
is used even though both “ﬁeld mice” and “wax and parafﬁn”, evoked in (20c), qualify
as its referents. A similar scenario is seen in (21), where both “a rat” and “a package of
bread”, evoked in (21a), qualify as referents of the possessivepronoun in (21b), and in (22),
where “a gust”, “the lake” as well as “the framed glass”, evoked in (22a), qualify as refer-
ents of the pronoun in (22b). In all these examples, the less informative pronominal form
is used despite the apparent ambiguity of reference, thus violating the maxim of manner
stated above. Notice, also, that in each case, the use of the pronoun is perfectly natural and
interpretable.
(20) a. and Herzog sometimes wiped mouse droppings from the table with his sleeve,
b. calmly wondering why ﬁeld mice
￿ should have such a passion for wax and
parafﬁn
￿ .
c. They
￿ gnawed birthday candles down to the wicks.
Saul Bellow; Herzog
29(21) a. A rat
￿ chewed into a package of bread
￿ ,
b. leaving the shape of its
￿ body in the layers of slices.
Saul Bellow; Herzog
(22) a. A gust
￿ from the lake
￿ made the framed glass
￿ tremble in Herzog’s arms.
b. He propped it
￿ carefully against the porch and took off his canvas gloves but
not his beret,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
Saul Bellow; Herzog
On the other hand, examples (23)-(24) below show the Manner Maxim being respected
in that more informative forms of expression are used in case of ambiguity.
(23) a. Herzog
￿ wrote to Chicago about jobs.
b. He
￿ had to ﬁnd a position for Valentine Gersbach
￿ , too.
c. Valentine
￿ was a radio announcer, a disk-jockey in Pittsﬁeld.
Saul Bellow; Herzog
(24) a. A frowzy doorman
￿ let Herzog
￿ into the crumbling vault of the lobby.
b. Herzog
￿ undressed in the examining room – a troubled, dire green.
Saul Bellow; Herzog
The conﬂicting patterns seen in the examples above seem to suggest that the Manner
Maxim as formulated above cannot be correct. However, a closer look at the discourses
reveals a behavior that is in fact consistent and requires only a reﬁnement of the maxim.
Notice that, in each of the ﬁnal utterances in (20)-(22) in which the pronominal form is
used, there is some additional information available in the same utterance that helps to dis-
ambiguate the reference of the pronoun. In (20c), it is the lexical semantic information
30associated with the main verb gnawed which the hearer uses together with his/her reposi-
tory of world knowledge to determine that “mice” but not “wax” or “parafﬁn” are gnawing
things. In (21b), it is the head noun (of the possessive pronoun) body, which again trig-
gers a world knowledge inference on the part of the hearer to determine that “rats” and not
“packages of bread” have bodies. Finally, in (22b), the verb propped triggers the inference
that “framed glasses” and not “gusts” or “lakes” can be propped against something. In
Examples (23)-(24) on the other hand, no inference seems to be easily triggered by any
element in either (23b) or (24b) if the proper name is replaced with a pronoun. Based on
this distinction between the two sets of examples, we can make a reﬁnement to the ﬁrst
version of the Manner Maxim as shown in (19) by adding another clause to it, clause (b),
to give (25):
(25) Maxim of Manner for Anaphoric Usage: Revised Version Use more informative
form(s) of reference
a. when more than one entity qualiﬁes as the interpretation of the pronominal
form(s) (where satisfying person, number, gender (etc..) features of the pro-
noun counts as “qualifying”), and
b. when no other aspect of the utterance in which the referring expression oc-
curs provides additional information to help the hearer in disambiguating the
expressions.
Letusnowseewhethertherevisedmaximallowsustoaccountforcertainotherkindsof
discourses, namelythoseinwhichmorethan onediscourseentitymentionedinan utterance
is spoken of in the following one. If the entities are grammatically ambiguous in the ﬁrst
utterance in which they are realized, then pronominal forms used to refer to each of them
in the subsequent utterance would be ambiguous. According to the maxim as stated above,
then, the speaker would be under an obligation to use more informativeforms of expression
31to facilitate understanding by the hearer. Furthermore, by the Maxim of Quantity as stated
in (16), we would also expect the speaker not to be more informative than required. And
one way in which this expectation could be met is by the use of over-informativeness with
respecttoonlyoneoftheentities, whichwouldbe justthesufﬁcientamountofcontribution.
This behavior is indeed found in naturally-occurring discourse. Consider (26) in which the
speaker uses a deﬁnite description the old man in (26b) to refer to “Herzog’s father”. Both
“Herzog” and “Herzog’s father” are evoked in (26a) and again in (26b). Using pronouns to
refer to the entities would have led to an ambiguity, and the hearer either would not be able
to interpret the pronouns, or else would assign them the incorrect interpretation. The same
situation is seen in (26c), in which the more informativeproper name for one of the entities
is used to avoid ambiguity or incorrect referent assignment.
(26) a. Herzog
￿ was broke, and asked his father
￿ to underwrite a loan.
b. The old man
￿ questioned him
￿ narrowly, about his
￿ job, his
￿ expenses, his
￿
child.
c. He
￿ had no patience with Herzog
￿ .
Saul Bellow; Herzog
The Gricean maxims discussed above thus seem to be respected even in these more
complex discourses in which several entities are talked about at once over successive ut-
terances. The question to be asked next is whether, in the case of ambiguities such as
those shown in (26), there is any constraint that forces the speaker to be over-informative
with certain kinds of entities and not others. For instance, in (26b), why did the speaker
choose to be more descriptive when referring to “Herzog’s father” (the old man) and not
when referring to “Herzog” (him)? Similarly, does anything govern the opposite choice for
over-informativeness in (26c)? The Maxims that we have formulated cannot answer this
question and we must therefore look elsewhere for an explanation of how the referring ex-
32pression forms have been used. In fact, this is where Rule 1 of Centering comes into play.
Using the ranking of entities by grammatical function for English, the Backward-looking
Center of (26b) is “Herzog” and that of (26c) is “Herzog’s father”. According to Rule 1, if
anything is realized as a pronoun, then it must be the Backward-looking Center. As a result,
when the speaker makes a choice to use a more informative expression for one of the enti-
ties in either utterance, s/he can only do so with the entity that is not the Backward-looking
Center.
So we have shown in the above discussion how we can formulate the constraints on
the choice of referring expression forms comprehensively by starting out with primitive
constraints stated in terms of Gricean principles and adding on Rule 1 to these principles.
In the next section, we proceed to the main goal of this Chapter, which is to explicity
formulate an algorithm for generating referring expressions that are wider in their domain
of application than Rule 1.
2.2 Center-movement and Center-realization based Algo-
rithm for Referring Expression Generation
Apart from the formulation of Rule 1, there is no other explicit formulation of a constraint
on the use of referring expression forms. To some extent, this lack is justiﬁed since all
other constraints if formulated can only be stated as preferences and do not operate in
discourse as strictly as Rule 1.3 However, there is one suggestion in the Centering model
of how speakers may choose forms to realize entities. This suggestion was illustrated with
example (8 - Chapter 1), repeated here as (27).
(27) a. Terry
￿ really goofs sometimes.
3Centering in fact claims that even Rule 1 can be violated.
33b. Yesterday was a beautiful day and he
￿ was excited about trying out his new
sailboat.
c. He
￿ wanted Tony
￿ to join him on a sailing expedition.
[C
￿ = Terry (he
￿ ); C
￿ = Terry; Tr = CONTINUE]
d. He
￿ called him
￿ at 6am.
[C
￿ = Terry (He
￿ ); C
￿ = Terry (him
￿ ); Tr = CONTINUE]
e. i. He
￿ was sick and furious at being woken up so early.
[C
￿ = Tony (he
￿ ); C
￿ = Tony; Tr = SMOOTH-SHIFT]
ii. Tony
￿ was sick and furious at being woken up so early.
[C
￿ = Tony; C
￿ = Tony; Tr = SMOOTH-SHIFT]
As discussed before, the use of the pronoun in (27ei) to refer to “Tony” is confusing
because “Terry” has been the center of attention through utterance (27d) and is also the
most likely referent of he in utterance (27e) since it is the Preferred Center in (27d). If
the pronoun is replaced by the full NP Tony, this confusion is avoided, as in (27eii). The
natural language discourses in (28) and (29) show that speakers avoid using pronouns in
such contexts, i.e., where a Non-preferred Center in an utterance is realized as the C
￿ and
C
￿ of the subsequent utterance, thus marking a SMOOTH-SHIFT Transition. In both (28b)
and (29e), “Bateman” is a Non-preferred Center and when the speaker shifts the center to
“Bateman” in the subsequent utterances, (28ci) and (29ﬁ) respectively, the form used to
realize the entity is a full NP, even though no other entity is realized from the previous ut-
terances. Furthermore, the use of a pronoun in both cases leads to the wrong interpretation,
as seen in (28cii), where the pronoun would incorrectly refer to “Edward”, and in (29ﬁi),
where the pronoun would incorrectly refer to “Jackson”.
(28) a. Edward slipped on a coat
b. and, putting on his hat, accompanied Bateman out of the store.
34[C
￿ = Edward (his); C
￿ = Edward; Tr = CONTINUE]
c. i. Bateman attempted to put the matter facetiously.
[C
￿ = Bateman; C
￿ = Bateman; Tr = SMOOTH-SHIFT]
ii. # He attempted to put the matter facetiously.
Somerset Maugham; The Fall of Edward Bernard
(29) a. Arnold Jackson’s remark seemed to have aroused in him a train of recollec-
tions,
b. for he began to talk of his prison days.
[C
￿ = Jackson (he); C
￿ = Jackson; Tr = CONTINUE]
c. He talked quite naturally, without malice,
[C
￿ = Jackson (he); C
￿ = Jackson; Tr = CONTINUE]
d. as though he were relating his experiences at a foreign university.
[C
￿ = Jackson (he); C
￿ = Jackson; Tr = CONTINUE]
e. He addressed himself to Bateman
[C
￿ = Jackson (he); C
￿ = Jackson; Tr = CONTINUE]
f. i. and Bateman was confused and then confounded.
[C
￿ = Bateman; C
￿ = Bateman; Tr = SMOOTH-SHIFT]
ii. # and he was confused and then confounded.
Somerset Maugham; The Fall of Edward Bernard
Two points are to be noted with the above examples. First, unlike (27ei), where the
hearer could have still interpreted the pronoun correctly based on additional inferences
availablelateron intheutterance, namelytheinferencethat“Terry” couldnotpossiblyhave
been sick, no such inference is easily available in (28cii) and (29ﬁi).4 At the same time, like
4There is a slight possibility of an inference obtaining from (29ﬁi). The writer has been talking about
Arnold Jackson relating his experiences in a totally relaxed manner so that it is unlikely that it is Jackson
35(27ei), naturally occurring discourses provide ample evidence of a pronoun being used to
realize a Non-preferred Center of the previous utterance if there is some structural or infer-
ential information available in the utterance that will allow the hearer to assign the correct
interpretation to the pronoun – though this will still place increased inference demands on
the hearer. (30) supplements the constructed Centering example to show that speakers do
indeed capitalize on inferential information to violate expectations. The relevant utterance
is (30f) in which a subject pronoun is used to realize a Non-preferred Center from (30e),
namely, “Constantine” (the Preferred Center being “Enver”). The inference that very easily
yields the correct interpretation for the pronoun is that the speaker has been talking earlier
(in (30a)) about “Constantine” as the person who’s going to be traveling, and since there is
no mention of “Enver” as having anything to do with traveling, the hearer is able to assign
“Constantine” as the interpretation of the pronoun when s/he encounters the travel related
verbs sailing and landing.
(30) a. ...a man called Constantine Andreadi
￿ is on his way from Constantinople
with certain documents that we want to get hold of.
b. He’s
￿ a Greek.
[C
￿ = Constantine (He’s
￿ ); C
￿ = Constantine; Tr = CONTINUE]
c. He’s
￿ an agent of Enver Pasha
￿
[C
￿ = Constantine (He’s
￿ ); C
￿ = Constantine; Tr = CONTINUE]
d. and Enver
￿ has great conﬁdence in him
￿ .
who would be then confused or confounded. However, notice that it is quite possible to imagine a context in
which something does lend to Jackson’s confusion as for example, Bateman’s rude behavior in the following
possible continuation of (29).
(i) He
￿ addressed himself to Bateman
￿
(ii) and he
￿ was confused and then confounded because Bateman seemed to have completely ignored every-
thing he had just related.
36[C
￿ = Constantine (him
￿ ); C
￿ = Enver; Tr = RETAIN]
e. He’s
￿ given him
￿ verbal messages that are too secret and too important to be
put on paper.
[C
￿ = Enver (He’s
￿ ); C
￿ = Enver; Tr = SMOOTH-SHIFT]
f. He’s
￿ sailing from the Piraeus, on a boat called the Ithaca, and will land at
Brindisi on his way to Rome.
[C
￿ = Constantine (He’s
￿ ); C
￿ = Constantine; Tr = SMOOTH-SHIFT]
Somerset Maugham; The Hairless Mexican
Examples (27) and (30) show how inferences that can be easily derived from utterances
can lead to a violation of expectation and thus to the use of pronouns which would have
otherwise been infelicitous. In addition to inferential information, there are also structural
aspects that lead to a violation of expectation in the choice of referring expression forms.
The simplest type of such structural features is grammatical markings for person, number,
gender, and sortalfeatures (forlanguagesthat havethem). For example, genderand number
markings on pronouns in English are one source of structural information that allows Non-
preferred Centers to be realized as pronouns. Gender and number disambiguation is shown
in (31c) and (32b) respectively.
(31) a. For a little while Doris
￿ did not speak.
b. She
￿ was surprised at her husband’s
￿ tone.
[C
￿ = Doris (She
￿ ); C
￿ = Doris; Tr = CONTINUE]
c. He
￿ spoke tersely.
[C
￿ = Doris’s husband (He
￿ ); C
￿ = Doris’s husband; Tr = SMOOTH-SHIFT]
Somerset Maugham; The Force of Circumstances
(32) a. And on their
￿ way home they
￿ met her
￿ strolling towards the quay. (their, they
= Mrs. Davidson and Mrs. Macphail; she = Miss Thompson)
37[C
￿ = Mrs. Davidson and Mrs. Macphail (their
￿ , they
￿ ); C
￿ = Mrs. Davidson
and Mrs. Macphail; Tr = CONTINUE]
b. She
￿ had all her ﬁnery on.
[C
￿ = Miss Thompson (She
￿ ); C
￿ = Miss Thompson; Tr = SMOOTH-SHIFT]
Somerset Maugham; Rain
The second point to be noted about (28) and (29) is that Rule 1 does not apply in either
case since the ﬁnal utterances realize only one of the entities from the previous utterances
in their respective discourse segments. Furthermore, according to Deﬁnition 7 in Centering
(see Figure 1.1), these entities are the backward-looking centers of their utterances since
they are the maximally salient entities from the previous utterance realized in the current
utterance. As such, Rule 1 does not apply here and the speaker is free to use a pronoun to
realize these Backward-looking Centers. The constraints that we want to formulate should
answer the question as to when and why the speaker chooses to use a full noun phrase
instead of a pronoun for these Backward-looking Centers. We will suspend formulation
of the constraints until later because as it will turn out, many more types of cases can be
accounted for by these constraints. For now, we provide an explanation of the tendency
seen in the above examples.
What is distinctive about the examples in (28) and (29) is that only one of the entities
from U
￿ ((28b) and (29e)) has been realized in U
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ((28c) and (29f)) and that this is a
non-preferred center. In Centering, a corollary of Rule 1 and Deﬁnition 6 are sufﬁcient
to explain the use of the deﬁnite description in these examples. The Rule 1 corollary and
Deﬁnition 6 (see Figure 1.1) are presented below.
￿ Rule 1 corollary: if there is a single pronoun in an utterance U
￿ , then it is the
Backward-looking Center of U
￿ .
38￿ Deﬁnition 6: The more highly ranked an element of
￿ C
￿ (U
￿ )
￿ , the more likely it is
to be the C
￿ (U
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ).
Deﬁnition 6 captures the idea that the Preferred Center in U
￿ is the entity that is most
likely to be the Backward-looking Center of U
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ . This preference has implications both
forhowhearerstend tointerpretpronouns as wellas forhowspeakersgeneratethe referring
expressions. In the examples above in particular, in the absence of any evidence to the
contrary, hearers will tend to interpret a single pronoun in an utterance as referring to the
Preferred Center of the previous utterance. Speakers, on the other hand, will tend to use
full noun phrases to realize Backward-looking Centers that are not the Preferred Center of
the previous utterance.
The Centering model, while suggesting an indication of a constraint on referring ex-
pression form in such contexts, never actually formulated it. It seems, however, that given
the tendency found in naturally occurring discourses, we can indeed formulate constraints
on reference form for such contexts.
In Figure 2.1, the entity-centering expectations are stated and the constraints are for-
mulated as based on center-realization and center-movement (CR-CM). The speciﬁed con-
straints hold for a much wider range of cases than the ones considered above. We will ﬁrst
explain the above examples in terms of the CR-CM algorithm and then discuss other cases.
Note that C1a and C1b are mutually dependent constraints and that C2 is a constraint
that operates exclusively of C1a and C1b. E1 is a restatement of the underlying idea of
Deﬁnition 6 which we discussed above. E2 captures the idea, again inherent in Centering,
that in the absence of any contrary evidence, hearers will expect the speaker to keep talk-
ing about the same entity. This is the expectation for maximal continuity in the discourse
segment which lends to maximal coherence. We discussed this at length in Chapter 1, Sec-
tion 1.5.2. In terms of the Centering Transition deﬁnitions, maximal continuity is obtained
with CONTINUE Transitions, which implies that the backward-looking centers of all the
39Center-realization and Center-movement based Algorithm for Generating Re-
ferring Expression Forms:
Expectations: (hearer-based)
(E1): the speaker will realize the Preferred Center of U
￿ as the Backward-looking
Center of the subsequent utterance U
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ , and
(E2): the speaker will continue to center this entity thereon from U
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
Constraints: (speaker-based)
(C1a): If U
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ indeed conforms to expectations (E1) and (E2), use pronouns for
the entities realized from U
￿ to U
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ just in case no additional inference needs to be
conveyed with a more descriptive expression;
(C1b): else, use a descriptive noun phrase for one (or more) entity (or entities) to the
extent that the hearer does not assign an interpretation to some pronoun following E1
and E2, but just in case no structural or inferential disambiguation is possible.
(C2): Where applicable, do not violate Rule 1 after C1a or C1b are applied.
(C3): After the application of C1b (if it applies), if additional inferences need to
be conveyed that can be derived from the remaining pronouns, use more descriptive
noun phrases for those pronouns where appropriate
Figure 2.1: Center-realization and Center-Movement (CR-CM) Algorithm for Referring
Expression Form Generation
utterances in the segment will end up also being the Preferred Center of their utterances.
Of course, this is only an expectation: discourse segments are most often not maximally
coherent in terms of the Centering Transitions. What is crucial to note, however, is that
this expectation inﬂuences the choices in referring expression form. In the examples that
we looked at above, E2 does not apply because the Preferred Center was not continued
as the center at all, so the question of expectations of further continuation of the center in
subsequent utterances does not arise. E2 will, however, apply in other cases that we will
look at later.
40The constraint C1a says that if the expectations E1 and E2 are met, pronouns can be
used to realize the centers. However, C1a contains a conditional clause (just in case no
additional inference needs to be conveyed with a more descriptive expression) that requires
explanation. This has to do with the fact that descriptive referring expressions are not just
used to respect the Centering principles and constraints. Often, more descriptiveforms may
be used even for Backward-looking Centers that were the Preferred Center of the previous
utterance, or in the more general case, in instances where both expectations E1 and E2
are met. Centering theory recognizes such uses of referring expressions and states that
such expressions do more than just refer. That is, they convey some additional information
and thus lead the hearer to draw additional inferences that would not have been obtainable
otherwise. We saw an example of such a case in (18).
Constraint C1b captures the relationship between inference demands that are placed
on hearers via the use of referring expressions. If the expectations in E1 and E2 are not
met, and if pronouns are used to realize the centers, hearers will most likely start with
assigning incorrect interpretation(s) to the pronoun(s) following their expectations and will
be forced tomakeadditional inferenceslater onduring utteranceprocessing. The constraint
on the generation of referring expressions attempts to avoid this additional inference by
specifying that thespeaker use more descriptiveformsfor one or moreentities to informthe
hearer that his/her expectation is not being met and that s/he should change interpretation
assignmentsaccordingly. Ofcourse, as theconditionalclause oftheconstraint speciﬁes, the
application of the constraint varies depending how much inferential information might be
already inherent in the utterance to allow the hearer to easily change his/her interpretation.
We discussed such examples in (30-32).
Rule 1 in C2 applies after C1a or C1b is applied, but in a restricted set of cases, namely,
where more than one entity is realized from U
￿ to U
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ . Note that if the conditional clause
in C1a applies, and that if, following this, Rule 1 applies, then we have an interesting
41prediction. Namely, if the speaker intended to trigger some additional inference by using
a descriptive noun phrase for the backward-looking center, then the only way the speaker
could generate the utterance without violating Rule 1 is to also use a descriptive noun
phrase for the entity or entities that is (or are) not the backward-looking center(s).
Finally, C3 applies after (and if) C1b has been applied. This constraint accounts for
cases in which none of the evoked entities are realized as pronouns. It takes care of the
speaker’s intention to convey more information about an entity than would conveyed by
merely using a pronoun. Note that a similar constraint applies in C1a (with the highest
conditional clause) but that C1a and C1b are mutually exclusive constraints.
We now explain the examples in (28) and (29) in terms of the CR-CM algorithm. In
(28b), “Edward” is the preferred center and, according to E1, should be the Backward-
looking Center of (28c). The speaker, however, does not realize “Edward” in (28c) at
all, instead realizing the Non-preferred Center “Bateman”. C1a now does not hold, so the
speaker is constrained to use a proper name to realize “Bateman”, since no inference would
be available with the use of a pronoun. Similarly, in (29f), the Non-preferred Center of the
previous utterance is the only entity that is realized in (29), and in the absence of any easily
available inference for the interpretation of a pronoun, we see the speaker’s obligation to
use a proper name being realized.
2.3 Centering Transition Sequences and the CR-CM Al-
gorithm
In the CR-CM algorithm formulated in the previous section, the main expectation that was
proposed for the choices in referring expression form was that the Preferred Center of an
utterance is most likely to be the Backward-looking Center of the subsequent utterance,
and that the speaker is most likely to continue to center this entity. Constraints on referring
42expression form were then speciﬁed as following from these expectations. However, the
examples that were explained in terms of the algorithm, while being naturally occurring ex-
amples, do not convey to what extent the CR-CM algorithm can be applied. In this section,
we deﬁne the domain of the algorithm’s application in terms of the Centering Transition
sequences. This strategy allow us to apply the algorithm as exhaustively as possible to the
extent that the Centering Transitions completely characterize the Transitions occurring in
discourse segments. In the examples in the previous section, we looked at the Transition
sequence CONTINUE
  SMOOTH-SHIFT (
  indicatesprecedence). Thefour Transitionsde-
ﬁned in Centering in fact allow us to postulate 16 different types of Transition sequences.
These are given in Figure 2.2. The sequences are generated as a simple permutation on the
four Centering Transitions and yield a 4x4 matrix.
CONT
  CONT CONT
  RET CONT
  SM-SH CONT
  RGH-SH
RET
  CONT RET
  RET RET
  SM-SH RET
  RGH-SH
SM-SH
  CONT SM-SH
  RET SM-SH
  SM-SH SM-SH
  RGH-SH
RGH-SH
  CONT RGH-SH
  RET RGH-SH
  SM-SH RGH-SH
  RGH-SH
Figure 2.2: Matrix of Transition Sequences
In the texts that we analyzed, we could not ﬁnd instances of four of the Transition
sequences. These are given below, with constructed examples for illustration. For each, we
brieﬂy discuss the application of the algorithm.5
￿ SMOOTH-SHIFT
  ROUGH-SHIFT:
(33) a. John
￿ went to the store.
5Note that we were looking for instances in our texts that contained structural ambiguity between entities
thatwere realizedacrosstheutterances. Aswas shownwithexamples(31)and(32), structuraldisambiguating
features often lead to a violation of expectations because the necessary inferences can be very easily drawn
on this basis. We excluded such samples from our analysis. Needless to say, including these for independent
reasons will most likely bring up many instances of the Transitions that we could not ﬁnd in the texts, given
our criteria.
43b. Bill
￿ was supposed to meet him
￿ there at 5pm.
[C
￿ = John (him
￿ ); C
￿ = Bill]
c. He
￿ arrived with Max
￿ at 5:30pm.
[C
￿ = Bill (He
￿ ); C
￿ = Bill; Tr = SMOOTH-SHIFT]
d. John
￿ had not expected Max
￿ to come.
[C
￿ = Max; C
￿ = John; Tr = ROUGH-SHIFT]
In (33c), “Bill” is the Preferred Center of (33c) and the Transition instantiated by the
utterance is a SMOOTH-SHIFT. According to E1, therefore, “Bill” is expected to be
the Backward-looking Center of (33d), and further, according to E2, it is also ex-
pected to lay out a further expectation of continuation by being the Preferred Center
of (33d). However, neither E1 and E2 are satisﬁed since (33d) doesn’t realize “Bill”
at all. Note that non-realization of the Preferred Center of (33c) in (33d) deﬁnes the
Transition sequence we are considering in the example, namely, SMOOTH-SHIFT fol-
lowed by a ROUGH-SHIFT. The Transition sequence type is also deﬁned by the fact
that the non-preferred center of(33c) that is realized in (33d) is not the Preferred Cen-
ter of (33d). Our example instantiates this by realizing the Preferred Center of (33d)
with an entity that was not realized in (33c). This entity is “John”, who was evoked
in (33a) and (33b). Now, since E1 and E2 have not been met, C1a does not hold and
C1b applies so that the speaker is obliged to use full noun phrases for one or more of
the entities in (33d). As C1b speciﬁes, the speaker should use full noun phrases to the
extent that the hearer does not assign interpretations to any pronouns by following
E1 and E2. Let us see how this works with the different alternative realizations with
pronouns. In each case, we will consider the interpretation of the pronoun(s) that the
hearer arrives at following E1 and E2. If pronouns are used for both the entities, as in
He had not expected him to come, the hearer would interpret the subject pronoun he
44as referring to “Bill” and the the object pronoun him as referring to “Max”, which is
incorrect with respect to the subject pronoun. If only the subject pronoun is used, as
in He had not expected Max to come, the hearer would interpret the subject pronoun
as referring to “Bill”, which is again incorrect. Finally, if an object pronoun is used,
as in John had not expected him to come, while the speaker deduces that “John” is
evoked from a prior utterance (33a) or (33b), the two entities “Bill” and “Max” from
(33c) still compete for the pronoun’s interpretation. The hearer will, following E1,
pick “Bill”, the Preferred Center of (33c), which is again incorrect. Note that in nei-
ther case is there any structural or inferential information easily available from the
utterance for pronoun disambiguation. So the only choice the speaker has is to use
proper names for both “John” and “Max”, or some other disambiguating NP forms.
(34) is like the examples (28) and (29) that we have looked at above. “Max” is the
Preferred Center of (34c) and thus the expected center (of (34d)) which is subject to
further continuation. Realization of the Non-preferred Center, “Bill”, in a preferred
center position in (34d) forces the use of a proper name since otherwise, the hearer
would, following E1 and E2, arrive at the incorrect reading for the pronoun, i.e., as
“Max”.6
￿ ROUGH-SHIFT
  CONTINUE:
(34) a. John
￿ went to the store.
b. Bill
￿ was supposed to meet him
￿ there at 5pm.
6Note that in this case, there is an inference that the hearer could make if a pronoun was used, as in He
had a ﬂexible schedule, namely that since “Max” is the person who is expected to arrive late, “Bill”, and
not “Max”, is more likely to have the more ﬂexible schedule. On the other hand, it is quite possible to see
how the hearer may still expect “Max” to have a ﬂexible schedule, as can be seen with the following possible
continuation:
(i) Max/He had a ﬂexible schedule but today he had to meet a deadline.
45[C
￿ = John (him
￿ ); C
￿ = Bill]
c. Max
￿ was to arrive later than Bill
￿ .
[C
￿ = Bill; C
￿ = Max; Tr = ROUGH-SHIFT]
d. Bill
￿ had a ﬂexible schedule.
[C
￿ = Bill; C
￿ = Bill; Tr = CONTINUE]
￿ ROUGH-SHIFT
  RETAIN:
(35) a. John
￿ went to the store.
b. Bill
￿ was supposed to meet him
￿ there at 5pm.
[C
￿ = John (him
￿ ); C
￿ = Bill]
c. Max
￿ was to arrive later than Bill
￿ .
[C
￿ = Bill; C
￿ = Max; Tr = ROUGH-SHIFT]
d. John
￿ saw Bill
￿ arriving at 5:15pm
[C
￿ = Bill; C
￿ = John; Tr = RETAIN]
(35) is exactly like (33) in that an entity from an utterance prior to (35c) is realized
as the Preferred Center in (35d) and a Non-preferred Center in (35c) is retained as
the Backward-looking Center.
￿ ROUGH-SHIFT
  SMOOTH-SHIFT:
(36) a. John
￿ went to the store.
b. Bill
￿ was supposed to meet him
￿ there at 5pm.
[C
￿ = John (him
￿ ); C
￿ = Bill]
c. Max
￿ was to arrive later than Bill
￿ .
[C
￿ = Bill; C
￿ = Max; Tr = ROUGH-SHIFT]
46d. He
￿ was the weather man.
[C
￿ = Max (He
￿ ); C
￿ = Max; Tr = SMOOTH-SHIFT]
In (36), “Max” is the Preferred Center of (36c), which instantiates a ROUGH-SHIFT
Transition and sets up an expectation for “Max” to be the backward-looking center
and the Preferred Center of the next utterance. Since E1 and E2 are thus met, the use
of the pronoun in (36d) to refer to Max is perfectly felicitous and interpretable.
￿ ROUGH-SHIFT
  ROUGH-SHIFT:
(37) a. John
￿ went to the store.
b. Bill
￿ was supposed to meet him
￿ there at 5pm.
[C
￿ = John (him
￿ ); C
￿ = Bill]
c. Max
￿ was to arrive later than Bill
￿ .
[C
￿ = Bill; C
￿ = Max; Tr = ROUGH-SHIFT]
d. but John
￿ found him
￿ already waiting at the store.
[C
￿ = Max (him
￿ ); C
￿ = John; Tr = ROUGH-SHIFT]
In (37), the use of the pronoun for “Max” in (37d) is perfectly natural and correctly
interpreted by the hearer since “Max” was the Preferred Center of (37c). Note, how-
ever, that a pronoun cannot also be used in the subject position for John, since then
the hearer would be confused.
While we have been able to account for above constructed examples with the CR-CM
algorithm, it would be more instructive to look at naturally occurring texts. We do this
below for the Transition sequences that we were able to identify.
47￿ CONTINUE
  CONTINUE:
CONTINUE Transition sequences are those in which the hearer expectations E1 and
E2aremaximallysatisﬁed. ThespeakerrealizesthePreferredCenterastheBackward-
looking Center of the subsequent utterance and also indicates an expectation of fur-
ther continuation. This is seen in (38), where the speaker continues to talk about
“Walker” throughout the segment and also realizes “Walker” as the Preferred Cen-
ter in each utterance. This example, furthermore, illustrates the simplest and least
conﬂicting case for referring expression generation: since there is only one entity
realized from (38b) to (38c), so there are no competing entities for the interpretation
of the pronoun and the speaker has no reason to not use a pronoun.
(38) a. He
￿ had no doubt it was Manuma
￿ who had ﬂung the knife. (He
￿ =
Walker)
[C
￿ = Walker (He
￿ ); C
￿ = Walker]
b. He
￿ had escaped death by three inches.
[C
￿ = Walker (He
￿ ); C
￿ = Walker; Tr = CONTINUE]
c. He
￿ was not angry
[C
￿ = Walker (He
￿ ); C
￿ = Walker; Tr = CONTINUE]
Somerset Maugham; Mackintosh
In (39), a second entity, “Mackintosh”, is evoked in (39b). E1 and E2 set up an ex-
pectation for the Preferred Center, “Walker”, to be realized as the backward-looking
center of (39c). The speaker realizes both entities, “Walker” and “Mackintosh”, as
centers in (39d). Now, unlike the examples that we have seen above with competing
entities as the interpretation of the multiple pronouns, here the use of the pronouns
for both entities would conﬁrm to the hearer’s expectations and allow him/her to ar-
rive at the correct reading by following E1 and E2. The Preferred Center of (39c) is
48also realized as the Preferred Center of (39d) and the speaker thus does not need to
use a full noun phrase for the other entity since the Non-preferred Center is now the
only remaining interpretation available. As the segment shows, the speaker indeed
chooses to use pronouns for both the entities in (39d).
(39) a. His
￿ little eyes twinkled. (His
￿ = Walker)
b. He
￿ blew himself out like a turkey-cock,
[C
￿ = Walker (He
￿ ); C
￿ = Walker]
c. and for the second time
￿
￿ insisted on telling Mackintosh
￿ every detail
of the sordid affair.
[C
￿ = Walker (
￿
￿ ); C
￿ = Walker; Tr = CONTINUE]
d. Then he
￿ asked him
￿ to play piquet.
[C
￿ = Walker (he
￿ ); C
￿ = Walker; Tr = CONTINUE]
Somerset Maugham; Mackintosh
￿ CONTINUE
  RETAIN:
In (40), E1 and E2 set up an expectation for “Crosbie” in (40b) to be the Backward-
looking Center in (40c). However, (40c) evokes an entity from (40a) in the Pre-
ferred Center position, and the speaker cannot use a pronoun for this since the hearer
would then interpret it as referring to “Crosbie”. Moreover, the second pronoun in
the prepositional phrase would further perpetuate the mistake since there would be a
likelihood of getting a reading in which “Crosbie” was exasperated by himself (lo-
cality constraints on coindexation holding). No inference is also easily available in
the utterance, so the speaker is obliged to use a proper name for “Joyce” to disam-
biguate the reference. Note, however, that the speaker is free to use a pronoun for
“Crosbie”, since being the only pronoun, the hearer would interpret it as referring to
49the Preferred Center, “Crosbie”, which would be the correct reading. Also note that
Rule 1 is applicable here and has not been violated.
(40) a. Crosbie
￿ did not speak.
b. His
￿ large, red face bore an expression of complete bewilderment,
[C
￿ = Crosbie (His
￿ ); C
￿ = Crosbie; Tr = CONTINUE]
c. and Mr. Joyce
￿ was at once relieved and exasperated by his
￿ lack of
comprehension.
[C
￿ = Crosbie (his
￿ ); C
￿ = Mr. Joyce; Tr = RETAIN]
Somerset Maugham; The Letter
￿ CONTINUE
  SMOOTH-SHIFT:
(41c) instantiates a CONTINUE Transition, with “Mackintosh” as the Preferred Cen-
ter. In addition, another competing entity is also realized in this utterance, namely,
“Manuma”. (41d) realizes the Non-preferred Center in the preferred center position,
which is contrary to E1 and E2, given the CONTINUE Transition in (41c). As a result,
the speaker is obliged to use a descriptive noun phrase to prevent the wrong read-
ing (i.e., the Preferred Center, “Mackintosh”), which is what we see with the proper
name in (41d). Again, no inference would be easily available if a pronoun was used.
“Mackintosh” has been acting very shifty and uncomfortable and he could have been
equally likely to take the medicines and skip the scene.7
7The treatment of complex sentences such as in (41c) is a major problem in Centering related studies,
the issue being whether to break up complex sentences into separate utterance units or to treat them as a
single unit. The results of the application of the Centering principles and constraints will vary depending
on how such sentences are treated. This question has received a lot of attention but no deﬁnitive conclusion
has been reached. Often, different researchers work with different assumptions about what qualiﬁes as the
utterance unit. Some, like Kameyama (1998) break up complex sentences into separate units, whereas others
50(41) a. He
￿ did not know what it was that made it impossible for him
￿ to look at
the Kanaka
￿ . (He
￿ = Mackintosh; Kanaka = Manuma)
[C
￿ = Mackintosh (He); C
￿ = Mackintosh]
b. While he
￿ was speaking to him
￿ , he
￿ kept his
￿ eyes on his
￿ shoulder.
[C
￿ = Mackintosh (he
￿ ); C
￿ = Mackintosh; Tr = CONTINUE]
c. Manuma
￿ took the medicine and slunk out of the gate.
[C
￿ = Manuma; C
￿ = Manuma; Tr = SMOOTH-SHIFT]
Somerset Maugham; Mackintosh
￿ CONTINUE
  ROUGH-SHIFT:
(42) is an example which shows that the availability of inferential information allows
the speaker to use a pronoun, even though the hearer’s expectations have been vio-
lated.8 In (42b), “the boy” is the Preferred Center and “Cooper” is the second entity
embedded in the complement clause, thus being lower ranked. In (42c), a new entity,
“Abas”, has been evoked in the Preferred Center position. The (only) pronoun that
is used in the utterance would be interpreted as referring to “the boy”, which would
be incorrect. However, the inference that the pronoun could only refer to “Cooper”,
the Non-preferred Center, is easily available from the verbal predicate in the clause.
That is, the hearer knows from (42b) that it is “Cooper” who has been having trouble
like Miltsakaki (1999) treat them as a single unit. In Chapter 3 and 4, we provide more extended discussion
of issued relating to complex sentences. For the purpose of the current example, we simply state that we
assume the analysis in Miltsakaki (1999) for subordinate clauses and take subordinate clauses to be part of
the utterance unit created by the main clause in which they occur. Further, we assume that entities evoked
in subordinate clause(s) are ranked lower than entities evoked in the main clause. For multiple subordinate
clauses, we assume a left to right ordering.
8We were not able to identify any instances of CONTINUE
! ROUGH-SHIFT Transitions where a full noun
phrase was used for both the entities.
51with his boys, and the act of ’leaving’ X is naturally entailed due to some trouble
with the X. Furthermore, there is no indication of “the boy” mentioned in (42a) and
(42b) as having gotten into any trouble because of which anyone may have left him.
And ﬁnally, the inference yielded by the verbal predicate in (42c) is made available
“before” the pronoun is encountered by the hearer, so that the entity to be mentioned
as the object of the verb is probably already anticipated.
(42) a. in their interval since their arrival, he
￿ had been gossiping in the servants’
quarters. (he
￿ = the boy)
b. He
￿ had learnt that Cooper
￿ had had trouble with his
￿ boys.
[C
￿ = boy (he
￿ ); C
￿ = boy; Tr = CONTINUE]
c. All but the youth Abas
￿ had left him
￿ .
[C
￿ = Cooper (him
￿ ); C
￿ = Abas; Tr = ROUGH-SHIFT]
Somerset Maugham; The Outstation
￿ RETAIN
  CONTINUE:
(43) a. This time Mackintosh
￿ gave him
￿ his
￿ whisky neat.
[C
￿ = Walker (him
￿ , his
￿ ); C
￿ = Mackintosh; Tr = RETAIN]
b. Walker
￿ collected his strength in a ﬁnal effort of will.
[C
￿ = Walker; C
￿ = Walker; Tr = CONTINUE]
Somerset Maugham; Mackintosh
(43) is an excellent example of the singular dominating inﬂuence of the Preferred
Center expectation as the driving force behind the constraints on referring expres-
sions. It shows that though maximal coherence has been deﬁned in terms of maximal
continuity, whereby utterance sequences continue to center the same entity, the form
52of referring expression is independent of this effect.9 (43a) instantiates a RETAIN
Transition in which “Walker” is realized as the Backward-looking Center. The next
utterance (43b) continues “Walker” as the centered entity, and also places it in the
Preferred Center position, thus instantiating a CONTINUE Transition. However, the
use of a proper name in (43b) for the retained center of (43a) shows that it is the
Preferred Center which is in fact expected as the Backward-looking Center of (43b).
A pronoun, if used, would lead the hearer to incorrectly interpret it as referring to
“Mackintosh” and not “Walker”. The speaker is thus obliged to use a more informa-
tive expression.
￿ RETAIN
  RETAIN:
The pattern in the RETAIN
  RETAIN sequence in (44) is simple to see. The entity,
“Campion”, is retained in (44b) and a new entity from an utterance prior to (44a) is
evoked as the Preferred Center. In (44c), this Preferred Center is realized but only
retained, andanother newentity is evokedas thePreferred Center. The speakerisfree
to use a pronoun for the retained center since the hearer would interpret it correctly
as the Preferred Center of (44b), namely “Hutchinson”. A pronoun cannot be used
for the subject entity, “Izzart”, because this violates E1 and E2 and would confuse
the hearer who would interpret it as referring to the Preferred Center, “Hutchinson”.
(44) a. presently, after yawning a good deal, he
￿ said he
￿ would go to bed. (he
￿
= Campion)
[C
￿ = Campion (he
￿ ); C
￿ = Campion]
9In fact, this is the erroneous assumption made in the BFP algorithm for pronoun interpretation (Brennan
et al., 1987), where one of the criteria for interpreting pronouns is deﬁned in terms of maximal coherence as
maximal continuity in terms of the Transition ranking in Rule 2. In Prasad & Strube (2000), it is shown that
this assumption either leads to incorrect resolution with pronouns or creates an ambiguity in the resolution
mechanism that perpetuates throughout the text.
53b. Hutchinson
￿ showed him
￿ to his
￿ room
[C
￿ = Campion (him
￿ ); C
￿ = Hutchinson; Tr = RETAIN]
c. and when he
￿ returned, Izzart
￿ said to him
￿ , “You don’t want to turn in
yet, do you?”
[C
￿ = Hutchinson (he
￿ ); C
￿ = Izzart; Tr = RETAIN]
Somerset Maugham; The Yellow Streak
￿ RETAIN
  SMOOTH-SHIFT:
(45) is a clear case of the hearer’s expectations being totally met, and due to which
the speaker is seen to use pronouns freely. The Transition sequence instantiated
is RETAIN
  SMOOTH-SHIFT, and the utterances (45b) and (45c) realize multiple
entities. (45b)setsupanexpectationthat“Bateman”, thePreferredCenter, willbethe
Backward-looking Center of (45c) – following E1 – and that further the speaker will
continue to center this entity – following E2. Both E1 and E2 are met in (45c). The
speaker is thus seen to use pronouns for both the entities. Note that the interpretation
of the pronouns could, in principle, go the other way too, with the subject pronoun
referring to the man and the object pronoun referring to “Bateman”, so the use of
the pronouns here provides robustness to the expectation speciﬁed in the CR-CM
algorithm as being the driving force behind the constraints on referring expression
form.10
(45) a. A man
￿ was advancing towards them on the terrace,
b. but Bateman’s
￿ back was turned to him
￿
[C
￿ = man (him
￿ ); C
￿ = Bateman; Tr = RETAIN]
10If the speaker had intended the alternative interpretation, we would, given the CR-CM algorithm, expect
the following realization of (c):
(i) and the man could not see him.
54c. and he
￿ could not see him
￿
[C
￿ = Bateman (he
￿ ); C
￿ = Bateman; Tr = SMOOTH-SHIFT]
Somerset Maugham; The Fall of Edward Bernard
￿ RETAIN
  ROUGH-SHIFT:
The example in (46) is the one we presented in Chapter 1, and we are now in a
positionto explain the acceptabilityand unacceptability of the alternativerealizations
of the referring expression forms.11
(46) a. and Dr. Macphail
￿ , getting out of bed, saw that he
￿ was heavily tattooed.
(he
￿ = Horn)
[C
￿ = Horn (he
￿ ); C
￿ = Dr. Macphail; Tr = RETAIN]
b. i. Horn
￿ made him
￿ a sign to come to the verandah. (actual utterance)
[C
￿ = Dr. Macphail (him
￿ ); C
￿ = Horn; Tr = ROUGH-SHIFT]
ii. # He made him a sign to come to the verandah.
[C
￿ = Dr. Macphail (him
￿ ); C
￿ = Horn; Tr = ROUGH-SHIFT]
11Since this example contains all the alternative realizations for the referring expression, we can explicitly
discuss the application of the Centering constraints on the different forms. Centering, as it stands, can use
the Rule 1 constraint to explain the acceptability of (46bi), which is the utterance actually used in the text
segment, and the unacceptability of (46biii). That is, the same rule predicts that (46bi) is acceptable since
the Backward-looking Center is realized as a pronoun and that (46biii) is not acceptable since the Backward-
looking Center, “Dr. Macphail”, is realized as a full NP while some other entity, “Horn”, which is not the
backward-looking center, is realized as a pronoun. However, Centering cannot explain the oddness (leading
to the tendencyto assign the incorrect interpretation to the pronouns) of (46bii) or the acceptability of (46biv).
Consider (46bii), for example. According to Rule 1, which comes into operation when there is more than
one center realized from one utterance to the next, there is nothing in principle wrong about this alternative.
This is because the constraint does not preclude the realization of any other entity as a pronoun as long as
the Backward-looking Center is also realized as a pronoun. And indeed, in this case, the Backward-looking
Center, “Dr. Macphail”, is realized as a pronoun (as well as the non-centered entity, “Horn”).
55iii. # He
￿ made Dr. Macphail
￿ a sign to come to the verandah.
[C
￿ = Dr. Macphail; C
￿ = Horn; Tr = ROUGH-SHIFT]
iv. Horn
￿ made Dr. Macphail
￿ a sign to come to the verandah.
[C
￿ = Dr. Macphail; C
￿ = Horn; Tr = ROUGH-SHIFT]
The ﬁrst utterance (46a) realizes “Horn” as the Backward-looking Center but it in-
stantiates a RETAIN Transition, setting up an expectation of another entity, “Dr.
Macphail”, as the Backward-looking Center of the next utterance.12 All the alterna-
tive realizations of (46b) instantiate a ROUGH-SHIFT Transition: both entities, “Dr.
Macphail” and “Horn”, are realized in the these utterances, but since “Dr. Macphail”
is the Preferred Center in (46a), he is expected to be the Backward-looking Center in
the (46b) utterances. So the expectation E1 is met in this case. However, E2 is not
satisﬁed, since in fact, the speaker only retains “Dr. Macphail” as the center. As a re-
sult, C1a does not hold and C1b must apply. That is, the speaker must use a full noun
phrase for one or more of the entities to prevent the hearer from making incorrect
inferences. Thus we have explained why (46bii) cannot occur. Now we are left with
(46bi), (46biii) and (46biv). The choice between (46bi) and (46biii) is made by Rule
1. Rule 1 directs the speaker to choose (46bi), and this is what we indeed observe.
This leaves us with (46biv). The use of full noun phrases for both the entities in this
example is acceptable, though less so than (46bi). We can explain this with the C3
constraint which can apply in this case since C1b has been applied too. Since this
example did not actually occur, it is hard to imagine (and it is also not clear from the
example itself) what additional inference the speaker could have intended to convey,
but if at all there was any additional inference to be abstracted from the utterance,
then it would haveto do with the use of full noun phrases for any remaining pronouns
12“Horn” is the only entity realized in the previous utterance in the segment, the utterance being He looked
suddenly savage, where he = Horn.
56in the utterance. This is what is encapsulated in the C3 constraint. In this example,
after the application of the C1b constraint, there is only one pronoun remaining in
the utterance, namely, the pronoun used to realize “Dr. Macphail”. And we can ex-
plain this example by appealing to the hypothetical possibility that the speaker has
intended some additional inference that can only obtain by using the proper name for
“Dr. Macphail”.
Two points need to be noted about this example. Firstly, in addition to explaining
why the incorrect reading is obtained for the pronouns in (46bii), we are also able
to predict why the speaker in fact chose to use a full noun phrase for one of the
entities. It was precisely to prevent the hearer from arriving at the incorrect reading
for the pronouns. This is a prediction that we were able to derive from the Centering
deﬁnitions, but which were not explicitly formulated within the theory itself. So
we see Gricean (Grice, 1975) principles about assumptions about shared knowledge
(Chafe, 1976) at work here. Secondly, Rule 1 has only a secondary role in these
cases, and that is to provide the decision about which entity to pronominalize and
which to realize as a full noun phrase.
￿ SMOOTH-SHIFT
  CONTINUE:
(47b) instantiates a SMOOTH-SHIFT Transition, and the Preferred Center, “Abas”, is
the only entity realized in its utterance. The speaker continues to center this entity as
the Backward-looking Center as well as the Preferred Center in (47c), so both E1 and
E2 are met, and the speaker is free to use a pronoun to realize “Abas”.13 Note that a
discourse-new entity is evoked in (47c) as a containing inferrable (Prince, 1992) and
cannot be pronominalized for independent syntactic reasons.14
13Following Prince & Walker (1995), we are assuming a left-to-right of complex NP’s for English, so that
possessives are ranked higher than head nouns.
14No doubt, the generation constraints that we have formulated here will have to be integrated with other
57(47) a. All but the youth Abas
￿ had left him
￿ .
[C
￿ = Cooper (him
￿ ); C
￿ = Abas]
b. Abas
￿ had desired to go too,
[C
￿ = Abas; C
￿ = Abas; Tr = SMOOTH-SHIFT]
c. but his
￿ uncle
" had placed him
￿ there on the instructions of the Resident
[C
￿ = Abas (his
￿ , him
￿ ); C
￿ = Abas; Tr = CONTINUE]
Somerset Maugham; The Outstation
￿ SMOOTH-SHIFT
  RETAIN:
(48) is like (47) except that after the SMOOTH-SHIFT Transition in (48c), the speaker
retains rather than continues the centered entity, “Mackintosh”. (48d). In this case,
the speaker cannot use a pronoun for the new entity evoked in (48d), “the chinese
cook”, since it is in the Preferred Center position: the hearer would be led to the
wrong interpretation, i.e., the subject pronoun would be interpreted as referring to the
Preferred Center of (48c), “Mackintosh” and the object pronoun would be interpreted
as referring to the only other available entity in the segment, “Walker”. Note, also,
that Rule 1 is not violated.
(48) a. He
￿ closed his eyes, (He
￿ = Walker)
b. and Mackintosh
￿ thought that he
￿ would never open them again.
[C
￿ = Walker (he
￿ ); C
￿ = Mackintosh]
c. His
￿ mouth was so dry that he
￿ had to go to get himself something to
drink.
[C
￿ = Mackintosh (His
￿ , he
￿ ); C
￿ = Mackintosh; Tr = SMOOTH-SHIFT]
mechanisms to be able to account for the full range of referring expression phenomena. We do not overlook
the need for such an effort.
58d. The Chinese cook
￿ silently put a chair for him
￿ .
[C
￿ = Mackintosh (him
￿ ); C
￿ = Cook; Tr = RETAIN]
Somerset Maugham; Mackintosh
￿ SMOOTH-SHIFT
  SMOOTH-SHIFT:
In the ﬁnal Transition sequence in (49), it is easy to see how E1 and E2 are not met
from (49b) through (49c). The speaker does not realize the Preferred Center of (49c),
“Walker”, in (49d), and is thus obliged to use a proper name for the Non-preferred
Center that is in fact realized.15
(49) a. Walker
￿ , shaking his
￿ ﬁst at him
￿ , called him
￿ every name he
￿ could
think of. (him
￿ = Manuma)
[C
￿ = Manuma (him
￿ ); C
￿ = Walker]
b. He
￿ riddled him
￿ with scorn.
[C
￿ = Walker (He
￿ ); C
￿ = Walker; Tr = SMOOTH-SHIFT]
c. Manuma
￿ sat still and smiled.
[C
￿ = Manuma; C
￿ = Manuma; Tr = SMOOTH-SHIFT]
Somerset Maugham; Mackintosh
15 In this case, there is a possibility of an inference obtaining in (49d) with the use of a pronoun, though.
“Walker” has been portrayed in the previous utterances as being very agitated, and as such is unlikely to be
the one who could be sitting still. This raises an interesting question with regard to how speakers decide how
much inferential information is enough such that they can generate the pronoun. Generation systems that
make use of CR-CM algorithm will need to deﬁne these inference-based thresholds. At this point, it is not
clear whether these choices are principled or random.
592.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, westarted outwith showingthat Centering speciﬁes only one constraint that
can be used to determine the choices made by speakers for referring expression forms. We
thenshowedthatifwestartedoutwithprimitiveGriceanprinciplesof cooperativebehavior,
we could then incorporate, in addition to Rule 1, other implicit suggestions made within
Centering to explicitly formulate an algorithm for the generation of referring expression
forms. The algorithm was formulated in terms of hearer-based expectations and speaker-
based constraints.
In order to show how well the algorithm could be applied to natural language, we de-
ﬁned the domain of its application in terms of the Centering Transition sequences and il-
lustrated with naturally occurring discourses (as well as constructed examples for the Tran-
sition sequences that we were not able to identify) that the algorithm was able to account
for the observed patterns of anaphoric reference.
We also pointed out that the CR-CM algorithm could be used for modelling generation
systems. However, it must be kept in mind that such generation systems need to sepa-
rate the tasks of structural processes and inferential reasoning. In the CR-CM algorithm,
three of the four constraints, that is, C1a, C1b, and C3, have a conditional clause that is
intended to capture this separation between the structural and inferential mechanisms.16 To
the extent that a generation system has been successful in modeling inferential reasoning,
we believe that the CR-CM algorithm can be usefully applied to generate the appropriate
referring expressions in natural language discourses. In the last Transition sequence, i.e.,
for SMOOTH-SHIFT
  SMOOTH-SHIFT, we noted that there was a possible inference that
could have obtained from utterance (49) if a pronoun had been used instead of the proper
16The idea of separating the structural mechanisms from inferential ones, especially at the discourse level,
has also been advocated elsewhere in work related to the modeling of discourse structure and meaning (Web-
ber & Joshi, 1998).
60name Manuma (see fn. 15). The current state of the art in the modeling of inferential rea-
soning, at least with respect to referring expression forms, does not allow us to predict how
much inference is sufﬁcient for the generation of a pronoun instead of a descriptive noun
phrase. In Centering, the relationship that is established between coherence and referring
expression forms (see Chapter 1, Section 1.5.3) predicts that some inferences are harder
than others. The amount of inference that a hearer needs to make is not quantiﬁed in any
way within Centering, so modeling the application of the CR-CM conditional clauses that
embody inference-related constraints can only result in an approximation of how referring
expressions are used in naturally occurring discourse.
Finally, it is not the case that inferences in natural language are just “easy” or “hard”,
as Centering claims, for this entails that there is always some source in the discourse from
which the necessary inferences can be drawn, especially when pronouns are used where
structural Centering constraints rule this out. However, there is also the possibility that
there is no available source, easy or hard to ﬁnd, that hearers can use to make the necessary
inferences. In natural language, this typically results in “misunderstandings”. Of course,
for the creation of artiﬁcial generation systems, we are probably better off in not modeling
such naturally occurring instances!
61Chapter 3
Relative Salience and Anaphoric
Reference in Hindi
In the previous chapter, we developed a constraint-based algorithm for generating referring
expression forms based on primitive Gricean principles and the Centering model. We also
pointed out that in order to use the algorithm, generation systems need to recognize the
need for separating structural processes from inferential mechanisms, and that they need to
have successfully modeled an inferential reasoning component.
Our particular goal in this thesis is to address issues related to the generation of re-
ferring expression forms in Hindi. In the previous chapter, the generation algorithm was
formulated using evidence from English, and this raises the question of whether the same
algorithm can be used across languages. We believe that the algorithm is general enough
to be applied to any language to the extent that the expectations and constraints formulated
in the algorithm are based on speaker and hearer behavior, and it is unlikely that languages
will exhibit variation in this respect. However, there is one parameter in the algorithm
that is language-speciﬁc. This is the linguistic criterion that determines the ranking of the
forward-looking centers list. A look at the algorithm shows the predominance of the Pre-
62ferred Center – appearing in expectation E1 – the constraints which ultimately decide the
form of referring expressions. This means that in order to apply the algorithm in any lan-
guage, we need to be able to ﬁrst identify the Preferred Center of utterances. The Preferred
Center is the most highly ranked entity of the forward-looking centers list, with the ranking
being determined by the degree of discourse salience associated with the entities or centers.
Previous research has established that languages exhibit variation in this respect, i.e., the
factors that are responsible for ranking discourse entities evoked in utterances vary from
language to language. As such, in order to apply the algorithm for generation in Hindi, we
need to ﬁrst identify the factors that determine discourse salience in the language, so that
the Preferred Center can then be identiﬁed.
Thischapterﬁrstmakesacontributiontowardssettingthesaliencedetermininglanguage-
speciﬁc parameter for Hindi. In Section 3.1, we propose a language-independent corpus-
based method for identifying the factors that determine discourse salience. The methodol-
ogy we propose utilizes Rule 1 of Centering theory. In Section 3.2, we apply the proposed
methodology to investigate three linguistic factors as the determinants of relative salience
in Hindi: grammatical function, word order, and information status. Our results show that
grammatical function has a signiﬁcant effect on discourse salience and that word order and
information status do not any show any effect.
Using the results from the
￿
$
# list ranking criteria for Hindi, in Section 3.3 we provide
a Centering analysis of zero pronouns in Hindi.
633.1 Determination of Relative Salience
3.1.1 Related Cross-linguistic Work
A good deal of cross-linguistic research on discourse anaphoric relations has been con-
ducted within the framework of Centering theory and much of this has focused on how the
ranking of the forward looking centers list varies from language to language. The original
suggestion in Centering was that grammatical function was the determining factor. How-
ever, this conclusion was based on English, a ﬁxed word order language. Later work in
different languages has suggested that different criteria may be at play cross-linguistically.
For instance, Walker et al. (1994) show that in addition to grammatical function, the
￿
%
# list
ranking in Japanese is also determined by topic and empathy. The topic may be a gram-
matical topic (marked by wa in Japanese) or a zero topic, which is inferred relative to other
overt forms in the utterance. Empathy is marked on verbs to indicate “...the speaker’s
identiﬁcation with a person or thing that participates in the event or state that he describes
in a sentence...” (Kuno, 1987). Walker et al. (1994) argue for the following ranking
criteria for Japanese: topic (grammatical/zero)
  empathy
  subject
  object
  other(s).
Based on this, they also propose, more generally, that the
￿
$
# ranking is language-speciﬁc
depending on the means the language provides for indicating discourse function. Research
on other languages suggest the effect of still other factors. Rambow (1993) argues that
the ranking in German follows the surface order position for entities evoked in the Mit-
telfeld, and Gordon et al. (1993) suggest for English that sentence-initial position seems
to contribute to salience, even in the case of non-subjects. Turan (1995) argues that the
￿
%
# ranking in Turkish is associated with either grammatical relation or a semantic role
hierarchy. She also provides evidence to show that word order is not a determining factor
for Turkish. In work earlier to Centering, Sidner (1979) suggested that thematic relations
are used for determining the salience of discourse entities, and Stevenson et al. (1993),
64Stevenson & Urbanowicz (1995) also show that thematic role has an effect on which entity
is likely to be spoken of next, arguing that the entity that is the GOAL of the predicate is
more salient than the entity that is the SOURCE, irrespective of the grammatical function
associated with the entities.
While most of the research for determining the ranking of the
￿
$
# list has assumed that
the criteria are language-speciﬁc, Strube & Hahn (1996), on the basis of empirical evidence
from German, a free word order language, make the claim that the ranking criteria for the
￿
%
# list should be determined by the functional status of the discourse entities, not only
for German, but also for other languages. In other words, they argue that such a ranking
may be a cross-linguistic universal, claiming in particular that it is extendable to ﬁxed
word order languages like English. The functional distinctions they use for their ranking
is in terms of the Praguian notions (Haji
&cov´ a et al., 1992; 1995) of context-boundedness
versus context-unboundedness, which they state corresponds to the distinction between
given information/theme and new information/rheme.1 Context-bound elements are ranked
higher than context-unbound elements. Bound elements are further divided into different
types and ranked in the following manner: anaphora
  possessive pronoun or elliptical
antecedent
  elliptical expression or head of anaphoric expression.2 Finally, for the cases
where they may be multiple occurrences of the elements with the same information status,
they provide a ranking in terms of linear order, from left to right.
1These notions are reformulated in terms of Prince (1992)’s classiﬁcation of information status in Strube
(1998).
2The terms elliptical antecedents and elliptical expressions refer to inferrables ((Prince, 1981; 1992)) and
are not to be confused with the phenomenon of ellipsis which relates to elided elements.
653.1.2 Methodology for Determining Salience
All previous efforts that have applied methods and strategies to determine the relative
salience of discourse entities in terms of linguistically encoded properties have used con-
structed examples together with native speaker judgments of preferred interpretations to
determine the ranking of the
￿
%
# list. Broadly, these methods can be grouped into two
types. In one kind of method (Walker et al., 1990; 1994), applied to Japanese, examples
were constructed as discourses consisting of four utterances. The ﬁrst utterance introduces
a discourse entity, which is established as the Backward-looking Center in the second utter-
ance. In the third utterance, there is a zero pronominal that refers to the Backward-looking
Center of the second utterance, and also a new entity is introduced in the same utterance.
Finally, the fourth utterance contains two zeros, intended to create ambiguity between the
two entities in the third utterance. The test for salience was conducted by manipulating fac-
tors related to the two entities in the third and fourth utterances, i.e., by varying whether an
entity was realized in subject or object position in the third utterance, whether an entity re-
alized in subject position was ga-marked or wa-marked in the third utterance, and whether
an entity realized in the fourth utterance in object position was marked as the locus of the
speaker’s empathy. Native speaker judgments were then elicited for the interpretation of
the two zeros in the fourth utterance. However, since the variable of interest in these dis-
courses was the ranking of the two entities in the third utterance, rather than have the native
speakers rank the entities, ﬁrst a BFP algorithm style (Brennan et al., 1987) of generating
multiple possible
￿
%
# lists for the third and the fourth utterances was employed and then the
native speakers were asked to pick the correct interpretation for the fourth utterance. Since
each different interpretation yielded a different
￿
$
# list, this procedure essentially pointed
to the ranking of the entities in the
￿
%
# list.
The examplein (50) from Walkeret al. (1994) illustrates theapplication of their method
for comparing zero topics with subjects.
66(50) a. Hanako
￿
Hanako
￿
wa
TOP/SUBJ
siken
exam
o
OBJ
oete,
ﬁnish
kyoositu
classroom
ni
to
modorimasita
returned
“Hanako returned to the classroom, ﬁnishing her exams”
C
￿ = Hanako;
C
￿ =
￿ Hanako, exam
￿
b. 0
￿
SUBJ
￿
hom
book
o
OBJ
locker
locker
ni
in
simaimasita
took-away
“She put her books in her locker”
C
￿ = Hanako;
C
￿ =
￿ Hanako, Book
￿ ;
Tr = CONTINUE
c. Itumo
always
no yooni
like
Mitiko
￿
Mitiko
￿
ga
SUBJ
0
OBJ2
mondai
problem
no tokikata
solve-way
o
￿
OBJ
￿
setumeisidasimasita
explained
“Mitiko, as usual, explained (to Hanako) how to solve the problem”
C
￿ = Hanako;
C
￿ 1 =
￿ Hanako, Mitiko, solution
￿ ZTA (TOP, SUBJ, OBJ);
Tr1 = CONTINUE;
C
￿ 2 =
￿ Mitiko, Hanako, solution
￿ (SUBJ, OBJ2, OBJ);
Tr2 = RETAIN
d. 0
￿
￿
’
￿
￿
SUBJ
￿
￿
’
￿
￿
0
￿
￿
’
￿
￿
OBJ
￿
￿
’
￿
￿
ohiru
lunch
ni
to
sasoimasita
invited
“(Hanako) invited (Mitiko) to lunch”
C
￿ 1 = Hanako;
C
￿ 1 from C
￿ 1(c) =
￿ Hanako, lunch, Mitiko
￿ (SUBJ, OBJ2, OBJ);
Tr1 = CONTINUE;
C
￿ 2 from C
￿ 2(c) =
￿ Mitiko, lunch, Hanako
￿ (SUBJ, OBJ2,OBJ);
Tr2 = SMOOTH-SHIFT
In (50c), there are two possible
￿
%
# s, using different rankings for the subject, “Mitiko”,
and the zero object, “Hanako”. With this example, Walker et al. (1994) establish the zero
topic assignment (ZTA) rule so that zero topics take precedence over the subject when the
two don’t coincide. With the ZTA in effect, the zero (object) topic is ranked higher than
the subject, and the Transition for (50c) is a CONTINUE. Without the ZTA, the subject
is ranked higher than the object and the Transition is a RETAIN. In (50d), which has no
topic or empathy marking, the subject takes precedence over the object. However, there are
67two possible interpretations for the zeros, yielding two different
￿
%
# lists. The results from
native speaker judgments about the interpretation of the zeros in (50d) show that the
￿
%
# 1
interpretation is preferred, i.e., the one that results from the ZTA ranking in (50c), with the
zero topic entity ranked higher than the subject entity.
In the other method, seen in the work for Turkish (Turan, 1998), German (Rambow,
1993) etc., constructed examples are again used to determine the preferred interpretation
of a single pronoun that is ambiguous syntactically and semantically between two entities
realized in the previous utterance. The assumption followed here is Gricean in that, in an
ambiguous context, the speaker is expected to use an underspeciﬁed expression such as a
pronoun to provide the default interpretation to the hearer. The default interpretation means
resolution of the pronoun to the maximally salient entity of the previous utterance. When
comparing the salience of two entities, this method provides the relative ranking for the
two entities, which can then be further analyzed in terms of their linguistic properties.
The examples in (51) and (52) from Rambow (1993) illustrates the application of such a
method to determine the ordering of the entities in the Mittelfeld in German. The example
discourses are constructed as question-answer pairs. The question contains a subject NP
and an indirect object NP, and both are of feminine gender. The answer contains a feminine
nominative pronoun. The only difference between (51) and (52) is that the two entities
“Ma
( nahme” and “russischen Wirtschaft” are realized in different orders. The coindexing
of the pronoun in the (b) utterances shows that the order in which the entities are realized in
the(a) utterancesaffectstheinterpretation ofthe ambiguouspronoun. Fromsuchexamples,
Rambow (1993) concludes that the word order of the entities in the Mittelfeld in German
takes precedence over their grammatical function.
(51) a. Frage:
Question:
Glauben
Think
Sie,
you,
Da
(
that
[eine solche Ma
( nahme]
￿
[a such measure]
￿
[der russischen Wirtschaft]
￿
[the Russian economy]
￿
helfen
help
kann?
can?
68“Do you think that such a measure can help the Russian economy?”
b. Antwort:
Answer:
Nein,
No,
sie
￿
she
￿
ist
is
viel
much
zu
too
primitiv
primitive
“No, it is much too primitive”
(52) a. Frage: GlaubenSie, Da
( [derrussischenWirtschaft]
￿ [einesolcheMa
( nahme]
￿
helfen kann?
b. Antwort: Nein, sie
￿ ist viel zu primitiv
While the methods used above are reliable for the determination of salience, we are in-
terested in looking at naturally-occurring discourses to the extent that they provide us with
the best kind of empirical evidence, especially with respect to discourse-related phenom-
ena. We therefore start with the assumption that the form of referring expressions used by
speakers in naturally-occurring discourse are valuable sources of information about the de-
gree of salience attributed to discourse entities. Furthermore, a closer study of the linguistic
properties of the phrases realizing these entities will ultimately allow us to abstract the fea-
tures that are responsible for determining salience. We propose to use a reformulation of
Rule 1, as stated in Figure 3.1.
Reformulated Rule 1:
If there are two entities realized in utterance
)
+
* and also in U
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ , and if one
of them is realized with a pronoun, then this entity must be the more salient
of the two in U
￿ .
Figure 3.1: Reformulated Rule 1 for Determining Relative Salience
In Chapter 2, Section 2.1, we showed how the Gricean principles, when reformulated
with respect to anaphoric expressions, could explain to quite an extent when and why
speakers choose to use more informative forms or less informative forms of reference. We
also showed that, for cases where two entities were realized across (adjacent) utterances
69and where using pronouns for both entities would lead to an ambiguity in the interpre-
tation of the pronouns, those same principles only constrained the speaker to use a more
informative expression for one of the entities, but did not specify for the speaker which
of the two entities this should be.3 We pointed out that the choice depended on the rela-
tive (discourse) salience of the entities and that this was captured by Rule 1. Given that
the Backward-looking Center of
)
+
*
￿
￿
-
, points to the maximally salient entity of
)
+
* that is
realized in U
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ , and Rule 1 itself, which states that if anything is realized as a pronoun,
the Backward-looking Center is, we can predict that when the Gricean conditions for over-
informativeness hold, speakers will be over-informative with the entity that is less salient,
since otherwise it would constitute a Rule 1 violation. Rule 1 in this sense is generative
since it is a constraint on speakers. Our reformulation of Rule 1 is intended to capture this
idea. The above-described preconditions/criteria for the choice of over-informativenessare
stated explicitly in Figure 3.2. That is, the criteria apply to utterance pairs,
)
+
* and
)
+
*
￿
￿
-
, ,
in which speakers have made an over-informativeness choice with one of the entities in
)
+
*
￿
￿
-
, . In addition, however, the reformulated rule holds only for utterance pairs in which
two entities are realized in
)
+
* as well as in
)
+
*
￿
￿
-
, and the two entities are ambiguous in
)
+
*
in terms of their grammatical features so that using pronouns for both the entities in
)
+
*
￿
￿
-
,
would lead to incorrect interpretation assignments or would confuse the hearer.
The exact procedure for determining the relative salience of entities in any utterance
)
+
*
is as follows: if two discourse entities
. and
/ in
)
+
* are both realized in
)
+
*
￿
￿
-
, , with only
/ being realized as a pronoun (in
)
+
*
￿
￿
-
, ), then
/ must be the
￿
1
0 of
)
+
*
￿
￿
-
, and must refer
to the highest ranked of all the entities in
)
+
* that are realized in
)
+
*
￿
￿
-
, . Since
. and
/ are
the only two entities in
)
2
* realized in
)
+
*
￿
￿
-
, ,
/ must be ranked higher than
. (or be more
salient than
. ). Conversely, if it is
. (and not
/ ) that is realized as a pronoun in
)
+
*
￿
￿
-
, ,
then by the same reasoning,
. must be more salient than
/ in
)
2
* .
3Note thatthesameproblemwouldariseifthereweremorethantwoentitiesrealizedacrosstheutterances.
70In an utterance pair,
)
+
* and
)
+
*
￿
￿
-
, :
(1.) There are at least two entities realized in
)
+
* and they are ambiguous with
respect to grammatical features such as number, gender, person, honoriﬁcity (for
languages like Hindi in which honoriﬁcity is grammaticized).
(2.)
)
+
*
￿
￿
-
, , realizes only two of such ambiguous entities from
)
2
* .
(3.) In
)
2
*
￿
￿
-
, , only one of the NPs realizing these entities is pronominalized.
Figure 3.2: Criteria for Utterance Pairs for Reformulated Rule 1
Applying this rule in the discourse in (53), which satisﬁes the utterance pair criteria
in Figure 3.2, we can conclude from the referring expression forms in (53b) that in (53a),
“Herzog” is more salient than “Herzog’s father”. Using pronouns for both the entities in
)
+
*
￿
￿
-
, would have led to an incorrect interpretation, or would at least confuse the hearer.
Gricean principles constrain the hearer to use a more informative expression for one of the
entities, and Rule 1 directs the speaker to be over-informative with the less salient entity.
In the observed utterance, since it is “Herzog’s father” that is realized by the speaker as a
full noun phrase, we can infer that he is the less salient of the two entities in
)
+
* . Similarly,
the use of the over-informative form Moses and the pronominal form he in (53c) indicates
that in (53b), “Herzog’s father” is more salient than “Herzog” (or “Moses”).4
4Since this is an English example, and since we are following the assumption that the ranking of entities in
English utterances is mainly determined by grammatical function, then according to the CR-CM algorithm,
the expectations E1 and E2 are met in (53c). As such, the speaker is free to use pronouns for both the entities.
However,we can explain this example by C1a, which says that if E1 and E2 are met, then realize both entities
as pronouns just in case no additional inference needs to be conveyed. If some additional inference does need
to be conveyed, the speaker does this by using a full noun phrase for the relevant entity. In (53c), we argue
that there is indeed some additional inference that the writer makes by using the alternative proper name used
for “Herzog” in the text, namely, Moses. Moses is “Herzog’s” ﬁrst name and since the utterance is from the
point of view of “Herzog’s father”, the writer presumably intended to convey a personalization of “Herzog”
from the point of view of his father.
71(53) a. Herzog
￿ was broke, and asked his father
￿ to underwrite a loan.
b. The old man
￿ questioned him
￿ narrowly, about his
￿ job, his
￿ expenses, his
￿
child.
c. He
￿ had no patience with Moses
￿ . (Moses = Herzog)
Saul Bellow; “Herzog”
Given the reformulation of Rule 1 and its relevance for salience determination, we can
then search corpora for utterance pairs
)
+
* and
)
+
*
￿
￿
-
, which satisfy the conditions given in
Figure 3.2. Once the utterance pairs havebeen identiﬁed in the corpus, they can be encoded
for various linguistic features that are hypothesized to have a bearing on discourse salience.
These features can then be analyzed to ascertain which features turn out to be signiﬁcant
for the relative salience of entities in each pair, and subsequently, across the entire sample.
We emphasize that the use of Rule 1 of the Centering model in this method does not
make the method circular. The circularity argument could be made in the following way:
we are using the
￿
1
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4
3
5
)
+
*
￿
￿
-
,
7
6 for the computation of the
￿
$
#
8
3
9
)
+
*
:
6 list ranking, but according
to the statement in Rule 1, the identiﬁcation of the
￿
1
0
4
3
9
)
2
*
￿
￿
-
,
7
6 is itself dependent on the
ranking of the discourse entities in
￿
$
#
;
3
9
)
2
*
<
6 list. Anticipating this argument, we note that
there is indeed a possible scenario of pronominalization where this circularity would arise;
this is the case where, given a pair of utterances
)
+
* and
)
2
*
￿
￿
-
, , there is more than one
pronoun in
)
+
*
￿
￿
-
, . In this situation, identifying the
￿
1
0
4
3
9
)
2
*
￿
￿
-
,
7
6 (which, of course, has to be
one of the pronouns) is wholly dependent on the ranking of the
￿
%
#
=
3
9
)
+
*
:
6 list. However,
our method exploits the scenario in which there is only one pronoun in
)
+
*
￿
￿
-
, , and in this
case, the
￿
1
0
4
3
5
)
+
*
￿
￿
-
,
7
6 can be identiﬁed as the pronoun itself, without relying on knowing the
ranking of the
￿
%
#
8
3
5
)
+
*
<
6 list. The identiﬁcation of the
￿
>
0
4
3
5
)
+
*
￿
￿
-
,
￿
6 in this way is also directly
justiﬁed by a corollary of Rule 1: if there is a single pronoun in
)
2
*
￿
￿
-
, , then it is the
￿
1
0
of
)
+
*
￿
￿
-
, . Note that our method also imposes another requirement on the type of utterance
pairs selected, namely, that there be two (and only two) entities realized from
)
2
* to
)
+
*
￿
￿
-
,
72with (only) one of them being realized as a pronoun in
)
+
*
￿
￿
-
, . This is a crucial requirement
in that it allowsus to compare the relativesalience of any two entities in any givenutterance
pair, and ﬁnally, in the corpus.
3.2 Relative Salience in Hindi
In this section, we apply the method proposed in the previous section for determining some
of the factors that affect discourse salience in Hindi, a free word order language. We ﬁrst
give a brief description of some key grammatical aspects of the language, then describe the
corpus from which the sample utterance pairs were extracted, and ﬁnally present the results
obtained with respect to the salience-determining factors in the language.
3.2.1 Language Description and Data Extraction
Language Description
The default word orderin Hindi issubject – indirectobject – direct object– verb(S-IO-DO-
V). However, the language allows many other permutations, as shown in (54). Word order
variation in Hindi has been argued to signal distinctions in meaning relating to information
structure (Gambhir (1981), among others). Hindi also has a rich case system, though case
marking is not obligatory.
(54) a. malay-ne
malay-ERG
sameer-ko
sameer-DAT
kitaab
book-ACC
dii
gave
(S-IO-DO-V) – DEFAULT
“Malay gave the book to Sameer”
b. malay-ne kitaab sameer-ko dii (S-DO-IO-V)
c. sameer-ko malay-ne kitaab dii (IO-S-DO-V)
d. sameer-ko kitaab malay-ne dii (IO-DO-S-V)
e. kitaab malay-ne sameer-ko dii (DO-S-IO-V)
73f. kitaab sameer-ko malay-ne dii (DO-IO-S-V)
Pronouns in Hindi exhibit a great deal of ambiguity. Third person pronouns5 are not
fully marked for number, honoriﬁcity6, and not at all marked for gender7 (unlike English,
cf. He/She). With respect to number marking, while some forms, like usne ‘he’, usko
‘him’, are unambiguously singular, some forms can be both singular and plural, like un-
hone ‘he/they’, or unko ‘him/them’. Table 3.1 shows the third person pronouns and the
nominal features for which they are speciﬁed.8 A look at the table reveals that there are no
unambiguous pronouns in Hindi.
Pronouns number gender honoriﬁcity
sg. masc./fem. hon vah
sg. masc./fem. nhon.
pl. masc./fem. hon.
pl. masc./fem. nhon. ve
pl. fem. nhon.
sg. masc./fem. hon.
us-ne sg. masc./fem. nhon.
pl. masc./fem. hon. unho-ne
sg. masc./fem. hon.
sg. masc./fem. nhon. us-X
sg. masc./fem. nhon.
pl. masc./fem. hon.
un-X pl. masc./fem. nhon.
sg. masc./fem. hon.
Table 3.1: Pronominal Features in Hindi for the 3rd Person Paradigm
The verbal agreement paradigm in the language reduces some of the ambiguity intro-
duced by the pronominal system. Hindi has verb agreement with the subject or the direct
object. The agreement inﬂection is marked for person, number, and gender. Agreement oc-
5First and second person pronouns are systematically excluded from this study.
6Honoriﬁcity is marked on animate nouns.
7 However, all the nouns have semantic gender (masculine or feminine), though there are no overt mor-
phological reﬂexes of this.
8ne
? Ergative case; X
? Other cases; hon.=honoriﬁc; nhon=non-honoriﬁc; sg.=singular; pl.=plural;
masc.=masculine; fem.=feminine
74curs with the subject in the imperfective aspect and with the object in the perfective aspect.
The verb also agrees with the object when the subject is dative. The verb may also bear the
default neuter afﬁx which is 3rd person masculine singular. This occurs in the perfective
aspect, when the object is marked with the postposition -ko, which blocks verbal agree-
ment. Table 3.2 presents the third person inﬂectional features of the verbal sufﬁxes. As can
be seen in the table, the unambiguous gender marking with the verbal sufﬁxes completely
compensates for the absence of gender marking on pronouns. However, ambiguity remains
with some of the other features, especially number. As we saw above, number marking is
only partially speciﬁed with pronouns as well.
verbal
sufﬁxes
number gender honoriﬁcity
-aa sg. masc./neuter nhon.
pl. masc. hon.
-e pl. masc. nhon.
sg. masc. hon.
sg. fem. nhon. -ii
sg. fem. nhon.
pl. fem. hon.
-iin pl. fem. nhon.
sg. fem. hon.
Table 3.2: Verbal Inﬂection in Hindi for the 3rd Person Paradigm
The following examples show the interaction of the pronominal system with the ver-
bal agreement system in Hindi for the disambiguation of the pronouns. The examples
show that, despite the interaction of the two inﬂectional paradigms in the language, there
is grammatical ambiguity for the pronouns in all cases except for (55) and (56).
(55) vah
PRO-NOM-3.sg.masc/fem.nhon.
jaa
go
rahaa-hai
be-PROG-3.sg.masc.nhon.
“He is going”
(56) vah
PRO-NOM-3.sg.masc/fem.nhon.
jaa
go
rahii-hai
be-PROG-3.sg.fem.nhon.
75“She is going”
(57) ve
PRO-NOM-3.sg/pl.masc/fem.nhon/hon.
jaa
go
rahe-haiN
be-PROG-3.sg/pl.masc.nhon/hon.
“He/They (masc.) are going”
(58) ve
PRO-NOM-3.sg/pl.masc/fem.nhon/hon.
jaa
go
rahii-hain
be-PROG-3.sg/pl.fem.nhon/hon.
“He/They (fem.) are going”
(59) usne
PRO-ERG-3.sg.masc/fem.nhon.
khaanaa
food
khaayaa
ate-PERF-3.sg.masc/fem.nhon.
“He/She ate food”
(60) unhone
PRO-ERG-3.sg/pl.masc/fem.nhon/hon.
khaanaa
food
khaayaa
ate-PERF-3.sg.masc/fem.nhon/hon.
“He/She/They ate food”
(61) usne
PRO-ERG-3.sg.masc/fem.nhon.
kitaab
book-3.sg.fem.
paRhii
read-PERF-3.sg.fem.
“He/She read the book”
(62) unhone
PRO-ERG-3.sg/pl.masc/fem.nhon./hon.
kitaab
book-3.sg.fem.nhon.
paRhii
read-PERF-3.sg.fem.nhon.
“He/She/They read the book”
(63) usko
PRO-DAT-3.sg.masc/fem.nhon.
kitaab
book-3.sg.fem.
mil-rahii-hai
get-PROG-3.sg.fem.
“He/She is getting the book”
(64) usko
PRO-DAT-3.sg.masc/fem.nhon.
ghar
house-3.sg.masc.
mil-rahaa-hai
get-PROG-3.sg.masc.
“He/She is getting the house”
(65) unko
PRO-DAT-3.sg/pl.masc/fem.nhon/hon.
kitaab
book-3.sg.fem.
mil-rahii-hai
get-PROG-3.sg.fem.
“He/She/They is getting the book”
76(66) unko
PRO-DAT-3.sg/pl.masc/fem.nhon/hon.
ghar
house-3.sg.masc.
mil-rahaa-hai
get-PROG-3.sg.masc.
“He/She/They is getting the house”
(67) raam
raam-NOM-3.sg.masc.nhon.
usko
PRO-ACC-3.sg.masc/fem.nhon.
dekh
see
rahaa-hai
be-PROG-3.sg.masc.nhon.
“Ram is looking at him/her”
(68) raam
raam-NOM-3.sg.masc.nhon.
unko
PRO-ACC-3.sg/pl.masc/fem.nhon/hon.
dekh
see
rahaa
be-PROG-3.sg.masc.nhon.
hai
“Ram is looking at him/her/them”
(69) raam-ne
raam-ERG-3.sg.masc.nhon.
usko
PRO-ACC-3.sg.masc/fem.nhon.
dekhaa
see-PERF-neut.
“Ram saw him/her”
(70) raam
raam-ERG-3.sg.masc.nhon.
ne
PRO-ACC-3.sg/pl.masc/fem.nhon/hon.
unko
see-PERF-neut.
dekhaa
“Ram saw him/her/them”
(71) usne
PRO-ERG-3.sg.masc/fem.nhon.
usko
PRO-ACC-3.sg.masc/fem.nhon.
dekhaa
see-PERF-neut.
“He/She saw him/her”
(72) unhone
PRO-ERG-3.sg/pl.masc/fem.nhon/hon.
unko
PRO-ACC-3.sg/pl.masc/fem.nhon/hon.
dekhaa
see-PERF-neut.
“He/She/They saw him/her/them”
Possessivepronouns inHindi showgenderagreement with thehead nouns, whicharises
from the inherent gender in Hindi nouns (also see fn 7). (73) gives examples of possessive-
77head gender agreement.9 Note, however, the noun agreement does not provide any gram-
matical information for the interpretation of the pronoun.
(73) a. uskii
PRO-POSS-3.sg.fem.
maa
mother-3.sg.fem.
“Ram’s mother”
b. uskii
PRO-POSS-3.pl.fem
kitaabeN
books-3.pl.fem
“Ram’s books”
c. uske
PRO-POSS-3.sg.masc.hon.
pitaa
father-3.sg.masc.hon.
“Ram’s father”
d. uske
PRO-POSS-3.pl.masc.
kapRe
clothes-3.pl.masc.
“Ram’s clothes”
e. uskaa
PRO-POSS-3.sg.masc.
sar
head-3.sg.masc.
“Ram’s head”
Hindi also has zero pronouns, but their occurrence is heavily constrained, unlike in
Italian (Jaeggli & Saﬁr (1989)) or Japanese (Kameyama (1985)). In Section 3.3, we look
at the constraints on the use of zero pronouns in Hindi.
Noun phrases in Hindi may be bare or may appear with a demonstrative article like
ye/yah ‘this’, vo/vah ‘that’, and ve ‘those’. There is an indeﬁnite article ek which is mor-
phologically identical to the numeral ‘one’. Following the classiﬁcation in Prince (1992),
the NPs with the indeﬁnite article usually refer to hearer-new and discourse-new entities,
whereas NPs with the null/overtdeﬁnite article usually refer to hearer-old and/or discourse-
old entities.
9The honoriﬁc marking in Hindi is homonymous with the plural marking.
78Corpus and Data Extraction
For the Hindi corpus, we collected 40 short stories and 10 news articles. The stories and ar-
ticles were chosen such that (a) they contained at least two characters who appear through-
out the text, and (b) these two characters were referred to in third person and in the same
gender. These conditions provided a qualitative bottom threshold for the extraction of ut-
terance pairs satisfying the criteria speciﬁed in Figure 3.2.
For identifying and extracting the utterance pairs in the selected texts, we ﬁrst had to
decide what counted as an utterance. One of the very important issues for a theory of dis-
course is to determine what constitutes the utterance unit for generating the
￿
%
# list in com-
plex sentences. In early work in Centering, the notion of the utterance was left loose, and
the conclusions that were drawn about the use of referring expressions and the effect of this
on discourse coherence were based on simple sentences without any complex/embedded
structures. In particular, for most of the work, the utterance was identiﬁed with either the
tensed clause or the sentence, without there being any motivated criteria for why one or the
other qualiﬁed as the utterance unit for discourse processing. The results of the application
of the Centering principles and the CR-CM algorithm will, however, vary depending on
how complex sentences are treated, both for the calculation of coherence as well as for the
generation and resolution of referring expressions.
The speciﬁcation of the utterance unit also becomes particularly important for deter-
mining the ranking of discourse entities. Since discourse entities are evoked by utterance
units, no ranking methodology can be applied unless the basic unit from which the forward-
looking centers list is created is properly delimited. This issue of specifying the utterance
units has received a lot of attention in the literature, and radically different accounts are
found for the treatment of complex sentences. Some, like Kameyama (1998), break up
complex sentences into separate units, whereas others like Strube (1998) and Miltsakaki
(1999), treat some or all of them as a single unit. For the purposes of applying our method
79for determining salience, however, we were faced with the problem of how to proceed
without a proper speciﬁcation of what counts as an utterance. In Chapter 4, we provide an
analysis for the proper treatment of relative clauses, suggesting an approach where relative
clauses are distinguished into two different classes, each class to be treated differently with
respect to their utterance status. Here, we merely identify the two classes and provide the
speciﬁcation of their utterance status. The reader is referred to Chapter 4 for the motivation
behind this classiﬁcation.
￿ Class 1: comprises non-restrictives, appositives, and indeﬁnite restrictives, and these
should be treated as forming an independent but embedded utterance unit.
￿ Class 2: comprises the deﬁnite restrictives and these should be treated as part of the
unit created by the clause in which they occur.
For other types of complex sentences, we make the following assumptions, adopting
results from work done by different researchers but based on what we believe to be the
correct approach for each type of sentence.
￿ Simple sentences are utterances.
￿ Subordinateclausesarepartofthemainclauseunitandentitiesinsubordinateclauses
are ranked lower than entities evoked in the main clause.
￿ Tenseless adjunct clauses are part of the main clause unit and entities in these clauses
are lower ranked than entities in the main clause.
￿ Conjunct clauses form separate utterance units at the same level of embedding.
￿ Nonreport complements are part of the main clause unit and entities in the comple-
ment clause are ranked lower than entities in the main clause.
80￿ Reported complements are part of the main clause unit but entities in these comple-
ments are inaccessible to the higher level of embedding.
We restricted the extraction of utterance pairs to those in which one of the entities in
)
+
* was the subject. In Prasad & Strube (2000), we looked at a larger set of utterance
pairs including comparison between grammatical categories that did not include the sub-
ject. However, since we are here primarily interested in the comparison and interaction
between the different salience affecting factors, we focus on the subject cases only for the
purpose of comparison among the different factors.
3.2.2 Salience Determining Factors
Followingthe speciﬁcations and restrictions givenin the previous section, we extracted 414
utterance pairs from the corpus. These pairs were then studied for the linguistic properties
that we were interested in, namely, grammatical function, word order, and information sta-
tus. In this section, we present and discuss the results of our analysis. The main conclusion
that we were able to draw from our ﬁndings was that grammatical role is the main deter-
mining factor of discourse salience in Hindi, and that word order and information status
has no signiﬁcant effect.
Inthefollowingexamples, thetwoentitiesevokedineachoftheutterancesareindicated
in boldface and in square brackets, and coreference is indicated by coindexation. As noted
above in the criteria for the extraction of utterance pairs, in each pair the single pronoun is
ambiguous with respect to the grammatical features of the two entities whose salience is
being compared.
81Grammatical Function
With the subject as the grammatical role of one of the entities in
)
+
* , the other grammatical
categories that we were able to compare the subject with were direct object, indirect object,
PP object, and adjunct (adjuncts included noun phrase adjuncts or noun phrases occurring
inside phrasal or clausal adjuncts).10
Example (74) illustrates an example of an utterance pair containing the subject and the
direct object as the grammatical roles of the two entities realized in
)
+
* . Applying the Rule
1 reformulation, we can conclude that in (74a), the entity “savaariyaaN” is more salient or
highly ranked than “chaate” since both entities are realized in (74b) and it is “savaariyaaN”
10We also found many cases in which other categories could be compared with the subject. For example,
we found 50 instances in which the non-subject entity in
@
B
A was realized as the possessor of some argument.
While we have excluded such cases from the discussion here since they are not crucial to our point, we did in
fact ﬁnd that the subject was categorically more salient than the possessor in each case. (1) and (2) provide
examples of such cases:
(1) a. thoRe
few
hii
EMPH
dinoN
days
meN
in
[
C vah]
￿
[
C he]
￿
[
D
F
E
[
D
F
E
[
G
8
E
=
C
￿
C
D
H
E samraaT]
￿
[
G
8
E
=
C
￿
C
D
H
E king]
￿
kaa
of
vishvaaspaatra]
conﬁdant]
ban
become
gayaa
went
“In just a few days, he became the King’s conﬁdant”
b. [samraaT]
￿
[King]
￿
ne
ERG
[usko]
￿
[him]
￿
koshaadhyaksha
treasurer
banaa
be
diyaa
gave
“The king made him the treasurer.”
(2) a. yah
this
kahtaa
saying
huaa
happen
[
C kanhaiiyaalaal]
￿
[
C Kanhaiiyaalaal]
￿
[
G
8
G
;
E
[
G
8
G
;
E
[
G
8
E
=
C
￿
C
G
8
G
8
E mahaaraaj]
￿
[
G
8
E
=
C
￿
C
G
8
G
8
E King]
￿
ke
of
carRNoN]
feet]
par
on
gir
fall
paRaa
did
“Saying this, Kanhaiyalal fell at the King’s feet.”
b. [mahaaraaj]
￿
[king]
￿
[uskii]
￿
[his]
￿
saccaayii
honesty
se
with
prabhaavit
impressed
ho
be
gayaa
went
“The King was impressed with his honesty.”
82that is realized with a pronoun and not “chaate”. “savaariyaaN” is thus the Backward-
looking Center of (74b). To the extent that we are studying the grammatical role feature
of these entities at this stage, we can further conclude that it is the property of being the
subject in (74a) that makes “savaariyaaN” more salient than “chaate”, which is realized as
the direct object.
(74) a. aise
such
maukoN
occasions
par
on
[
I savaariyaaN]
￿
[
I passengers]
￿
[
J
L
K chaate]
￿
[
J
L
K umbrellas]
￿
taan
open
letii
take
haiN
3pl.fem.prs
“On such occasions the passengers open umbrellas”
b. kabhi-kabhi
sometimes
tej
fast
havaa
wind
se
with
[chaate]
￿
[umbrellas]
￿
[their]
￿
[their]
￿
haath
hands
se
from
urr
ﬂy
bhii
also
jaate
go
haiN
3pl.fem.prs
“Sometimes, because of the strong winds, the umbrellas even ﬂy away from
their hands”
Example (75) shows another comparison of the subject and the direct object for their
effect on salience. In (75b) it is the subject entity of (75a), “baadshaah”, and not the direct
object entity that is realized as the pronoun, and therefore, being the Backward-looking
Center of (75b), it counts as the more salient of the two entities in (75a).
(75) a. [ek baadshaah]
￿
[a king]
￿
[ek qaazii]
￿
[a judge]
￿
ko
ACC
bahut
much
maantaa
like-INF
thaa
did
“A king was very fond of a judge.”
b. [qaazii]
￿
[judge]
￿
ne
ERG
[uspar]
[him]
￿
apnii
SELF
vidvataa
knowledge
kaa
POSS
aisaa
such
raNg
color
jamaa
stuck-INF
rakkhaa
place-INF
thaa
had
ki
that
baadshaah
king
use
him
sarvagyaanii
all-knowing
samajhtaa
understand
thaa
did
“The judge had inﬂuenced him with his knowledge so much that the king
thought him to be all-knowing”
By the same argument, example (76) shows that the entity realized as the subject,
“shramik”, is ranked higher than the one realized as the object of the prepositional ar-
83gument of the verb, “yuvak”. Both the subject as well as the prepositional object in (76a)
are realized in (76b), but it is the subject that is pronominalized and therefore, it qualiﬁes
as the Backward-looking Center of (76b) and as more highly ranked than the prepositional
object in (76a).
(76) a. kuch
some
der
time
pashchaat,
after,
[
I ek shramik]
￿
[
I a laborer]
￿
[
M
N
M
[
M
N
M
[
M
H
K us yuvak]
￿
[
M
H
K that youth]
￿
ke
near
paas]
to]
aayaa
came
“After some time, a laborer came up to the youth”
b. [He]
￿
[He]
￿
[yuvak]
￿
[youth]
￿
se
of
puuchaa
asked
ki
that
“kyaa
“what
aagyaa
wish
hai?”
is?”
“He asked the youth, “what is your wish?” ”
(77) and (78) provide further examples of the comparison between the subject and the
prepositional object, in both cases showing that the subject entity is more highly ranked
than the prepositional object entity.
(77) a. [
I yamduut]
￿
[
I death-messenger]
￿
ﬁr
again
[
M
N
M
[
M
N
M
[
M
H
K gorelaal]
￿
[
M
H
K Gorelaal]
￿
ke
of
darvaaze
door
par]
at]
aa
come
dhamkaa
did
“The death-messenger turned up at Gorelal’s door again”
b. [uske]
￿
his
pairoN
feet
kii
of
aahaT
movement
se
with
[gorelaal]
￿
gorelaal
kii
of
dhukdhukii
heart
dhaRakne
beating
lagii
start-did
“Gorelal’s heart started beating at the sound of his feet.”
(78) a. andheraa
darkness
ho
happen
calaa
left
thaa
had
“It had become dark”
b. [
I samraaT]
￿
[
I king]
￿
ghuumtaa-ﬁrtaa
roaming
[
M
N
M
one
[
M
H
K ek diin grihasta]
￿
day
ke
[
M
N
M
darvaaze
[
M
H
K a poor householder]
￿
par]
of
gayaa
door on] went
“Oneday, theking, roaming around, wentupto thedoorof apoorhouseholder”
84c. [grihasta ne]
￿
[householder ERG]
￿
[usko]
￿
[him]
￿
dekhte
seeing
hii
EMPH
puuchaa,
asked,
“kaho
“say
bhaai,
brother,
tum
you
kaun
who
ho,
are,
kahaaN
where
jaaoge?”
going?”
“The householder, as soon as he saw him, asked, ”say, brother, who are you
and where will you go?””
Example (79) illustrates the comparison between the subject and the direct object of an
adjunct clause. Here again, the subject entity (in (79b)) emerges as being more salient than
the object inside the adjunct clause.
(79) a. savere
morning
vahaaN
there
se
from
satkaarpuurvak
respectfully
vidaa
farewell
hokar
having
[vah]
￿
he
aage
forward
baRhaa
grew
“In the morning, having received a respectful farewell, he moved ahead”
b. [
I grihasta]
￿
[
I householder]
￿
bhii
also
kuch
some
duur
distance
tak
till
[
O
P
J
￿
Q
S
R
[
O
P
J
￿
Q
S
R
[
J O use]
￿
[
J O him]
￿
pahuNcaane]
reaching]
aayaa
came
“The householder also came for some distance to drop him off.”
c. alag
separation
hote
being
samay
time
[usne]
￿
[he]
￿
[samraaT]
￿
[king]
￿
se
of
puuchaa,
asked,
“bhaiiyaa,
Brother,
sevaa-satkaar
hostpitality
me
in
koii
any
truTii
lack
huii
happened
ho
be
to
then
use
it
kshamaa
forgive
karnaa
do
aur
and
idhar
here
se
with
jab
when
kabhi
ever
aanaa,
come,
hamaarii
our
kuTii
cottage
meN
in
jaruur
surely
Thaharnaa”
stay
“Before separating, he asked the king, “Brother, if there was anything lacking
in our hostpitality, then forgive it, and when you come this way again, be sure
to stay at our cottage.”
Table 3.3 shows the distribution we found in the data with respect to the different pairs
of grammatical categories that we compared. In each row, we list the numbers and percent-
ages for the hypothesis that the subject was ranked higher than the category it was being
compared with. The second column contains the number/frequency for the subject being
85ranked higher and the third column gives the total number of those cases that occurred
in the sample. The results show that the subject has a signiﬁcantly greater inﬂuence on
salience than the other grammatical function categories.
Ranking Number (%) Total
Subject
  Direct Object 144 (96) 149
Subject
  Indirect Object 50 (87) 57
Subject
  PP Object 128 (100) 128
Subject
  Adjunct 72 (90) 80
Total 394 (95) 414
Table 3.3: Frequencies for Relative Salience of Grammatical Functions
The fact that the percentages in each row of the table are not 100% provide an indica-
tion of the claim made in Centering that Rule 1 can be violated by speakers, as shown by
the utterance pair in (80), where the object entity in (80a) is realized as a pronoun in (80b)
rather than the subject entity. However, the high percentages in each row also show that
while speakers can be expected to violate Rule 1, they will more often not violate the rule.
Theoretically, this gains support again from Gricean expectations about speaker-hearer co-
operative behavior. Since Gricean principles are not laid out as categorical constraints, the
fact that the subject does not get picked out as the pronominalized entity all the time is
understandable.
(80) a. raajkaaj
royal-administration
ke
of
maamloN
matters
meN
in
[
I vah]
￿
[
I he]
￿
[
J
L
K usko]
￿
[
J
L
K him]
￿
baRhaavaa
encouragement
bhii
EMPH
dene
giving
lagaa
did
“He also started giving him encouragement in matters of royal administration”
b. thoRe
few
hii
EMPH
dinoN
days
meN
in
[vah]
￿
[he]
￿
[samraaT]
￿
[king]
￿
kaa
of
vishvaaspaatra
trusted-person
ban
become
gayaa
went
aur
and
anya
else
darbaariyoN
ofﬁcials
se
than
kahiiN-adhik
much-more
yogya
able
pramaaRNit
proven
hua.
became
“In just a few days he became the king’s trusted person and proved to be much
more able than the other ofﬁcials”
86At the same time, the less than 100% frequency of the higher ranking of the subject
entities raises the possibility of other factors overriding the effect of grammatical function.
For example, we might entertain the possibility that the Rule 1 violations are not really that,
but simply exhibit the more dominant effect of word order if we found in those apparent
violation cases that the non-subject entity was in fact preposed to a position before the
subject. This would put Hindi in the same class as other languages such as German, in
which word order has been shown to play role in discourse salience. Similarly, we might
also be able to explain the apparent violations in terms of the information status of the
discourse entities, which has been claimed to havean effect on salience. In the next section,
we address this issue by looking directly at the effect of word order and information status,
and answer the question as to whether the Rule 1 violations are real, or whether they are
the result of other factors overriding the grammatical function factor.
Word Order and Information Status
The surface order of constituents has been argued to be a determining factor for relative
salienceinGerman(Rambow(1993),Strube&Hahn (1996),Strube(1998),Strube&Hahn
(1999)), with the
￿
$
# list ranking being partially determined by the left to right ordering of
the constituents. Since Hindi is a free word order language like German, this raises the
issue of whether the word order criteria for ranking the
￿
%
# list might hold for Hindi as
well. This expectation, however, is not borne out for Hindi. In our sample of utterance
pairs, there was a fair amount of word order variation in the realization of the entities in the
different grammatical function categories we looked at. Table 3.4 shows the interaction of
grammatical function with word order with respect to discourse salience. The ﬁrst column
is the header for the two different word orders for each pair of grammatical categories
from Table 3.3. The second column gives the distribution of the different word orders
and in combination with numbers for the ranking. X in this second column stands for
87the non-subject grammatical categories. A look at the table shows that in none of the
cases is the preposed non-subject constituent ranked higher than the subject. Furthermore,
the distribution in the table also answers the question that we posed regarding the Rule 1
violations in the previous section. All of the Rule 1 violations shown in the table obtain for
those cases in which the subject appears before the non-subject constituent. So, whatever
the explanation for the Rule 1 violations may be, we know for certain that they do not occur
because of the overriding effect of word order.
Word Order Ranking Totals
S
  X X
  S
S-DO 100 5 105
DO-S 44 0 44
(149)
S-IO 46 7 53
IO-S 4 0 4
(57)
S-PPO 50 0 50
PPO-S 78 0 78
(128)
S-ADJU 33 8 41
ADJU-S 39 0 39
(80)
Totals 394 20 414
Table 3.4: Interaction of Grammatical Function and Word Order for Discourse Salience
It has been claimed in Strube (1998) that information status is an important criteria for
the
￿
%
# list ranking in German as well as English. An extension to this claim is also made
in the same work that information status may be a linguistically universal criterion. This
claim however, is not borne out in the Hindi data. To test the claim, we looked at a subset
of the information status distinctions, comparing hearer-new, discourse-new entities with
hearer-old, discourse-old entities. Since we were primarily interested in the interaction of
grammatical function with information status, we identiﬁed utterance pairs in which the
subject was hearer-new and discourse new, and some non-subject constituent was hearer-
old, discourse-old. This case provides us with the clearest case of whether the non-subject,
when old, becomes more salient. We found that in all the 93 such utterance pairs that
88we were able to identify, the new subject entity was categorically selected as the one that
was pronominalized in the following utterance, and not the old non-subject entity. This
provides robust evidence for a counterargument to the language universality of information
status with respect to discourse salience.
Based on the above ﬁndings, we are now in a position to propose a
￿
%
# list ranking
criteria for Hindi. Excluding the role of word order and information status, the ranking is
given in terms of grammatical function, as follows:11
￿
￿
%
# list ranking criteria for Hindi:
SUBJECT
  DIRECT OBJECT
  INDIRECT OBJECT
  ADJUNCTS
  OTHER
3.3 Zero Pronouns in Hindi
This section presents a corpus-based investigation of the use of zero pronouns in Hindi.
After establishing that the antecedents of these null arguments cannot be recovered syn-
tactically (Rizzi, 1986), we propose an account in terms of Centering theory. Given the
Hindi-speciﬁc ranking criteria proposed in the previous section, we argue that the dis-
course constraint to license the felicitous use of Hindi zero pronouns should be formulated
as a combination of preferences for sequences of Transitions and a “zero pronoun rule”,
adapted from Rule 1 of Centering theory. More generally, the proposed account will ex-
plain (a) why null elements are most frequently the subject, (b) why object drop in Hindi
occurs only when the subject is also dropped.
Hindi allows major grammatical relations such as subject and object to be covert in
ﬁnite clauses and these unexpressedrelationsfunction as pronouns. This raises thequestion
of how the reference for these zero pronouns is determined. We ﬁrst show that Hindi zero
11As we noted before, Prasad & Strube (2000) provide the results for the rankings between the non-subject
categories.
89pronouns are not recoverable via identiﬁcation with rich AGR, as is argued for languages
like Italian and Spanish ((Rizzi, 1986), among others) . This is despite the fact that Hindi
has morphologically uniform and rich inﬂectional paradigms for verbal agreement. In such
a case, the recoverability of these pronouns for reference is assumed to be constrained
by rules of discourse. In previous work, (Butt & King, 1997) also make this assumption
and further, specify a discourse constraint that relates the use of zeros to word order and
information structure, in particular, to topicalization. We argue that the proposal made by
Butt & King (1997), namely that arguments can be dropped when they are the continuing
topic, with the topic equated with the topicalized constituent (if any) of a sentence, cannot
account forall theobserved facts. Finally, weprovidean alternative(corpus-based) account
of the discourse constraints on zero pronouns in Hindi tensed main clauses.12 The account
is couched within the framework of Centering theory and the constraint is stated in terms of
the Transitionpairpreferences andthe zeropronounrule, adaptedfrom Rule1of Centering
theory.
3.3.1 Hindi in a Typology of Null Argument Languages: On Identiﬁ-
cation via Agreement
Kameyama (1985) groups Hindi with Type II languages such as Italian and Spanish with
respect to the extent to which major grammatical functions can be non-overt in tensed
clauses. Following Rizzi (1986) and Jaeggli & Saﬁr (1989), such languages have a verbal
morphology that is sensitive to one or more grammatical features (person, number, gender,
aspect, etc..). Furthermore, since these languages have only subject-verb agreement, ob-
ject drop is disallowed, and this fact is immediately explained by the requirement that the
person/number/gender features of the zero pronoun should be recoverable by agreement,
12Arguments are rarely dropped in subordinate clauses. The constraints on their occurrence are not ad-
dressed in this study.
90in order for referent identiﬁcation to take place. This behavior contrasts with what is seen
in languages like Japanese and Chinese, which display a syntactically unconstrained use
of zero pronouns, in that person, number and gender features of null arguments are not
associated with verbal agreement. Recoverability of these arguments then is argued to rely
on discourse factors and not on syntax at all.
Hindi is like Spanish, Italian and Latin in having a rich verbal agreement system but is
different from them in that the verb can agree with both the subject and the object, as was
described in the previous section, and is also evident in (81) and (82).
(81) malay
malay-3sg.M
kitaab
book-3sg.F
paRh
read-INF
rahaa
stay-PROG.M
hai
be-PRES.3sg
“Malay is reading the book”
(82) malay
malay-3sg.M
ne
ERG
kitaab
book-3sg.F
paRhii
read-PERF.3sg
“Malay read the book”
Given the classiﬁcation of languages in terms of the rich AGR licensing condition,
Kameyama (1985) claims that Hindi behaves like Italian and that it allows an argument to
be dropped ifthe verbwas inﬂectedforitsperson/number/genderfeatures. So, forexample,
if the verb agreed with the subject, as in (81), the subject should be able to appear as null
and if the verb agreed with the object, as in (82), there would be nothing ruling out the
object from being realized as null. At the same time, however, what she claims is not
possible for Hindi is for the subject to be null when the verb agrees with the object, and
vice versa. This is illustrated in the examples in (83) and (84) (adapted from Kameyama
(1985)):
(83) a. Q: kyaa
QPL
[malay]
￿
[malay]
￿ -3sg.M
ne
ERG
kitaab
book-3sg.F
paRhii?
read-PERF.3sg.F?
“Did Malay read the book?”
91b. A: [malay/*0]
￿
[Malay/*0]
￿ -3sg.M
ne
ERG
kitaab/0
book/0-3sg.F
paRhii
read-PERF.3sg.F
“Malay read the book”
(84) a. Q: kyaa
QPL
[malay]
￿
[malay]
￿ -3sg.M
kitaab
book-3sg.F
paRh
read-INF
rahaa
stay-PROG.M
hai?
be-PRES.3sg
“Will Malay read the book?”
b. A: [malay/0]
￿
[Malay/0]
￿ -3sg.M
kitaab/*0
book/*0-3sg.F
paRh
read-INF
rahaa
stay-PROG.M
hai
be-PRES.3sg
“Malay is reading the book”
Counterexamples to these expectations, however, are abundant in naturally occurring
data, as examples (85) and (86) show:
(85) a. [fanTuush]
￿
[FanTuush]
￿ -3sg.M
ne
ERG
aadmiyoN
men-3pl.M
kaa
of
gussaa
anger
saamaan
furniture-3sg.M
par
on
utaaraa.
took-down
“Fantuush took out his anger with the men on the furniture.”
b. [0]
￿
[0]
￿ -3sg.M
vahaaN
there
kii
of
sab
all
[kursiyaaN]
￿
[chairs]
￿ -3pl.F
toR
break-INF
daaliiN.
put-PERF.3pl.F
“(Fantuush) broke all the chairs there.”
(86) a. [unhone]
￿
[he]
￿ -3sg.M
shahar
city
me
in
makaan
house
banvaa
make-CAUS
liyaa
take-PERF-.3sg.M
thaa
be-PAST.3sg.M
(unhone
￿ = Gajadhar Baabu)
“He had got a house made in the city”
b. [0]
￿
[0]
￿
[baRe laRke amar aur laRkii kaantii kii shaadiyaaN]
￿
older son amar and daughter kantii of marriages]
￿ -3pl.F
kar
do-INF
dii
give-PERF-3pl.F
thiiN
be-PAST.3pl.F
“(Gajadhar Babu) had done the marriages of his older son Amar and daughter
Kaantii”
In both (85b) and (86b), the person, number and gender features of the null subjects
92cannot be determined by the verb because the verb agreement is with the object. In (85b),
the verbagrees with the direct object kursiyaaN
￿ ‘chairs’, and in (86b), the verb agrees with
the head noun of the complex direct object noun phrase shaadiyaa
￿ ‘marriages’. So despite
the rich agreement inﬂection on the verb, we cannot maintain that there is an agreement
based licensing constraint on the use of Hindi zeros.13 We therefore need to look elsewhere
for the constraints that governthe use of null pronouns. In this sense, Hindi groups together
more closely with Japanese and Chinese, although the use of zeros in the latter is more
unrestricted than in Hindi.
3.3.2 PreviousResearchontheDiscourse ConstraintsLicensing Hindi
Zero Pronouns
In their study of null elements in Hindi and Urdu discourse, Butt & King (1997) also argue
that the interpretation of null elements in Hindi lies outside the realm of syntax and that the
felicitous use of zero pronouns is instead governed by the discourse context in which the
utterance is used. In particular, they attempt to relate argument drop in Hindi with the free
word order that is characteristic of the language. The different word orders in Hindi have
been shown to relate to different discourse functions Butt & King (1997). Furthermore,
Butt & King (1997) attempt to relate word order, information structure (Vallduv´ i, 1990;
Vallduv´ i & Engdahl, 1996) and referentiality. They draw on Gambhir’s account of the
discourse functions of word order variants in Hindi, but focus primarily on four discourse
functions: (a) Topic (b) Focus (c) Background and (d) Completive Information:
1. Topic: the topic in their account is identiﬁed with the clause-initial constituent in
matrix clauses. Structurally, this position is identiﬁed as [Spec, IP]. According to
13Note that Georgian is one language that patterns like Hindi in its verb agreement paradigm (see
Kameyama (1985)), and also respects the licensing constraint of null argument in terms of identiﬁcation
by agreement.
93this proposal then, topicalizations are assumed to be hosted by [Spec, IP] and are
therefore the topic of the clause. This is shown in (87):
(87) [IP
To
[SPEC,IP
Hassan
hassan
Naadiyaa
ko-TOPIC
gave
]
a
naadiyaa
toffee
ne Toﬁi dii ]
“Hassan gave a toffee to Nadiya”
2. Focus: The focus is the pre-verbal position if there is only one focused element.
However, if there are multiple foci, where one would receive the neutral focus, and
the other would receive what has been termed as Contrastive focus, then the con-
trastive focus element can be focused in situ.
3. Backgrounded Material (BM): The backgrounded material is the post- verbal po-
sition. This is similar to topicalized information in that both have the status of “old”
or “known” information, but they are different from topics in that while topics are
the pointer to the relevant information to be accessed by the hearer, the BM only
provides more detailed information as to how the new information ﬁts in with the al-
ready known information. That is, the BM provides the info. that may be necessary
for a good understanding of the new (focussed) information supplied. (see. Hoffman
(1995)).
4. Completive Information: The completive information is the preverbal in situ back-
grounded material.
As for the licensing constraint on zero pronouns, Butt & King essentially claim that an
argument can be dropped if it is a continuing topic (i.e., if it is the topic of the current as
well as the previous utterance) or if it is the backgrounded information.
Their example (88) below gives an example of a continuing topic: the topic is the same
from utterance (a) to (b) and can thus be felicitously dropped.
94(88) a. [main]
￿ -TOPIC baais baras se yahaan rah rahaa huun
“[I]
￿ -TOPIC have been living here for 22 year”
b. [0/main]
￿ -TOPIC rozaanaa is hii saRak se guzartaa huun
“[0/I]
￿ -TOPIC go by this street daily”
(89) gives an example of a shifting topic: the topic in the (b) utterance has been shifted
to a different entity than in the (a) utterance and thus cannot be dropped.
(89) a. to [(hum)]
￿ -TOPIC uspe ek naaTak likhte hain.
“So let [(us)]
￿ -TOPIC write a play about that”
b. [main/*0]
￿ -TOPIC erfors kaa aadmii huun
“[I/*0]
￿ -TOPIC am an airforce man”
3.3.3 Dissociating Word Order and Information Structure from the
Form of Referring Expressions
While the account proposed by Butt & King (1997) is an attractive one in that it relates
word order, information structure, and the form of referring expressions used in discourse,
especially in light of such established correlations for other languages such as German
(Rambow, 1993; Strube & Hahn, 1999), this three-way correlation cannot be maintained
for Hindi. Further motivation for the absence of such correlations comes from our ﬁndings
related to the
￿
%
# list ranking criteria for Hindi in the previous section. There we showed
that word order and information status has no signiﬁcant effect on discourse salience and
therefore also on pronominalization. In the study presented in the previous section, how-
ever, we did not investigate the interpretation and constraints on the use of zero pronouns.14
14It is legitimate to assume that the constraints on overt pronouns are not the same as the ones on zero
pronouns, primarily because they are not necessarily in free variation.
95In what follows, we argue that word order and information structure (associated with the
word order) have no bearing on the felicitous use of zero pronouns in Hindi.
A look at the examples in Butt & King (1997) containing a continuing topic shows
that in each case, the topic coincides with the subject. Since there is no reliable way of
telling whether the subject is indeed in the TOPIC position in the clause, the real test of
the effect of the topic on null anaphora lies in clauses where some non-subject constituent
has been topicalized. The following examples taken from the corpus used for this study
show that a null argument can be licensed when it does not refer to the topicalized element.
In (90a), the prepositional object “Alladiya” is the topicalized entity (where topicality is
indicated by the topic marker to (Kidwai, 1997; Prasad, 1997) in addition to its clause
initial position). The zero pronoun in (90b), however, cannot refer to this entity and instead
picks the grammatical subject denoted entity as its antecedent.
(90) (A group of people are talking about the appalling behavior of a man called Al-
ladiya and suddenly recall Alladiya’s father, Hamiidaa..)
a. [is haraamzaade allaadiyaa se to]
￿ -TOPIC
[this bastard alladiya from TOP]
￿ -TOPIC
[hamiidaa]
￿ -SUBJ
[hamiidaa]
￿ -SUBJ
laakh
million
darze
times
acchaa
better
thaa
was
[Roughly] “Hamiidaa was a million times better than this bastard Alladiyaa”
b. [0]
T
￿
￿
￿
’
￿
￿
[0]
T
￿
￿
￿
’
￿
￿
fakat
EMPH
ek
once
hii
only
baar
time
kafan
cofﬁn
churaataa
steal
thaa
did
“(#Allaadiyaa/Hamiidaa) stole the cofﬁn only once”
An important point to note here is that both the “topicalized constituent” as well as the
“subject” are equally likely candidates for antecedents of the zero pronoun. So, the zero
pronoun not only can be licensed when it refers to some non-topicalized constituent, but in
fact cannot refer to this clause-initial topicalized element, even when the person, number,
and gender features are perfectly compatible with it. This point will be discussed further in
96the later sections.
In the next example, the prepositional phrase is topicalized and though the topicalized
constituent is not a likely candidate for the zero pronoun, the example still illustrates that
the zero can be licensed when it refers to the non-topicalized element.
(91) a. [apnii duukaan se]
￿ -TOP
[self’s store with]
￿ -TOP
[Kishan]
￿ -SUBJ
[Kishan]
￿ -SUBJ
param
totally
santushT
satisﬁed
va
and
sukhi
happy
thaa
was
“Kishan was totally satisﬁed and happy with his store”
b. [0]
T
￿
￿
￿
’
￿
￿
[0]
T
￿
￿
￿
’
￿
￿
raat
night
khaaT
cot
par
on
jaataa
went-HAB
to
then
na
(he)
jaane
didn’t
kitne
know
sapne
how
aate
many dreams
came (to him)
“When (Kishan) went to his bed at night, there was no telling how much he
dreamt”
Examples such as those given above indicate that word order/topicalization cannot be a
strong licensor of zero pronouns in Hindi. In the next section, we turn to our analysis of a
hand collected corpus and propose an alternative account of null arguments in Hindi.
3.3.4 TheDiscourse Constraint onHindi Zero Pronouns: A Centering
Account
So far, we have established that Hindi Zero pronouns are neither identiﬁable by syntactic
constraints such as the requirement for identiﬁcation by rich AGR, nor by discourse con-
straints that attempt to relate their felicitous use to word order and information structure.
In this section, we present a Centering-based analysis of a Hindi corpus which we have
hand created and annotated for purposes of this study. We have analyzed the corpus for the
effect of Transition preferences between utterances on whether a zero pronoun was used or
not, and the results show a distinct correlation between certain Transition pairings and the
occurrence of the zero pronouns.
97Following the results on the Hindi salience ranking in the previous section, we assume
that the elements of the C
￿ list in Hindi are ranked by grammatical function (subject
 
direct object
  indirect object
  adjuncts).
3.3.5 Corpus and Coding
The corpus used for this study was a collection of 6 short stories and 3 newspaper articles.
The total number of sentences was 2192. Each sentence in the corpus was coded for:
￿ Clause type (declarative, imperative, interrogative).
￿ Main vs. subordinate clause.
￿ Position of the grammatical functions of subject, object and indirect object (when
they are overt).
￿ Overt/null realization of the grammatical functions.
￿ The cospeciﬁer of the null elements with respect to grammatical function and posi-
tion.
￿ Three Centering variables: (a) the
￿
U
￿ , (b) the
￿
1
0 , (c) and the Transition marked by
the clause.
Clause types such as imperativesand interrogativeswere excluded from the analysis, as
were direct speech segments (which most often included the previous two types). Follow-
ing Kameyama (1998), we assume direct speech segments to be inaccessible to the utter-
ances in the next higher level of segmented discourse, so their exclusion does not upset the
computation of the Transitions, which is the main point of this study. After exclusion of
these clause types the sentences in the corpus totaled 1332. In coding for the elements that
are potential candidates for subsequent reference, we have also excluded the annotation
98of things such as events, states, propositions, or phrases. Null arguments in subordinate
clauses were found to be very rare (we counted only 4) and we have excluded these from
the annotation too.
3.3.6 Analysis and Results
Out of the 1332 clauses that were ﬁnally coded for the Centering variables and for which
the Transitions were computed, there were 466 clauses in which there was no continuing
reference from the previous utterance.15 In the remaining 866 clauses, only 209 had one or
more zero pronouns whereas the remainder had either a full NP or a overtpronominal form.
A quick look at the distribution of zero pronouns with respect to the major grammatical
functions showed that most of these zero pronouns were subjects (199), very few were
direct objects (10) and there were none corresponding to any other grammatical function.
While we will not attempt to answer the question of why no grammatical function other
than the subject and the object are realized as null, the constraint that will be formalized
below does explain the low number associated with zero objects. In fact, in the corpus, the
zero objects occurred only when there was also a zero subject in the clause. we return to
this presently.
After computing the Transitions between all the utterances in the corpus, the ﬁrst pre-
liminary ﬁnding was that all the utterances containing zero pronouns were marked with the
CONTINUE Transition. Though this ﬁnding was interesting, it did not say much about what
kinds of entities in the previous utterance could be realized as zero in the current one. A
CONTINUE Transition is obtainable after all the other three Transitions, which means that
any entity in the
￿
%
# list of the previous utterance has the potential of being realized as a
zero in the current utterance. Furthermore, this also does not answer the puzzle indirectly
15This could be said to mark the beginning of a new discourse segment in Centering terms. However, we
do not address this question here.
99posed earlier, namely, that if it is not the topicalized constituent of an utterance that can be
realized as a zero in the next one, then what is?
The next step of the analysis therefore involved extraction of Transition pairs rather
than just single Transitions. Thus, if an utterance had a zero pronoun, we recorded the
Transition marked on it as well as the one marked on the previous utterance. The distribu-
tion of Transition preferences this time was the following:
￿ There were only three kinds of Transition pairs associated with the zero pronouns:
(92) CONTINUE + CONTINUE
(93) SMOOTH-SHIFT + CONTINUE and
(94) RETAIN + CONTINUE
The distributionof each pair forthe 199zero subjectpronouns isshowninFigure 3.5.
CONTINUE + CONTINUE 106 (53%)
SMOOTH-SHIFT + CONTINUE 85 (42%)
RETAIN + CONTINUE 8 (4%)
Table 3.5: Distribution of Zero Subject Pronouns in Hindi Corpus
Note that in determining the frequencies above, the zero objects have not been excluded
intentionally from the total number of zero pronouns, but rather for statistical reasons: as
mentioned above, zero objects always occurred with the zero subjects, and furthermore,
only with the CONTINUE + CONTINUE or the SMOOTH-SHIFT + CONTINUE Transition
pairs. Since the subjects are ranked higher than the objects in the ranking hierarchy of the
￿
%
# list, these zero objects will never ﬁgure in the computation of the Transitions. We have
therefore excluded them to prevent any distortion of the frequencies (even though this may
not be signiﬁcant enough).
100One of the ﬁrst thingsthat is obviousfrom the distributionseen aboveis the signiﬁcance
of the Preferred Center, the
￿
U
￿ , in Hindi for the realization of zero pronouns in discourse.
The percentages of the CONTINUE Transitions following a CONTINUE and following a
SMOOTH-SHIFT are roughly the same. The low percentages of a RETAIN followed by a
CONTINUE also indicates that the continuing topic, if deﬁned in Centering terms as the
backward looking center (Prince, 1998), has very little likelihood of being realized as a
zero pronoun unless it is also the preferred center of the previous utterance.
The ﬁgures also explain why the subject is the grammatical function most often realized
as null. Given the
￿
$
# list ranking criterion for Hindi, where the subject is always most
highly ranked in the
￿
%
# list, and the categorical preference for a CONTINUE Transition
that we have seen above, the subject is the only grammatical function that can generate
a CONTINUE Transition. For the same reason, the objects cannot be dropped, because it
would lead to either a RETAIN or a Rough shift Transition which is dispreferred. At the
same time, we can also now explain why objects can be dropped when the subjects are also
dropped. This follows from Rule 1 of Centering theory which we can reformulate for zero
pronouns for Hindi, shown in Figure 3.3.
Zero pronoun rule for Hindi:
If anything is realized as a zero pronoun in the utterance, then the
￿
￿
￿ must be.
Figure 3.3: Zero Pronoun Rule for Hindi
According to this rule, if there is a single zero pronoun in the utterance, then it must be
the previous
￿
U
￿ (thus generating a CONTINUE Transition). The Object-drop is observed in
the data because there is nothing ruling it out as long as the previous
￿
U
￿ is also dropped.
However, it is less likely to occur by itself because it would then violate the zero pro-
noun rule. Finally, we can also address the absence of the correlation between word order,
namely, topicalization, and the realization of zero pronouns. This is because topicalized
101Optionally drop an argument in
)
2
*
￿
￿
-
, if:
the Transition marking the previous utterance
)
+
* is a CONTINUE or a SMOOTH-
SHIFT,
the Transition marked by the current utterance, U
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ , is a CONTINUE, and
the Zero Pronoun Rule is not violated.
Figure 3.4: Constraint on Zero Pronouns in Hindi
constituents, unless the subject itself is topicalized, do not rank as the highest entity in the
￿
%
# list in Hindi and can therefore never generate the two preferred Transition pairs if they
are realized as null in the next utterance.
We can now state the discourse constraint that licenses the occurrence of zero pronouns
in Hindi. This is shown in Figure 3.4.
One question still remains, however. There were a large number (247) of the preferred
Transition pairings (CONTINUE + CONTINUE and Smooth Shift + CONTINUE) listed above
that did not realize the
￿
￿
￿ of
)
+
*
￿
￿
-
, as null. A detailed study of this disparate pattern has
been beyond the scope of this study, but is the focus of future research.
3.4 Conclusion
In this Chapter, we ﬁrst addressed the question of the observed cross-linguistic variability
in the way referring expression forms are realized and we pointed out that one of the most
important sources of this variability lies in the way different languages rank the forward-
looking centers lists. Since this dissertation is concerned with the generation of referring
expressions in Hindi, we were particularly interested in identifying the linguistic correlates
of the criteria for ranking the forward-looking centers list in Hindi. To this end, we ﬁrst
proposed a language-independent corpus-based method for identifying the factors that de-
termine discourse salience. The proposed methodology utilized a reformulation of Rule 1
of Centering theory. We then applied the method for investigating three linguistic factors,
102namely grammatical function, word order, and information status, to determine whether
they count as the criteria for the ranking. Our results showed that grammatical function is
the primary determinant of discourse salience and that word order and information status
do not show any signiﬁcant effect.
Using the results from the
￿
%
# -list ranking criteria for Hindi, we provided a Centering
analysis of zero pronouns in Hindi. We argued that the interpretation of and the licensing
conditions on Hindi zero pronouns cannot be done in terms of syntactic constraints and
that, despite the rich agreement inﬂectional paradigm of the language, arguments may be
dropped even when the identiﬁcation via agreement requirement is not met. The statement
of the constraints for the interpretation of these null elements needs to be made in terms of
the discourse context. We discussed previous efforts in this direction and showed that these
accounts were insufﬁcient in explaining all the observed facts about argument drop. In par-
ticular, we argued against a discourse constraint that motivated a correlation between word
order, information structure, and the form of referring expressions. Finally, we presented
a corpus based Centering analysis of Hindi texts and showed that zero pronouns occurred
most often with certain Transition pairings over utterances. In addition, we explained the
difference in the frequency of occurrence found between subject and object pronouns in
terms of the “zero pronoun rule” for Hindi.
103Chapter 4
Relative Clauses and the Utterance Unit
in Centering
4.1 The Problem
One of the very important issues that arises in the modeling of discourse phenomena is
the delimitation of the utterance unit in discourse. This has received special attention
in studies grounded in Centering theory which models attentional state at the local level.
Centering principles and constraints apply on an utterance by utterance basis, and therefore
it is of some importance to specify what counts as an utterance. This problem is harder for
utterances than for other types of linguistic units, such as those for sentences and words.
Sentence and word boundaries are easily determined because they have an overt reﬂex that
can be precisely identiﬁed, but not so with discourse units. Units in discourse are deﬁned
in more abstract terms. In the Centering model, for example, an utterance as a unit is
deﬁned as being about something, where this “something” is the topic (or the Backward-
looking Center) of the utterance. So it would seem that, if we could track the topics in a
discourse, we would be able to easily identify the utterance units. However, this seemingly
104easy task acquires great complexity because it is not very easy to determine what the topic
is at any given point of the discourse. Most of the time, this is done intuitively, and there
is yet no reliable procedure outlined for accomplishing this task. In fact, ironically, one
of the appealing aspects of the Centering model is that it can itself be used to identify the
topicofutterances, whichmaybethen usedtoexplainotherdiscoursephenomena. Sidner’s
focusing algorithm (Sidner, 1979; 1983), for example, of which Centering is an abstraction,
is used to track the topic (her discourse focus), which she then uses for identifying the
referents of certain kinds of anaphoric expressions. Thus, such an approach will obviously
not work, as things stand, and it seems that we need an independent way of identifying the
utterance.
4.2 Related Work on Complex Sentences
4.2.1 Clause-based Approaches
There are to date two kinds of approaches that have been discussed or proposed in the lit-
erature on delimiting the utterance unit. In one approach, utterances are identiﬁed with the
tensed clause. As a result, complex sentences are broken up into separate units by identify-
ing the tensed clauses in the sentence, and each of these counts as a separate utterance. This
is seen in early work in Centering, such as Sidner (1983), and is shown with the discourse
segment (95).
(95) a. Wilbur is a ﬁne scientist and a thoughtful guy.
b. He gave me a book a while back which I really liked.
c. It was on relativity theory,
d. and talks mostly about quarks.
e. They are hard to imagine,
105f. because they indicate the need for elementary ﬁeld theories of a complex na-
ture.
Sidner (1983)
In this work, however, no explicit distinction was made between different kinds of
complex sentences, and as such the criteria followed for splitting up complex sentences
was rather arbitrary. In later work, Kameyama (1998) provided the ﬁrst extensive account
of various types of complex sentences, bringing to attention the notion of the update unit,
i.e., the unit on which the Forward-looking Centers lists are created. She proposed an intra-
sentential centering hypothesis (ICH) which states that a complex sentence should be split
into a set of center-updating units corresponding to “utterances” in inter-sentential Center-
ing. The central motivating aspect of this hypothesis (as of the stipulation made in Sidner’s
work) was that it allowed for the processing of intra-sentential anaphoric dependencies in
the same way as for inter-sentential dependencies without any extension to the original
Centering model. The relevance of the notion of the update unit comes into play when we
consider what to count as the Forward-looking Centers list for an utterance before which a
complex sentence occurred. According to Kameyama’s ICH, after a complex sentence S,
the next utterance picks the Forward-looking Centers list as the one resulting from breaking
up S into a (structured) sequence of sub-sentential units rather than the one which results
from treating S as a whole as a unit.
The break-up of complex sentences, according to Kameyama, could yield a possibly
nested structure yielding a hierarchical ordering rather than a linear ordering. Following
this, she proposes two types of structures that could be possibly created by complex sen-
tences – sequential and hierarchical. If the break up yields a sequential ordering of the
utterances, the update unit for the utterance after the complex sentence is the last utterance
in the linear ordering of the utterances resulting from the break up of the complex sen-
tence. However, if the break up yields a hierarchical structure, then this raises the question
106of which level of embedding provides the output update unit for the next utterance. The
update unit could result from the last utterance in the top level in the hierarchical structure,
or it could result from the last utterance at some embedded level in the structure.
Kameyama proposes a classiﬁcation of different complex sentence types in terms of (a)
whether their break up results in a sequential or a hierarchical structure, and (b) which level
of embedding to consider to retrieve the update unit. Her hypotheses, with (her) examples,
are provided below:
￿ Sequential Structures: Coordinated clauses (conjuncts) and adverbial subordinated
clauses (adjuncts), according to Kameyama, break up into sequential structures:
– Tensed Clausal Conjuncts: Tensed clausal conjuncts
￿
W
V
9
, ,...,
￿
2
V
Y
X break up
into a sequence of utterances
)
2
, ,...,
)
2
X at the same level of embedding at
which Cl
￿ starts out in the segment.
(96) Her mother was a Greer
(97) and her father’s family came from the Orkney Isles.
– Tenseless Conjuncts: Tenseless subordinate clausal conjuncts do not update
the center, and belong to the same utterance unit as the immediately super-
ordinate clause.
(98) I wanted [ to grab her by the arm and beg her [ to wait, to consider, to
know for certain ] ].
– Tensed or Tenseless Parallel Conjuncts: Two adjacent conjuncts (tensed or
tenseless) induce parallelism.
(99) She had held to the letter of her contract
(100) and
￿ didn’t come onto the stage.
107– Tensed Adjuncts: Tensed clausal adjuncts (i.e., adverbial subordinate clauses)
form separate utterance units at the same level of embedding as their immedi-
ately super-ordinate clauses.
(101) Although she’s still a teenager who looks like a baby,
(102) she is getting married
– Tenseless Adjuncts: Tenseless clausal and phrasal adjuncts belong to the same
utterance unit as the immediately super-ordinate clause.
(103) [ In the fullness of her vocal splendor ], however, she could sing the
famous scene magniﬁcently.
￿ Hierarchical Structures: Hierarchical structures are created by two kinds of com-
plex sentences which Kameyama considers. One is reported (direct) speech and the
other is the non-report (indirect) speech complement.
– Reported Speech Complements: Reported speech is an embedded centering
segment that is inaccessible to the super-ordinate centering level.
(104) Hughes said Monday,
a. “It is the apparent intention of the Republican Party to campaign on
the carcass of what they call Eisenhower Republicanism.
b. but the heart stopped beating
c. and the lifeblood congealed
d. after Eisenhower retired.
e. Now he’s gone
f. the Republican Party is not going to be able to sell the tattered re-
mains to the people of the state.”
108(105) Sunday, he added,
a. “We can love Eisenhower the man
b. even if we considered him a mediocre president
c. but there is nothing left of the Republican Party without his leader-
ship.”
– Non-reported Speech Tensed Clausal Complements: Tensed clausal non-
report complements create embedded discourse segments. (Kameyama how-
ever left it an open question as to what the relative salience of the entities in the
embedded segment was as compared to the higher clause.)
(106) Her choice of color means
a. she is simply enjoying the motor act of coloring without having
reached the point of selecting suitable colors for different objects.
– Tenseless Complements: Tenseless clausal complements belong to the same
utterance units as their super-ordinate clauses.
(107) We watched them [ set out up the hill in hand on a rainy day in their
yellow raincoats [
￿ to ﬁnger paint at the grammar school ]]
As noted above, breaking up complex sentences in this way is appealing in that it al-
lows us to handle intra-sentential phenomena with the same principles that apply to inter-
sentential processes. Of particular interest in this respect are anaphoric dependencies that
occur intra-sententially. Kameyama showed that following her hypotheses, pronouns could
be disambiguated with the same principles that she applied to the inter-sentential level
within the Centering framework.
In a separate study of certain kinds of adjunct clauses, Suri & McCoy (1994) provided
an analysis of ‘SX because SY (S
Z )’ sentences within the framework of RAFT/RAPR (Re-
109vised Algorithm for Focus Tracking and Revised Algorithm for Pronoun Resolution).1 Suri
& McCoy (1994) analyzed ’(S
Z
;
[
\
￿ ), SX because SY (S
Z ), (S
Z
￿
￿
￿
￿ )’ sequences to study how
readers resolved the subject pronouns of SX, of SY, and of S
Z (occurring after the complex
subordinate clause). Their goal was to ascertain where to look for the update unit (that
would be the input for resolving pronouns) in and around these complex structures. Their
results are summarized as follows:
(108) a. Readers prefer to resolve Subject(SX) with Subject(S
Z
8
[
\
￿ ).
b. Readers prefer to resolve Subject(SY) with Subject(SX) (over Subject(S
Z
;
[
\
￿ )).
c. Readers prefer to resolve Subject(S
Z
]
￿
￿
￿ ) with Subject(SX)
Based on the above results, they propose to process sentences of the form ‘SX because
SY’ as follows:
(109) a. For resolving a Subject(SX) pronoun, ﬁrst propose SF(S
Z
^
[
\
￿ ) as the referent.
b. For resolving a Subject(SY) pronoun, ﬁrst propose Subject(SX) as the referent.
c. Compute the SF of a sentence of the form ’SX because SY’ to be Subject(SX).
So in the work of Suri & McCoy (1994) too, a proposal is made to partition a complex
sentences into constituent utterances. Like Kameyama (1998), they propose that tensed
adjunctclauses should be treatedas separate utteranceunits at the same levelof embedding.
However, they differ from Kameyama in that the unit that counts as the update unit for the
utterance occurring after the complex structure is the super-ordinate clause rather than the
last utterance unit in the linear ordering resulting from a break up of the sentence.
1This framework is closer to Sidner’s focusing algorithm than to Centering theory in that RAFT/RAPR
maintains two foci for each utterance, a subject focus (SF) and a current focus (CF), whereas Centering
maintains a single focus, the C
_ , or the Backward-looking Center.
1104.2.2 Sentence-based Approaches
Contrary to the above approach where complex sentences are split up into separate sequen-
tial or hierarchical units, other works such as Strube (1998) and Miltsakaki (1999) attempt
to deﬁne the utterance either as the “sentence” or adopt an approach towards a less ﬁne
grained segmenting (than Kameyama’s, in particular) of the sentence into smaller units.
Strube (1998) motivates his deﬁnition by comparing his anaphora resolution algorithm,
where an utterance is deﬁned as the sentence, with two versions of the BFP algorithm
(Brennan et al., 1987). The two versions are based on two different ways of segmenting a
sentence into smaller utterance units. In one version, he deﬁnes an utterance as a simple
sentence, a complex sentence, or each full clause of a compound sentence, whereas in the
other version, he extends the algorithm with Kameyama’s hypotheses for intra-sentential
centering. Strube’s results show that a sentence-based approach towards the treatment of
utterances yields the best results for pronoun resolution.
While the above result is worth some consideration, it suffers from the drawback that
it does not offer any insights into whether there were any observed differences in the algo-
rithms’ performance across the different types of complex sentences. As Prince points out
(pc. EllenPrince), complexsentencesperform severaldifferentfunctional rolesinlanguage
and discourse, and in order to explicate these roles, we need to study them separately rather
than collapse all the different types into a single category a priori. An indirect effect of this
will obviously be a proper treatment of utterances for anaphora resolution algorithms.
A functional approach towards the treatment of complex sentences is taken in Milt-
sakaki (1999). Miltsakaki argues that an “utterance” consists of a matrix clause and all the
dependent clauses associated with it.2 Her primary data comes from complex sentences
that contain subordinate clauses introduced by subordinating conjunctions like because,
2Coordinated clauses would be treated as distinct utterances according to this deﬁnition, although this is
not stated explicitly in the mentioned work.
111so, when etc. Functionally, she deﬁnes the utterance using the notion of topic continuity,
and she argues that only matrix clauses can establish topics (be it a continuation or a shift
in the topic). She provides empirical support for this view using cross-linguistic pronoun
interpretation results from English, Greek, and Japanese. Furthermore, she also claims that
entities evoked in the subordinate clauses are less salient than the entities evoked in the
matrix clauses.
It may seem that we have come back to using the notion of topic-hood for deﬁning the
utterance unit, which we said above was a difﬁcult task. However, there is a crucial point
to be made here. Traditional tests of topic-hood involve explicit identiﬁcation of the topical
element, so that in the following example, the As for X, ... test is applied to isolate John
as the topic of the sentence.
(110) John went to the store.
(111) As for John, he went to the store (As for X test for topic-hood)
Contrary to the abovegoal of identifying the topic of a sentence/utterance explicitly,the
approach in Miltsakaki (1999) merely aims to suggest that certain kinds of clauses either
do or do not have a topic. It turns out that, for the purpose of delineating utterances in
complex sentences, this is enough.
Miltsakaki’s approach for the treatment of sentences with subordinated clauses is con-
trary to the approach taken by Kameyama. While Kameyama treats some subordinate
clauses, namely the tensed adjuncts, as creating a distinct utterance unit and others, namely
the tenseless adjuncts, as belonging to the same unit as their matrix clause, Miltsakaki
treats all subordinate clauses as belonging to the same unit as their matrix clause. We adopt
the approach taken by Miltsakaki towards the treatment of the above type of complex sen-
tences. However, we note that the deﬁnition of the utterance provided by Miltsakaki must
be extended to account for other types of complex sentences. A case in point is sentences
112containing relative clauses, which is the focus of this chapter. We argue for a treatment of
relative clauses where
￿ relative clauses are distinguished between restrictive and non-restrictive clauses,
￿ indeﬁnite restrictives are further treated in the same way as deﬁnite non-restrictives,
￿ non-restrictive and indeﬁnite restrictives are treated as was suggested by Kameyama
for all relative clauses, that is, as creating a distinct but embedded utterance unit in
which the entities, though accessible to the higher level, are not more salient than the
entities at the higher level,
￿ and ﬁnally, deﬁnite restrictives are not treated as distinct utterance units: entities
evoked within these clauses belong to the
￿
%
# list of their matrix clause and are lower
ranked than the entities evoked in their matrix clause.
The approach we are proposing reemphasizes the idea that discourse segments have
a hierarchical structure. This view is consistent with the proposal made by Kameyama
regarding the hierarchical structure of discourse segments.
4.3 Relative Clauses
Relative clauses are typically distinguished into two broad classes depending on their syn-
tax and function. Restrictive relatives are closely connected to their head noun that they
modify and further serve the purpose of identifying the referent of the head noun:
(112) John bought [ the book [ that he had seen in the store yesterday ]].
Non-restrictive clauses on the other hand, are parenthetic like comments which add
further information about the noun they modify but do not in any way serve to identify the
referent of the noun:
113(113) At last he made up his mind to go to [ Jervis, [ who had a store about a mile away
]]. (he = Mackintosh)
The proposal that we will make for the treatment of relative clauses is similar to the
one adopted in Hurewitz (1998) and Chae (2000), where non-restrictive clauses are treated
as separate utterance units, and restrictive clauses are treated as part of the unit deﬁned by
the clause within which they occur.3 However, these works do not provide any empirical
or theoretical arguments for their proposal.4 We present theoretical and empirical reasons
to show that different kinds of relative clauses have different effects on the hierarchical
organization of discourse segments.
4.3.1 Conjoined Clause Hypothesis for Non-restrictives
The ﬁrst evidence for the difference in the treatment of restrictives and non-restrictives is
the test of syntactic paraphrasability. The examples in (114) and (115) show that while
the non-restrictive clause in (112) can be paraphrasable as a conjunct, the restrictive in
(112) cannot. Of course, given the function of restrictive relative clauses, the restrictive
paraphrase excludesthe interpretation in which the hearer canuniquely identify the referent
of the book in the ﬁrst clause.
(114) # John bought the book. He had seen it in the store yesterday.
(115) At last he made up his mind to go to Jervis. (he = Mackintosh) Jervis/He had a
store about a mile away.
3The proposal in Hurewitz (1998) and Chae (2000) acutally differs from ours to some extent. Both take
the view that the non-restrictive clauses that form separate utterance units are only those that occur clause-
ﬁnally. Clause-medial non-restrictives are treated like restrictives, i.e., as forming part of the main clause
unit in which they occur syntactically. According to our proposal, all non-restrictives are treated as separate
utterance units, irrespective of their syntactic position.
4Similarly, Kameyama (1998) also makes an unmotivated proposal for relative clauses.
114The hypothesis that non-restrictives should be interpreted as distinct utterances also has
support in the syntactic literature in the Main Clause Hypothesis (MCH) of Emonds (1979).
This hypothesis is a formalization of the idea in Ross (1967) that non-restrictives are main
clauses, although they have the appearance of wh-relative clauses. One of Ross’s main ar-
guments is that any parenthetical coordinate clause beginning with and can be paraphrased
as a non-restrictive, as shown below (from Ross (1967)):
(116) a. Enrico, and he is the smartest of us all, got the answer in seven seconds.
b. Enrico, who is the smartest of us all, got the answer in seven seconds.
Emonds’ defense of Ross’s idea that non-restrictives are independent clauses is op-
posed to the competing analysis, the subordinate clause hypothesis (SCH) (Smith, 1964;
Jackendoff, 1977). The SCH proponents argue that non-restrictives form a single con-
stituent with their antecedent, at every level of representation. In contrast, Emonds’ pro-
poses that a non-restrictive does not form a single constituent with its antecedent, at any
level of representation. Emonds argues that a non-restrictive is derived from a clause right-
conjoined with the clause containing its antecedent. Non-restrictives are thus main clauses
at D-structure whereas restrictives are embedded clauses. At S-structure, non-restrictives
are derived via a coordinate deletion and S’-attachment transformation that ﬁrst deletes the
coordinating conjunction and then adjoins the non-restrictive to its antecedent within the
clause (i.e., without forming a constituent with it).
Demirdache (1991) presents an analysis for non-restrictiveswhichincorporates insights
from both the MCH as well as the SCH.5 FollowingSCH, she assumes thata non-restrictive
5Demirdache (1991) actually calls the non-restrictives appositives. We take this to be a terminological
difference, and prefer to call her appositives as non-restrictives since appositives are usually treated syntac-
tically as nominal modiﬁcation. These could, of course, also be analyzed as reduced relatives in which the
relative clause has a nominal predicate. Here, we do not consider there to be any syntactic or functional
difference between appositives and non-restrictives.
115is a subordinate clause at D-structure: it is base-generated adjoined to its antecedent. How-
ever, followingMCH, she assumes that anon-restrictiveis interpreted at LF(Logical Form)
as anindependent clausewhichfollowsthematrixclause. AtLF, thenon-restrictiveislifted
out of the matrix clause, in which it was embedded at S-structure, and then adjoined to the
latter.
Demirdache (1991) also treats the anaphoric relationship between the relative pronoun
in the non-restrictiveand its antecedent on a par with the anaphoric relationship established
across discourse between a pronoun and its antecedent in a separate clause. However, she
points out that the anaphoric nature of the relative pronoun does not imply that it estab-
lishes the same kind of anaphoric connections as pronouns that occur across two separate
assertions. This distinction that she makes is based on the treatment of non-restrictives as
auxiliary assertions (Jackendoff, 1977). She argues that this is because, given two separate
assertions, realized syntactically as two distinct sentences in discourse, a pronoun in the
second sentence could cospecify some constituent in the ﬁrst sentence, but need not (117).
In contrast, the relative pronoun in a non-restrictive must necessarily cospecify some con-
stituent in the main clause (118), in particular, the constituent that it modiﬁes syntactically.
In other words, while the non-restrictive is interpreted as an independent clause, it is still
more closely tied to its preceding clause than a truly independent sentence in discourse is.
(117) John
￿ saw a man
￿ . He
￿
￿
’
￿
￿
‘
’
9
￿ is tall.
(118) John
￿ saw a man
￿ , who
a
￿
￿
’
￿
￿
‘
’
a
￿ is tall.
For now, we leave the discussion of the syntactic approaches towards the treatment of
non-restrictives as independent clauses. We will return to it after we present our analysis
of relative clauses, Section 4.3.3.
1164.3.2 Resumptive Pronouns and Relative Clauses
Non-restrictive relative clauses with both deﬁnite and indeﬁnite heads are traditionally dis-
tinguished from restrictive relative clauses syntactically (with punctuation or with the lex-
ical distinction between which and that). This has led to the treatment of relative clauses
not marked in this way as restrictive relatives. However, Prince (1990) shows that relative
clauses headed by an indeﬁnite that pattern syntactically like restrictives, actually behave
discoursally likenon-restrictives, and she argues that indeﬁnite head relativeclauses should
be classiﬁed with the non-restrictives rather than with the deﬁnite restrictives.
The argument made by Prince (1990) for the above classiﬁcation comes from facts
about the occurrence of “resumptive pronouns” in English and Yiddish. She points out that
the standard treatment of resumptives is that they are used when the speaker has started
uttering a sentence that is ungrammatical due to an extraction violation and attempts to
salvage the sentence by using a pronoun in the illegally extracted site. Thus, resumptives
have been shown (Langendoen, 1970; Kroch, 1981) to occur in island environments (Ross,
1967), such as indirect questions (119), left branching constructions (120) as well as rel-
ative clauses (121. (Examples are from Prince (1990)). In this sense, the appearance of
resumptives has been given a processing explanation.
(119) There are always guests who I am curious about what they are going to say.
(120) The only one we could see her ﬁgure was Number 2.
(121) That asshole X, who I loathe and despise the ground he walks on, pointed out that
...
However, Prince shows with examples from the same corpus from the which the island
violation resumptives were taken that resumptives can in fact occur even in environments
where there is no extraction violation. This is shown in her examples (122-124).
117(122) They were just towed across the Midway onto the bridle path, where they were just
sitting there peacefully.
(123) That’s a suggestion of yours which I followed, which I didn’t even want to do that.
(124) I have a friend who she does all the platters.
A corpus study done by Prince (1990) on the distribution of resumptives in relative
clauses in English and Yiddish shows that the resumptive pronouns in non-island environ-
ments occur mostly in either non-restrictivesor else in restrictiveswithindeﬁnite heads. No
such correlation, however, is found with the resumptives in the island environments. Prince
explains this observed distribution in terms of the ﬁle card account of the interpretation of
deﬁnites and indeﬁnites given by Heim (1982), arguing that
￿ for the indeﬁnite restrictives, the head introduces or evokes a ﬁle card into the dis-
course model and that the relative clause merely adds a property to this card,
￿ for the non-restrictives, the head alone pulls out or activates the card in the discourse
model to which again, the relative clause adds a property, and ﬁnally,
￿ for the deﬁnite restrictives, the card can only be pulled out after the entire NP (with
the relative clause) has been processed.
Giventhis difference, she argues that, viewed from the point of the state of the discourse
model, resumptives then seem to act like discourse anaphors. That is, they can be used
only when the ﬁle card which these resumptives evoke has been activated (either by ﬁrst
mention or repeated mention) and that with respect to relative clauses, this can happen only
in indeﬁnite restrictives and non-restrictives; they are infelicitous in the case of deﬁnite
restrictives because the ﬁle card cannot be activated until the end of the NP is reached and
therefore the resumptive occurring inside the NP modifying restrictive relative has nothing
to refer to.
118The examples (125) and (126) illustrate the difference between indeﬁnite head relatives
and deﬁnite head relatives in the following way: in the indeﬁnite head restrictive in (125),
the head a man alone introduces a new ﬁle card into the discourse model, corresponding to
“man”. That is, by the time the relative clause modifying the head a man is encountered,
the ﬁle card already exists in the model. The link between the ﬁle card activated by the
mention of “Mary” inside the relative clause and the “man” ﬁle card is established as a new
link.
(125) ... a man [ who loves Mary ] ...
(126) ... the man [ who loves Mary ] ...
In the case of the deﬁnite restrictive in (126), the card is not activated until the end of
the NP is reached. That is, the card is not activated before the relative clause has been
processed. When this happens, the card that is activated already has the property of loving
Mary on it (with a possible old link to some other card).
Prince also captures this asymmetry structurally. In the case of the deﬁnite restrictives,
the relative clause is a complement at the level of the head noun (excluding determiners)
whereas for the indeﬁnites, the relative clause adjoins to the complete NP projection. One
of the things that is explained by allowing these two structures is the unavailability of
resumptive pronouns in deﬁnite restrictives. Since the resumptive pronouns (excluding the
ones that arise due to island violations or due to processing factors) are discourse pronouns,
they need to look at an evoked ﬁle card to get a reference, and in the case of deﬁnites, the
structure predicts the infelicity of the resumptive because there is no ﬁle card evoked until
the end of the relative clause, and therefore a resumptive within the relative cannot refer.
On the other hand, in the case of the indeﬁnite, the ﬁle card gets pulled up or evoked as
soon as the indeﬁnite noun phrase is encountered, and therefore the resumptive can pick its
119reference easily.6
To summarize, there are two key aspects of the analysis of resumptives in Prince (1990)
thatarerelevantfortheutterancestatus ofrelativeclauses. First, theoccurrence of the(non-
island) resumptive pronouns in non-restrictives as well as indeﬁnite head restrictives calls
for, as Prince also argues, a grouping together of the two types and considering this group
as behaving differently from the deﬁnite head restrictives. Second, the discourse status of
the resumptives pronouns occurring in the non-island environments calls for a segmenting
of such relative clause-containing sentences so that the resumptive discourse pronouns can
be resolved like other discourse pronouns. However, recall that we said in the previous
section that non-restrictives are auxiliary assertions that, while interpreted as independent
clauses, are closely tied to the clause to which they are syntactically attached.
In the next section, we provide support from discourse anaphoric evidence for the
grouping of the non-restrictives with the indeﬁnite head restrictives. Also, with regard to
the treatment of this group as independent utterances at the discourse level, we provide fur-
ther evidence for this, but in addition argue that what Jackendoff (1977) and Demirdache
(1991) are calling “auxiliary assertions” are, at the discourse level, embedded utterances
within the discourse segment.
6Further support for Prince’s proposal for distinguishing indeﬁnite head restrictives from deﬁnite head
restrictives comes from facts about extraposition in relative clauses. As Manninen (2002) points out, extra-
position of restrictive relative clauses is usually grammatical only when the nominal head is indeﬁnite:
(1) a. A letter arrived yesterday which was addressed to Mary.
b. ?? The letter arrived yesterday which was addressed to Mary.
(2) a. A handsome man walked into the room who looked like Ewan McGregor.
b. ?? The handsome man walked into the room who looked like Ewan McGregor.
1204.3.3 Anaphoric Evidence from Discourse
In the previous sections, we presented independent evidence from related work on relative
clauses which suggests that non-restrictives should be treated as independent utterances for
interpretation. Also of interest were facts about the occurrence of resumptive pronouns
in certain kinds of relative clauses, in particular, in non-restrictives and indeﬁnite head
restrictives, which suggest that these types should be treated as forming a class distinct
from the deﬁnite head restrictives. In this section, we present data from naturally occurring
discourses that provide further evidence for making a distinction between the two afore-
mentioned relative clause types, and furthermore, for treating one of the classes, namely,
the class comprising non-restrictives and indeﬁnite head restrictives, as forming an inde-
pendent utterances for interpretation. Our evidence comes from the patterns of anaphoric
reference across adjacent sentences, the ﬁrst of which contains a relative clause, and the
second of which contains a referring expression cospecifying with some expression in the
previous complex sentence.
Grice Again
A robust assumption in Centering theory is a Gricean constraint on referring expression
forms that was formulated in Chapter 2. In the same chapter, we showed at length how the
constraint, when combined with the Centering principles, allows us to explicitly formulate
an algorithm to predict referring expression form choices within the scope of the Centering
transitions. Here, we use a summarized version of the algorithm to study referring expres-
sion forms in relative clauses and to arrive at conclusions about their utterance status. The
summarized algorithm is given as a constraint below:
￿ CR-CM Constraint:
The maximally salient entity in U
￿ is expected to be the Backward-looking Center
121in U
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and is also expected to be pronominalized, unless additional inferences are
intended to be conveyed by the referring expression. Furthermore, provided there is
grammatical and sortal compatibility, speakers are expected to use pronouns for less
salient entities only if there is “reasonable” structural or inferential evidence in the
utterance to allow the hearer to make the necessary alternative inferences.
We looked at several examples in Chapter 2 which showed that the above constraint
is truly satisﬁed in natural language discourses. We present an example here to reiterate
our point. (127b) instantiates a CONTINUE transition, with “Mackintosh” as the Preferred
Center. In addition, another competing entity is also realized in this utterance, namely,
“Manuma”. (127c) realizes only the Non-preferred Center (the less salient entity). As
a result, based on the constraint above, the speaker is obliged to use a descriptive noun
phrase, which is what we see with the use of the proper name in (127c). If a pronoun
had been used, the hearer would interpret it incorrectly, i.e., as referring to the maximally
salient entity, “Mackintosh”. Note that no inference would be easily available if a pronoun
were used. “Mackintosh” has been portrayed as acting very shifty and uncomfortable in
the previous utterances in the segment, and he could have been equally likely to take the
medicines and skip the scene.
(127) a. He
￿ did not know what it was that made it impossible for him
￿ to look at the
Kanaka
￿ . (He = Mackintosh; Kanaka = Manuma)
[C
￿ = Mackintosh (He
￿ ); C
￿ = Mackintosh]
b. While he
￿ was speaking to him
￿ , he
￿ kept his
￿ eyes on his
￿ shoulder.
[C
￿ = Mackintosh (he
￿ ); C
￿ = Mackintosh; Tr = CONTINUE]
c. Manuma
￿ took the medicine and slunk out of the gate.
[C
￿ = Manuma; C
￿ = Manuma; Tr = SMOOTH-SHIFT]
Somerset Maugham; “Mackintosh”
122The above example shows that, in the absence of any structural or (sufﬁcient) inferen-
tial evidence to the contrary, speakers use descriptive noun phrases to refer to less salient
entities. Furthermore, speakers use pronouns to refer to the maximally salient entities just
in case they did not intend to convey any additional inferences to the hearer. If the CR-CM
constraint is not respected, then we might have reason to believe that one or more parame-
ters in Centering may need to be changed in order to account for the facts. We believe that
one of the results that the application of the constraint yields for us is the determination of
the utterance status of different types of relative clauses.
Non-restrictives and Indeﬁnite-head Restrictives
The naturally occurring examples provided this section present evidence to show that we
cannot maintain the assumption about indeﬁnite restrictives and non-restrictives being part
of the main clause utterance unit.
Consider for example the discourse in (128). In (128b), the speaker continues to talk
about “Moses Herzog” from (a) and realizes him as the maximally salient entity, i.e., in
the Preferred Center position. Now (128b) contains an indeﬁnite restrictive relative clause,
which modiﬁes the lower ranked entity in the main clause, namely, “Simkin”. In (128c),
we see that the speaker uses a pronoun (He) to refer to “Simkin”. Based on the CR-CM
constraint formulated above, the use of the pronoun in (128c) is hard to explain if we take
“Simkin” tobe lowerranked than “Moses” followingthe assumption thatthe relativeclause
unit is part of the main clause unit. Furthermore, note that the relative is embedded deep in
the clause, under a man, and is thus, structurally very low in its salience.
(128) a. A fellow like Moses Herzog
￿ , a little soft headed or impractical but ambitious
mentally, somewhat arrogant, too, a pampered, futile fellow whose wife had
just been taken away from him under very funny circumstances ....
123b. This Moses
￿ was irresistible to [ a man [ like Simkin
￿ [ who loved to pity and
to poke fun at the same time ]]].
c. He
￿ was a reality-instructor.
Saul Bellow; “Herzog”
The examples (129) and (130) show a similar pattern. In (129a), the lower ranked
entity, “Mithridates”, is the entity whose expression is modiﬁed by the relative clause, and
utterance (129b) showsthis lowerranked entity being referred to with apronoun. Similarly,
(130b) realizes the lower ranked entity “Hiram Shpitalnik” with a pronoun, and in (129a),
the expression realizing this entity is modiﬁed by the non-restrictive relative clause.
(129) a. He
￿ thought awhile of [ Mithridates
￿ , [ whose system learned to thrive on
poison]]. (He
￿ = Herzog)
b. He
￿ cheated his assassins, who made the mistake of using small doses, and was
pickled, not destroyed.
Saul Bellow; “Herzog”
(130) a. At last he
￿ went to see [ Hiram Shpitalnik
￿ , [ who was an old old old man,
very tiny, with a long beard down to his feet]]. (he
￿ = the boy)
b. He
￿ lived in a hatbox.
Saul Bellow; “Herzog”
Note that in both of the above examples (129) and (130), a pronoun is used in the (a)
utterances for the maximally salient entity and not for any other entity, so that the Preferred
Centers are also the Backward-looking Centers of their utterances. Both of these factors
should have obliged the speaker a descriptive noun phrase to refer to the lower ranked
entity. But this is not what is in fact observed.
(131b) contains a reduced non-restrictive relative modifying the lowest ranked entity
“the vicar’s predecessor”, who is introduced in the discourse segment as a discourse-new
124entity. Two other discourse-old entities mentioned in the sentence are higher ranked than
this newly introduced entity, namely, “Albert Edward” and “the vicar” his
￿ (which is also
the backward-looking center of the utterance). The use of a pronoun in (131c) to refer to
“the vicar’s predecessor” shows that reduced relatives are also like the non-reduced non-
restrictives we saw above. Not only is the pronoun in (131c) not the Preferred Center of
the previous utterance (131b), it is also lower ranked than the Backward-looking Center of
(131b).
(131) a. The vicar
￿ had been but recently appointed, a red-faced energetic man in the
early forties,
b. and Albert Edward
￿ still regretted [ his
￿ [ predecessor
￿ , [ a clergyman of the
old school who preached leisurely sermons in a silvery voice and dined out a
great deal with his more aristocratic parishioners. ]]]
c. He
￿ liked things in church to be just so, but he never fussed;
Somerset Maugham; “The Verger”
(132) provides support for the Prince’s (1990) argument that indeﬁnite restrictives be-
have similarly to non-restrictives. In (132b), the speaker continues to talk about “Walker”
from (132a), and realizes him as the maximally salient entity, i.e., in the Preferred Cen-
ter position of the utterance. Now (132b) contains an indeﬁnite restrictive relative clause,
realizing the entity “Mackintosh” inside this relative clause. (Note that “Mackintosh” is
not realized in (132a).) In (132c), we see that the speaker uses a pronoun (He) to refer to
“Mackintosh”.
(132) a. ...but Walker
￿ had a gift of repartee, coarse and obvious, which gave him an
advantage.
b. His
￿ loudvoice, his
￿ bellowoflaughterwere[weapons[againstwhichMackintosh
￿
had nothing to counter ]].
125c. He
￿ learned that the wisest thing was never to betray his situation.
Somerset Maugham; “Mackintosh”
Theaboveexamplesallcontaincasesofperipheralnon-restrictiveclauses. Theexample
below, (133), shows that even center-embedded non-restrictives exhibit the same effect.
“George Hoberly”, the lowerranked entity of (133a), is modiﬁed by the appositiveand then
referred to with a pronoun in (133b).7 In addition, the example illustrates that including the
relative clause unit in the main clause unit will also lead to a Rule 1 violation, as shown by
the use of a proper name to refer to the Preferred Center of (133a).
(133) a. Herzog
￿ had several times seen [ George Hoberly
￿ , [ Ramona’s friend before
him]], following him with his eyes from one or another of these doorways.
b. He
￿ was thin, tall, younger than Herzog
￿ , correctly dressed in Ivy League
Madison Avenue clothes, dark glasses on his lean, sad face.
Saul Bellow; “Herzog”
All of the above examples show that the observed patterns of pronoun use cannot be
explained, assuming the validity of the Gricean and Centering-based CR-CM constraint.
The examples have demonstrated that the entity or entities realized in the non-restrictives
and indeﬁnite head restrictivesare somehoware more salient than the other entities realized
in the main clause of the sentence. The ﬁrst hypothesis that we could put forth to explain
these patterns of reference is that these relative clauses make the elaborated entity more
salient in the utterance than others. This would further the idea that all embedded clauses
are part of the clause in which they occur. It would also be consistent with approaches sug-
gested for other types of constructions where the structural determinants of salience, such
as grammatical function, are overridden by other factors such as empathy, certain thematic
roles, etc. However, while this account may seem appealing, it does not account for all
7We are treating appositives on a par with non-restrictive relatives.
126the facts. The counter-argument comes from examples like (132). In this example, the en-
tity “Mackintosh” that the speaker refers to with a pronoun in (132c) is not the elaborated
entity in (132b). That is, the nominal expression used to realize “Mackintosh” is not the
noun that the relative clause modiﬁes. The modiﬁed noun in fact realizes another entity,
“weapons”, and furthermore, “Mackintosh” is not realized in the main clause at all. It is not
clear how we could explain that entities that are realized in these types of relative clauses
but are also not at the same time realized in the main clause somehow become maximally
salient in the sentence. We instead propose that a more plausible account is provided by an
approach that treats such relative clauses as forming independent utterance units that then
deﬁne their own ordering on the centering update unit that is used to interpret pronouns in
the subsequent utterance.
Example (134) provides further evidence that the sentence-based approach for com-
plex sentences containing non-restrictive relatives (and also indeﬁnite restrictives) should
be rejected in favor of a clause-based approach. The example shows that when the speaker
does wish to continue to talk about an entity in the main clause rather than an entity in-
side the non-restrictive, such as when Edward in (134a) is continued as the topic in (134b),
the speaker uses a non-pronominal – in this case, a proper name. (Note that we are as-
suming that the relative clause modiﬁes “something” in the main clause and that the entity
“Edward” is not realized in the relative clause.)
(134) a. There was [ something in Edward’s
￿ tone [ that made Bateman
￿ look up
quickly ]].
b. But Edward’s
￿ eyes were grave and unsmiling.
Somerset Maugham; “The Fall of Edward Bernard”
Of course, we did ﬁnd cases in which a pronoun was used to refer to an entity that
was realized in the main clause of the previous sentence even when a non-restrictive (or an
indeﬁnite restrictive) occurred in the sentence. However, such cases involve the presence
127of additional inferential or structural evidence that occurs in the utterance in which the
pronoun is used, and this provides the hearer with the resources needed to interpret the
pronoun appropriately. In addition, there are also examples in which a full noun phrase is
used to refer to the entity that is realized in the non-restrictive. But, again, these are cases
where the speaker intends to make additional inferences that would not be obtainable with
a pronoun alone. The ﬁrst kind of case is seen in the discourse in (135). The pronoun in
(135c) is used to realize “Herzog”, which is realized in the main clause, and this is contrary
to the pattern seen in (134) following which we claimed that a non-pronominal form should
be used in such cases. However, a closer look at the example shows that the speaker has
used a clause-initial participial adjunct, that is, Reaching the corridor, which provides the
hearer the source for the interpretation of the pronoun. The previous utterances (135a)
and (135b) are talking about “Herzog” walking in some direction, and thus the participial,
which can only be interpreted with the (pronominal) subject of the sentence, steers the
hearer away from “the judge” as the most likely interpretation of the pronoun.
(135) a. When the witness stood, Herzog
￿ stood up, too. He
￿ had to move, he
￿ had to
go. ...He
￿ walked heavily and quickly.
b. Turning once in the aisle, he
￿ saw only the lean gray head of [ the judge
￿ , [
whose lips silently moved as he read one of his documents]].
c. Reaching the corridor, he
￿ said to himself, “Oh my God!” and in trying to
speak discovered an acrid ﬂuid in his mouth that had to be swallowed.
Saul Bellow; “Herzog”
The second case discussed above can be seen in (136) and (137). In (136), a proper
name is used to refer to “Elias” which is realized as the only entity in the peripheral non-
restrictive in the previous sentence (136b). This is contrary to the expectation that we have
argued for above. However, we claim that the syntactic construction used by the speaker
128to convey the intended meaning/inference is not (syntactically) compatible with a pronoun,
as the marginal example in (136) shows.
(136) a. In it
￿ he
￿ looked like [ his cousin Elias Herzog
" , [ the ﬂour salesman who had
covered the northern Indian territory for General Mills back in the twenties]].
b. Elias
" with his earnest Americanized clean-shaven face ate hard-boiled eggs
and drank prohibition beer – home-brewed Polish piva.
c. ?? He
" with his earnest Americanized clean-shaven face ate hard-boiled eggs
and drank prohibition beer – home-brewed Polish piva.
Saul Bellow; “Herzog”
(137) also shows the use of a proper name to refer to the lower ranked entity, “a stoutish
gentleman”, modiﬁed by a non-restrictive reduced relative. This counterexample is ex-
plained by the fact that the writer has introduced the gentleman in question for the ﬁrst
time, and intends to inform the hearer of the name of this gentleman before continuing to
talk about him – hence, the use of the proper name to convey this additional information to
the reader.
(137) a. Longmore
￿ beheld in the fading light [ a stoutish gentleman
￿ , [ on the fair
side of forty, in a high light hat, whose countenance, indistinct against the sky,
was adorned by a fantastically pointed moustache]].
b. M. de Mauves
￿ saluted his wife with punctilious gallantry, and having bowed
to Longmore
￿ , asked her several questions in French.
Henry James; “Madame De Mauves”
So far we have established that non-restrictive and indeﬁnite restrictive relative clauses
should be treated as creating a separate utterance unit if we are to account for the facts
about the use of referring expressions in subsequent utterances. However, this still leaves
open the question about whether there is any hierarchical structure created by such clauses,
129that is, whether these clauses form independent units at the same level of embedding as the
main clause or whether they form an embedded unit. While there is no strong evidence
with which we can provide a deﬁnitive answer to this question, we believe that such rel-
ative clauses form embedded utterance units. Functionally, the types of relative clauses
considered above provide further information about some particular entity in the sentence
but this information has the quality of being parenthetical in that it temporarily diverts the
hearer’s attention from the main topic of the discourse (segment). In this sense, these rela-
tive clauses introduce subordinated topics which the speaker can talk about for a while in
the segment before switching back to the main topic. This can be seen in the discourse in
(138) which is an extension of (131). The speaker, after taking about “the vicar’s prede-
cessor” (the subordinated topic) in the relative clause in (b) and (c) and (d), switches back
to talking about “Albert Edward”, the immediately previous most salient entity before the
embedded segment.8
(138) a. The vicar
￿ had been but recently appointed, a red-faced energetic man in the
early forties,
b. and Albert Edward
￿ still regretted [ his
￿ [ predecessor
￿ , [ a clergyman of the
old school who preached leisurely sermons in a silvery voice and dined out a
great deal with his more aristocratic parishioners. ]]]
c. He
￿ liked things in church to be just so, but he never fussed;
d. he
￿ was not like this new man who wanted to have his ﬁnger in every pie.
e. But Albert Edward
￿ was tolerant.
Somerset Maugham; “The Verger”
8Though it cannot count as strong evidence for the embedding created by the relative clause, the discourse
in (138) (as also the discourse in (134) shows that the embedded structure of the discourse is made evident
by the use of a non-pronominal to switch back to the last most maximally salient entity after the embedded
segment is complete.
130In treating the non-restrictives and indeﬁnite head restrictives as creating an embedded
segment and introducing a subordinated topic, we are also able to explain the syntactic
analysis of Demirdache (1991) and the analysis of the resumptives in Prince (1990). What
Demirdache and others have called “auxiliary assertions” for interpretation at LF consti-
tutes the “embedded discourse segment” in our approach. The formation of the embedded
segment is signaled by syntactic cues such as relative pronouns which also serve to point
out the entity about which the auxiliary assertion is being made.
Our approach also provides force to the ﬁndings and conclusions made in Prince (1990)
with respect to the occurrence of resumptives in these clause types. Since non-restrictives
and indeﬁnite restrictives form independent utterances (albeit embedded), the speaker is
free to generate a pronoun in the syntactically empty position.
Restrictive Relative Clauses
The patterns of anaphoric reference seen in restrictive relative clauses are very different
from what we saw above with the non-restrictives and the indeﬁnite restrictives. First, a
pronoun used after a sentence containing a restrictive relative clause tends to be used for
referring to an entity evoked in the main clause rather than one evoked in the restrictive
relative clause. Furthermore, there is also a dispreference for using a pronoun for referring
to an entity evoked by the head of the nominal that is modiﬁed by the relative clause, in
case there is a competing entity that is more salient in the clause than the modiﬁed noun.
The example in (139) shows the ﬁrst kind of pattern:
(139) a. ...but also for his upright character, he was arrested one day on a charge of
fraud.
b. and [ the dishonesty
￿ [ which the trial
￿ brought to light ]] was not of the sort
which could be explained by a sudden temptation.
131c. It
￿ was deliberate and systematic.
Saul Bellow; “Herzog”
Functionally, we can explain the patterns seen in restrictive relative clauses in the fol-
lowing way. Restrictive relative clauses are used for identifying the referent of the head
noun which they modify. Unlike the non-restrictives or indeﬁnite restrictives, they do not
provide further information about some entity that has already been evoked by some ex-
pression in the sentence. In fact, their purpose is precisely to enable the hearer to evoke
the relevant entity intended by the speaker. In this sense, then, it is understandable that
restrictive relative clauses could not create an independent utterance unit. In particular, in
terms of the notion of subordinated topics that we introduced above, restrictives do not
introduce a topic (new or subordinate) and therefore do not create an independent utterance
unit. They should therefore be considered as part of the unit created by the main clause in
which they occur.
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have addressed the problem of delimiting the utterance unit for dis-
course processing. For the application of the Centering principles as well as of the CR-CM
constraint formulated in this dissertation, different ways of deﬁning the utterance will yield
different results.
While dealing with all types of complex sentences is beyond the scope of this disserta-
tion, we have provided an analysis of complex sentences containing relatives clauses. With
supporting evidence and arguments from related research on relative clauses, both from a
syntactic point of view as well as from the discourse point of view, we have argued that rel-
ative clauses should be distinguished into two classes, one comprising the non-restrictives
and indeﬁnite head restrictives, the other comprising the deﬁnite head restrictives. Our ev-
132idence consisted of naturally occurring instances of adjacent utterances in which the ﬁrst
constitutedacomplexsentence containingarelativeclause, and thenextsentence contained
a referring expression (pronoun as well as deﬁnite description) that referred to some entity
evoked in the previous sentence. We observedthat, in the case of non-restrictivesand indef-
inite head restrictives, the form used by speakers to refer to an entity in the relative clause
was a typically a pronoun, whereas the form used to refer to an entity in the main clause
was typically a full noun phrase. We argued that this could not be explained by the idea that
a noun phrase of the main clause becomes more salient when it is modiﬁed by one of these
relative clause types, and that a more plausible explanation is provided by our approach in
which such relative clauses create an embedded discourse segment, introducing what we
call “subordinated topics”. We also showed that our approach was consistent with other
treatments of such types of relative clauses, and in particular, it provided additional force
to (a) the syntactic analysis of non-restrictive relative clauses where the non-restrictive is
raised out at LF and adjoined and interpreted as an independent clause, and (b) to the treat-
ment of resumptive pronouns in both non-restrictives and indeﬁnite head restrictives as
discourse pronouns.
With respect to deﬁnite head restrictives, we observed the opposite pattern of anaphoric
reference from the above. We argued that these restrictives do not form an independent
utterance and therefore should be treated as part of the main clause unit.
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Conclusions
Our primary goal in this thesis was to make a contribution towards the generation of
referring expressions in Hindi. Beginning with the work of Grosz (1977) and Sidner
(1979), it has been recognized that anaphoric usage and interpretation in discourse is sig-
niﬁcantly constrained by the way entities (Karttunen, 1976; Webber, 1978) in the evolving
model of discourse are structured, both at the local and at the global level (Grosz, 1977;
Grosz & Sidner, 1986). This structural organization of the discourse entities is argued to
be a reﬂection of, among other things, their salience status, which an anaphoric generator
or interpreter makes crucial reference to in order to ﬁnd the co-speciﬁers (in the sense of
Sidner (1979)) of anaphoric elements. This same assumption is made in Centering theory
(Grosz et al., 1995), in which the relative salience of discourse entities is claimed to im-
pose constraints on the form of referring expressions to the extent of affecting the local
coherence (or the processing complexity) of the discourse.
In Chapter 2, we started by discussing the limitations of Centering theory in terms of
providing an explanation for a wide range of alternations in the use of referring expression
forms, and we pointed out that the only constraint Centering theory explicitly formulates
is given in the encoding of Rule 1, which can only be applied to a restricted set of cases.
134The goal of this chapter was to explicitly specify constraints on the generation of referring
expressions. These constraints borrowed ideas only implicitly stated in Centering theory
and also ideas relating to Gricean principles of interpretation (Grice, 1975). In doing this,
we were interested in showing that these constraints can be applied to understanding and
modeling referring expression phenomena in a wide variety of cases.
In Chapter 3, we presented a study of referring expressions in Hindi. Languages have
been shown to vary with respect to the constraints that govern the use of referring expres-
sions, and one of the sources of variation lies in the different means that languages have at
their disposal for the marking of discourse salience. In other words, we need to determine
how to rank the forward-looking centers list of an utterance at any given point of the dis-
course. Centering constraints, as well as the generation constraints that we formulated in
Chapter 2 can only be applied to a language after this language-speciﬁc parameter has been
set. To this end, in this chapter we ﬁrst presented a corpus-based language-independent
methodology to identify linguistic factors that determine relative salience. The methodol-
ogy exploited a speciﬁc formulation of Rule 1 of Centering without being circular in its
application. We then applied this method to a Hindi corpus and investigated the effect of
three factors on discourse salience: grammatical role, word order, and information status.
The results of our study showed that Hindi, despite being a free-word order language does
not display any effect of word order on discourse salience. In free word order languages
like German, word order has been argued to have an effect on salience (Rambow, 1993).
Our results thus bring out a signiﬁcant contrast between Hindi and German, in that it calls
for viewing scrambling or other word order phenomena across the two languages differ-
ently, at least to the extent that the same syntactic form does not necessarily map onto the
same discourse function in the two languages. Information status has also been argued,
most notably in Strube (1998), to affect discourse salience. The initial results in Strube
(1998) were based on evidence from German, and information status was later extended to
135be a universal factor. However, results from our Hindi corpus show that the information
status of discourse entities does not exhibit any salience-affecting characteristics, suggest-
ing a reassessment of the universality claim with respect to information status. For Hindi,
then, grammatical role emerges as the most signiﬁcant factor.
In the same chapter, following the results obtained from the application of the method-
ology above, we use grammatical role as the primary ranking criterion to provide an anal-
ysis of the use of zero pronouns in Hindi. Contrary to earlier proposals, we argue that the
constraints on the use of zeros in Hindi are neither syntactic (Kameyama, 1985), nor can
they be explained purely in terms of the singular notion of the topic, especially one that
is deﬁned syntactically (Butt & King, 1997). Our study is conducted within the Centering
framework, using the Hindi speciﬁc ranking results, and the analysis is provided in terms
of Centering Transition preferences. We show that pronouns can be dropped in Hindi only
when they occur in an utterance following a CONTINUE or a SMOOTH-SHIFT Transition,
when they are coreferential with the preceding Preferred Center. We also formulate a Zero
Pronoun Rule that must be used in tandem with the rules for overt pronoun interpretation
or generation in Hindi.
With respect to the corpus analysis to identify the linguistic determinants of salience,
one of the ﬁrst issues we faced was that of specifying the utterance unit for local discourse
processing. In the model of discourse interpretation that is assumed here, discourses are
composed of utterances and discourse entities are added to the discourse representation
when the utterance they are part of is syntactically and semantically processed. The ques-
tion then is, what constitutes the utterance? Is it the sentence, or some smaller unit like the
tensed clause? Is the representation of the utterances in the discourse model hierarchical?
If so, what determines the hierarchical discourse representation of the ongoing discourse?
These are issues that have been explored extensively in previous research. However, there
is no consensus yet reached. In order to continue with the work presented in this the-
136sis, however, we adopted what we believed to be the correct results from the literature,
with different assumptions coming from different research sources. In Chapter 4, however,
we presented an analysis of the utterance status of complex sentences containing relative
clauses since no extensivework on relative clause containing sentences is available (except
for suggestions made in Kameyama (1998) and Hurewitz (1998)). With respect to relative
clause sentences, we argued that different kinds of relative clauses have different effects on
the hierarchical organization of discourse segments. Nonrestrictive relative clauses form a
distinct but embedded utterance unit, while restrictives are part of the main clause unit in
which they occur. Our data also provided support for the partitioning of the class of restrici-
tive relatives into indeﬁnite head restrictives and deﬁnite head restrictives. The partitioning
was motivated by anaphoric patterns in discourse, which showed that the indeﬁnite head
restrictives behaved like the non-restrictives. Our analysis for relative clauses provides fur-
ther support for the analysis of resumptive pronouns in non-island environments in Prince
(1990) and the syntactic treatment of appositives in Demirdache (1991).
Our ultimate goal is to be able to account for the full range of discourse anaphora in
Hindi, especially on the generation side. However, the domain of analysis for a study of
discourse phenomena is quite large and intricate. We have pointed out at various points in
the dissertation that several aspects of discourse structure and discourse interpretation need
to be modeled before we can even hope to provide a comprehensive account of discourse
anaphoric phenomena. For example, given that we are concerned with anaphoric usage on
an utterance by utterance basis, as would have to be the case if one were working within the
Centering framework, wewouldﬁrst needto determinehowtosegment complexsentences.
A treatment of the full range of complex sentences, was, however, beyond the scope of
this dissertation. However, this remains an important subject for us in future work. In
addition, in developing a generation algorithm for referring exprssions, we pointed out that
inference was an important component of a generation system. While developing a model
137for inferential reasoning was beyond the scope of this dissertation, we believe that we
have made a signiﬁcant contribution with the generation algorithm, to which the inferential
module need merely be added when it has reached a satisfactory point in its explication.
In teasing out inference from the structural processes in our algorithm, we believe that we
are in agreement with several other approaches to the derivation of meaning, both at the
sentence and the discourse level.
We have several further issues that we are hoping to address in future work. First, we
would like to investigate the discourse functions of word order variation in Hindi in light of
the results in this dissertation, namely that there is no signiﬁcant correlation between word
orderanddiscoursesalience. Theparticularissuewewouldliketopursueisthatgivenword
order variation is commonly seen as a way to bring entities into focus, the absence of the
aforementioned correlation is curious, especially since Centering also purports to deal with
focusing phenomena. One possible solution to this dilemma is that word order variation in
languages like Hindi might be doing something other than the kind of focusing described
in Centering. The second issue we would like to address has to do with the axiomatization
of the Transition sequence occurrences in discourse. In applying the CR-CM algorithm to
natural language English texts, we discovered that there were some Transition sequences
that we could ﬁnd no instances of. We would like to address the idea that certain Transition
sequences are more likely than others in discourse, and attempt to model this as a set
of rules. Centering does propose a ranking of the Transitions, but not of the full scale
of Transitions that we have analyzed in this dissertation. Finally, we hope to do further
work on zero pronouns in Hindi and account for why there were several cases in which the
PreferredCenterin anutterance
)
+
*
￿
￿
-
, wasnotrealizedas azeroina CONTINUE-CONTINUE
and SMOOTH-SHIFT-CONTINUE Transition sequence. These cases suggest to us that the
constraints for generating zeros in Hindi might be more strict than has appeared to us so
far.
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